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Intent and Incoherence
Sheila Foster"
In this Article, Professor Sheila Foster dissects the intent standard in equal protection
jurisprudence, filtering it through the lens of democratic process theory. Most legal scholars
and commentators writing in this area continuously restate, and critique, the "rule" of intent as
a uniform standard in constitutional law. However, it is clear from the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence (and that of the lower federal courts) that different levels of consciousness can
satisfy the discriminatory intent standard, and hence violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Exactly what explains these disparate, and seemingly incoherent, levels of intent is the subject of
this Article. Professor Foster identifies a set of criteria that explains the application of these
different levels of intent, using democratic process theory and its offspring, motive review theory.
She then sets out to "cohere" the intent doctrine according to democratic process principles. As
her analysis demonstrates, conceptualizing the different levels of intent along a continuum
according to democratic process principles provides a coherent account of the intent doctrine.
Moreover, the account of the intent doctrine offered in the Article also provides aframework in
which to assess the Court's fidelity to its normative and doctrinal commitments. Using this
framework, Professor Foster identifies two areas-administration offacially neutral laws and
legislative redistricting-where judicial review raises problematic questions about the Court's
fidelity to its commitments. Both areas illustrate a new type of incoherence in equal protection
jurisprudence: that between the Court's treatment of certain types of incoherence in equal
protection jurispnutence: that between the Court's treatment of certain types of governmental
decisions and the normative justifications underlying such treatment
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I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial posture toward facially racial governmental action
appears to be well settled for now. Any express use of racial criteria is
constitutionally suspect, regardless of the race of those benefited or
burdened by such classification.' What is more complex is the judicial
posture toward governmental decisions that are racially neutral on
their face, but suspected of being racially discriminatory. Our
definitions of race discrimination, and judicial searches for a coherent
1. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1995); City of
Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989).
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concept, seem to be plagued by the tension between "outcome" and
"process" norms of constitutional interpretation. In doctrinal terms,
these norms are expressed as the "impact" standard versus the "intent"
standard.2 On the one hand, discrimination can be solely characterized
by the consequences or effects resulting from an official action or
practice. Thus, it is said that discrimination can be detected by the end
result of an otherwise facially neutral action.3 On the other hand,
discrimination can be determined by what is in the heart and minds of
the decisionmakers. This approach is inward-looking and regards race
discrimination as a psychological phenomenon and hence tries to
identify discrimination by uncovering evidence of illicit motivation.4
After a period of uncertainty between these two extremes, the
United States Supreme Court announced in 1976 that governmental
action would not be deemed racially discriminatory absent evidence of
discriminatory purpose or intent.5 This landmark case, Washington v.
Davis,6 was a watershed in equal protection jurisprudence for the very
2. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Defining Discrimination: Intent v. Impact, 16 NEw
PERSPECrVES 29 (1984) (describing the "nondiscrimination principle").
3. For instance, evidence that the decision has a disproportionately negative impact
on a suspect group, like racial minorities, is said to define the concept of discrimination. See
generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 319 (1987) (noting that "injury of racial
inequality exists irrespective of the decisionmakers' motives"). This outcome-oriented view
of race discrimination is not concerned with a decisionmaker's conscious or unconscious
attitudes, but rather with the injury that the racially disparate result signals to others-for
instance negative cultural messages, see id at 324 (advocating a "cultural meaning" test for
actions that result in racially disproportionate impact that would "evaluate governmental
conduct to determine whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches
racial significance"), or stigma, see, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)
(referring to the harm of racial discrimination as a stigmatic harm, in that it results in
"practically a brand upon them ... an assertion of their inferiority"). See also Paul Brest,
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1976)
[hereinafter Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle] ('The accumulation of suspected but
unproved race-dependent conduct ... may systematically deprive minorities of important
benefits.").
4. This view of race discrimination is said to be rooted in deep-seated and/or
unconscious prejudice that motivates or causes a perpetrator to act in a discriminatory
manner. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TuL. L.
REV. 1407, 1412 (1990) (describing the "perpetrator" perspective, concerned with
"eradicating the behaviors of individuals who have engaged in 'prejudicial' discriminatory
practices"); Lawrence, supra note 3, at 345-49 (describing "process" theorists and the nature
of "unconscious racism").
5. I will use the terms "intent" and "purpose"' interchangeably throughout this
Article, because the Court has used them interchangeably despite their arguably different
meanings. See, e.g., Marjorie J. Weinzweig, Discriminatory Impact and Intent Under the
Equal Protection Clause: The Supreme Court and the Mind-Body Problem, 1 LAw &
INEQUALTY J. 277, 307-08 (1983) (noting the different possible uses of the concept of intent,
some of which may overlap with the concept of purpose).
6. 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
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reason that it repudiated the notion that disparate impact or unequal
outcomes alone would invalidate facially neutral governmental action.
On its face, Davis seems to have settled on a universal standard for
reviewing facially neutral governmental decisions.
However, despite the equal protection doctrine's "universalist
ambitions,"7 the Court's application of the discriminatory intent
requirement has been far from coherent. Though it adopted what has
been described as a "process" norm, the Court in Davis and its
progeny has nevertheless clung to the notion that the outcomes-the
disproportionate effects-of official actions continue to play an
important, and sometimes determinative, role in identifying the
requisite discriminatory intent.9 As Justice Stevens correctly predicted
in his Davis concurrence, "the line between discriminatory purpose
and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite
as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume."10
Indeed, the evidentiary requirements for proving intent do vary widely
over different contexts.11 In some contexts, impact is virtually
irrelevant, as are other objective, circumstantial factors. In other
7. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283,
1313 (1995).
8. The intent standard has been referred to as a "process" standard because it is said
to be focused on legislative inputs, versus their outputs. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring
Principle: On Race, Process and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL L. REv. 935, 950 (1994)
[hereinafter Flagg, Enduring Principle] (analyzing process theorists' view of discrimination
law); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 213, 284 (1991) (noting that the intent standard "directs judicial review towards purging
legislative decisionmaking of certain considerations rather than guarding against particular
substantive outcomes").
9. In Davis, the Court hinted at the possibility of a multifarious intent standard.
Consistent with its pre-Davis equal protection jurisprudence, the Court explained that in
some cases, particularly those involving jury selection, disparate impact evidence alone was
indicative of a discriminatory purpose. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241 ("It is ... clear from the
cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion
of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show intentional
discrimination."' (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945)). In other cases, the
Court implied, much more demanding evidence would be required to prove discriminatory
purpose. See id
10. Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
11. As Justice Stevens explained this variation:
Although it may be proper to use the same language [discriminatory purpose] to
describe the constitutional claim ... the burden of proving a prima facie case may
well involve differing evidentiary considerations. The extent of deference that one
pays to the trial court's determination of the factual issue, and indeed, the extent to
which one characterizes the intent issue as a question of fact or a question of law,
will vary in different contexts.
Id at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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contexts, impact plays a central role in finding a discriminatory
purpose.
Nevertheless, more than evidentiary variation is at stake in the
Court's application of the intent requirement. While courts and
commentators continually restate the "rule" of intent-that
discriminatory purpose is required to invalidate official action under
the Fourteenth Amendment-it is clear that various levels of intent are
accepted and/or required in different contexts.12 The variation in how
much of a role impact has in demonstrating the required intent can be
drastic from context to context. With these varying degrees of
evidentiary demands come varying degrees of consciousness that can
violate the Equal Protection Clause. This consciousness can range
from a specific desire to harm the affected group, to general
knowledge that harm is substantially certain to occur, to an
unconscious bias towards the affected group. The Court has yet to
articulate what considerations or factors drive these different levels of
intent.
Exactly what explains these disparate approaches to intent is the
subject of this Article. I identify a set of criteria that explains the
application of these different levels of intent. As many others have
noted, the intent doctrine reflects the dominance of a very influential
strand of constitutional theory, widely referred to as democratic
"process theory," in adjudicating difficult constitutional interpretation
issues.' 3 The criteria that I identify are linked to various democratic
process considerations that underlie a more specific theory, "motive
review," credited with the Court's adoption of the intent requirement.
My purpose is to show not only how process principles shaped the
adoption of the intent requirement, but also how they continue to
shape its application to different types of governmental activity in
12. See id, (Stevens, J., concurring).
13. Process theory counsels judicial deference towards, and precludes courts from
second-guessing the substance of, decisions made by other governmental actors. See, ag.,
Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 397,
403-04 (describing the Court's "preoccupation" with process-based theories); Flagg,
Enduring Principle, supra note 8, at 936 (describing the "impact of a particular constellation
of process-oriented values on the development of constitutional race discrimination law");
see also Klarman, supra note 8, at 284, 298 (also noting distinction with "political process
theory" that "identifies particular subject matter areas-such as voting rights and race
discrimination-as appropriate for judicial intervention based on the likelihood that the
political process has been subverted, either through franchise restrictions or prejudice
directed against 'discrete and insular minorities"'); Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1299 (noting
the remarkable influence that process theory has had on equal protection jurisprudence);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1980) (noting that the Court measures constitutionality of
decisionmaking processes by its view of democracy and corresponding values).
1070 [Vol. 72:1065
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different contexts. A closer look at the Court's reasoning reveals how
these principles shape, and hence cohere, the jurisprudence of intent.
The difficulty of satisfying the intent standard is directly linked to the
very factors that cohere the Court's jurisprudence. However, by
continuing to perpetuate the "myth"14 of one static intent standard, the
current doctrine both reveals its facial incoherence and conceals the
range of its potential for identifying racial (and other forms of)
discrimination.
To be sure, the intent standard itself has been rightly criticized by
many as an ineffective means to identify racial discrimination." The
intent requirement has also had a deterrent effect on those subjected to
racial discrimination, left by the perceived futility of proving their
claim. 16 Some have gone so far as to suggest that the time has come to
recognize that the judicially created concept of "discrimination" has
outlived its usefulness in the effort to remedy racial (and other forms
of) inequality. 7 On the whole, I concur with these sentiments, and, in
a perfect world, the Court would have heeded'to them. Unfortunately,
it has not. For this reason, I do not want to add myself to the list of
abolitionists of the intent standard. Given the intractable nature of the
intent doctrine in equal protection jurisprudence, it is important to
make clear that the intent requirement is neither as inflexible in its
definitional construction nor as unattainable in its evidentiary
requirements as critics suggest. Instead, I hope to bring to the
forefront certain values that serve as guiding criteria underlying
judicial review in this arena. By unmasking these criteria, I also
provide a basis for judging the Court's adherence to its own normative
commitments. When the Court strays from these commitments, as I
argue that it has in recent cases, the result has been to create an even
14. See Daniel K Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1105 (1989).
15. Some of the main criticism includes: the intent standard ignores the existence of
white race consciousness, see Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blin4 But Now I See": White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 980-81
(1993) [hereinafter Flagg, White Race Consciousness]; it ignores the real cause of racial
discrimination--unconscious racism, see Lawrence, supra note 3, at 322; and the injury of
racial inequality exists irrespective of the decisionmaker's motive; see Theodore Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REv. 36,48-49 (1977); Weinzweig, supra note 5, at 336.
16. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent. Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNEI. L. REv. 1151, 1166 (1991) (concluding
that discrimination victims often decline to file discrimination claims because of the
perceived difficulty of proving discriminatory intent).
17. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV.
117, 117 (1995) (suggesting a need to look beyond the concept of discrimination for other
concepts that can provide better remedies for persistent forms of inequality in the workplace).
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deeper incoherence. This new brand of incoherence not only creates
dissonance with its theory of judicial review, but also results in
doctrinal instability and a retrenchment in the Court's commitment to
racial equality.
In Part I, I trace the incoherence in the development of the intent
doctrine and the requirement and/or acceptance of different levels of
intent throughout its application across various contexts. Specifically,
I argue that there are three levels of intent-specific, general, and
unconscious-that can violate the Equal Protection Clause. In this
Part, I also consider one commentator's explanation for the intent
doctrine's facial incoherence. This explanation posits that the doctrine
can be understood as allocating individual and governmental burdens
of proof, and levels of intent, according to the substantive right at
issue. I conclude that, while the Court is sensitive to the nature of the
right at issue in applying the intent requirement, substantive concerns
are only one part of a larger gestalt approach to judicial review of
facially neutral actions. Substantive concerns must be viewed in
conjunction with institutional process concerns in order to make sense
of the different evidentiary frameworks and the accepted levels of
intent that can invalidate governmental action.
Part 11 articulates the process and substantive criteria that drive
the Court's posture toward various types of facially neutral
governmental action suspected of being discriminatory. Specifically, I
contend that there is a direct link between the judicial concerns
underlying the adoption of the intent requirement and their
corresponding precepts in motive review theory. I also identify the
connection between institutional process considerations underlying
judicial motive review and the Court's sensitivity to particular subject
matter areas-like voting rights. These two strands can be seen as part
of the same tradition, because they both direct judicial review toward
ensuring an unfettered democratic process. In Part II, I reexamine the
Court's application of various levels of intent to different government
actions and substantive contexts in light of the democratic process
considerations articulated in Part II. I argue that the intent doctrine
coheres when viewed through the lens of these institutional process
and substantive concerns.
Part IV then explores two recent areas where the Court has
jeopardized this seeming coherence. The first area is its review of
alleged discriminatory administration of facially neutral laws in
McCleskey v. Kemp. 8 There, the Court refused to scrutinize a claim
18. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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that the Georgia death penalty had been discriminatorily applied to a
black defendant charged with killing a white victim. 9 Faced with
sophisticated and comprehensive statistical evidence demonstrating
racially disparate patterns of death penalty administration, the Court
attempted to distinguish cases in its intent jurisprudence that might
have mandated closer judicial scrutiny of McCleskey's sentence.2' I
argue that the Court's rejection of McCleskey's claim poses troubling
questions about its willingness to adhere to a coherent intent
jurisprudential framework. The second area involves judicial review
of alleged racial gerrymanders resulting in the creation of majority
black voting districts responsible for a substantial increase in the
number of black representatives elected. In 1993, with Shaw v. Reno,21
the Court began to scrutinize these facially neutral redistricting plans
without proof of discriminatory intent on the part of the state
legislatures adopting them. I argue that the criteria to which the Court
has committed itself in reviewing facially neutral legislative decisions,
and the definition of harm that it has embraced before invalidating
those decisions, weigh in favor of far more restraint than the Court
exercises in these cases. In particular, the absence of an "intent"
requirement as a barrier to judicial scrutiny of the legislative process is
conspicuous here, and even more so because of the interests at stake.
In both instances, the Court has potentially created a different
type of incoherence-that between its treatment of certain types of
decisions and the normative justifications underlying such treatment.
This incoherence comes with a high cost to the legitimacy of the Court
and to racial equality. I conclude the Article urging the Court to
adhere to a coherent intent jurisprudence consistent with the
democratic process principles embraced throughout its jurisprudence.
By doing so, I believe that the Court can both be faithful to its
normative commitments and live up to the promise of equal
protection.
II. INTENT AND INCOHERENCE
A. Incoherence from the Beginning
In four cases, the Court set out to change the course of equal
protection doctrine regarding facially neutral governmental action that
has a disparate effect on an identifiable group. Prior to these cases, the
judicial posture toward this class of governmental decisions appeared
19. See id at 295.
20. See id
21. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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uncertain. Specifically, the Court seemed to imply that governmental
actions would be constitutionally problematic by reference to their
outcomes alone.22 However, in Washington v. Davis, the Court
expressed the fear that adjudging the constitutionality of a decision
solely by its outcomes would seriously call into question a host of
official regulations that burdened one group over another.23 Based
partly on this fear, the Court unabashedly rejected the notion that "a
law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of
government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of
another."2 4  In a subsequent case, Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court detailed the type
of evidentiary scheme that a challenger could employ to prove the
requisite discriminatory purpose.25 This scheme relied primarily on
circumstantial and objective evidence of events surrounding the
challenged decision.26 It built upon the Court's mandate in Davis that
intent be determined by "the totality of the circumstances."'27
Despite the Court's move toward a universal standard and
evidentiary scheme, the application of the intent doctrine began to defy
the consistency that seemingly characterized it. The Court in both
Davis and Arlington Heights sent a strong, unmistakable message
expressing the indeterminacy of disparate impact evidence, and the
desire for other circumstantial evidence, in demonstrating
discriminatory intent. However, this framework did not cohere when
applied to various types of governmental decisionmaking. Within two
years after Arlington Heights, the intent doctrine barely resembled the
framework established in that case. In Castaneda v. Partida, the Court
allowed an inference of intent based almost solely on evidence of
disparate impact-contrary to its stated repudiation of the prominence
of such evidence to the core constitutional inquiry.' Shortly
thereafter, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the
22. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); Paul Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP.
Cr. REv. 95, 99 (1971) [hereinafter Brest, Legislative Motive] (describing Palmer as "the
latest addition to one of the most muddled areas of our constitutional jurisprudence").
23. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (rejecting a disproportionate impact test because it
would "raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory and licensing statutes").
24. Id at 242.
25. 429 U.S. 252,266 (1977).
26. See id.
27. Id at 265-66.
28. 430 U.S. 482,497-99 (1977).
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Court settled on a very narrow definition of discriminatory intent.2 9
Under this rendering of intent, evidence of disparate impact is virtually
irrelevant to a finding of intent, as are other objective indicia."
1. Davis and the Totality of the Circumstance
Facing the ambiguity created by its precedents, 31 the Court in
Washington v. Davis acknowledged that these precedents could be
interpreted as extending a disparate impact standard beyond the
statutory context.32  However, it quickly declared that the disparate
impact standard "is not the constitutional rule.' 3 3 In supporting this
conclusion, the Court found in some of its past decisions a requirement
of discriminatory purpose and disavowed those cases that seemingly
contradicted that view.34 It then resolved the facial contradictions of its
precedent by sternly holding that "our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact."'35
Nevertheless, for all its sternness in requiring a showing of
discriminatory intent as a prerequisite for judicial invalidation, the
29. 442 U.S. 256,279 (1976).
30. See id
31. The Court had already held that, as to private sector decisions, the governing
standard of discrimination was outcome-oriented. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court
held that, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, disproportionate racial impact without
discriminatory intent could establish a violation of the statute's prohibition against
employment discrimination. 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Upon a showing of impact, the
Court in Griggs held that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the disputed
employment practice, a test in that case, "bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful
performance of the jobs for which it [is] used." Id. at 431.
32. 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
33. Id
34. The Court found support in the language of its earlier discriminatory legislation
cases such as Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), and Keyes v. School District No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 240 (1973), both of which had predicated judicial scrutiny upon a finding of
discriminatory purpose. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. It disavowed Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217 (1971), as being inconsistent with the other cases and cited Keyes as evidence that
Palmer was not understood "to have changed the prevailing rule." Davis, 426 U.S. at 243.
35. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. The Court reiterated this sentiment a few more times
throughout its opinion. For instance, it stated that "[d]isproportionate impact ... is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution" and
"[s]tanding alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." Id at 242
(citation omitted). Later on, addressing the facts of the case, the Court proclaimed: "[W]e
have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for
employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any person ... equal
protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of [blacks] fail to qualify than
members of other racial or ethnic groups." Id. at 245.
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Court never defined exactly what "discriminatory purpose"
encompassed or exactly how one could prove it. Moreover, the Court
ultimately left a mixed message about the relevance of disparate
impact evidence to this inquiry. Holding that disparate outcomes were
not "irrelevant" to the central constitutional inquiry of intent, the Court
created a wide opening for "inferring" discriminatory intent from the
"totality of the relevant facts. 36 Indeed, it left the impression that
discriminatory purpose could be inferred, in some contexts, solely by
reference to the disproportionate outcomes of a governmental
decision.37
Davis involved a challenge to various District of Columbia
Police Department recruiting policies that were alleged to be racially
discriminatory because of their disparate effects on potential black
police officers.38 The sole issue on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was the Department's adoption of a written personnel
test, "Test 21," developed by the Civil Service Commission, that
excluded a disproportionately high number of blacks.39 The Court had
to decide what weight to assign to the racially disparate results-that
more blacks than whites failed Test 21--considering the facial
neutrality of the test.' Applying its loosely defined requirement of
discriminatory intent, the Court found that Test 21 was not adopted as"a purposeful device to discriminate against [blacks]. '41  To the
contrary, the Court found such an inference impossible in light of "the
affirmative efforts of the ... Police Department to recruit black
officers [and] the changing racial composition of the recruit classes
and of the force in general," as well as "the relationship of the test to
36. l at 242. The Court warned: 'This is not to say that the necessary
discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a
law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of
racial discrimination." Ide at 241.
37. Specifically, it stated:
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact ... that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory
impact-in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate
exclusion of [blacks] from jury venires-may for all practical purposes
demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.
Id. at 242.
38. See id. at 232-33.
39. See id at 235.




the training program." 42 The totality of the Department's actions,
including its recent recruiting, served to defeat any inference of
discriminatory purpose.
2. Arlington Heights and the Objective Evidentiary Scheme
As explained, Davis was less than clear in its delineation of
exactly what type of evidence a challenger needed to produce to
satisfy the discriminatory purpose inquiry. One year after Davis, the
Court seized the occasion to clarify the motive inquiry, and its requisite
proof, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation.43 Arlington Heights paved the way for a
more consistent approach to finding discriminatory purpose, delineating
exactly how a plaintiff could produce evidence of a decisionmaker's
actual motivation behind a particular decision. In doing so, the Court
rendered evidence of disparate impact peripheral to the central
constitutional inquiry and stressed the need to look to other types of
circumstantial evidence.' The evidentiary scheme that the Court
adopted assumed that the relevant mental state would be connected to
objective factors, relying on the historical and social context of the
decision to infer the decisionmaker's intent.45
The Supreme Court began its opinion in Arlington Heights
reaffirming the central holding of Davis, but adding an important
caveat: a discriminatory purpose need only be one of many
motivating factors in adopting the challenged official decision or
practice to invoke heightened judicial scrutiny of the decision.4
Turning to the means by which a challenger can demonstrate a
showing of illicit motive, the Court carefully emphasized that the
outcome of an official action, "whether it 'bears more heavily on one
race than another,"' is only marginally relevant in identifying whether
42. Id The district court found that, in the three or four years prior to the Davis
litigation, 44% of new police force recruits had been black. See id. at 235. Moreover, the
figure "represented the proportion of blacks on the total force and was roughly equivalent to
20- to 29-year-old blacks in the 50-mile radius in which the recruiting efforts of the Police
Department had been concentrated." Id
43. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
44. See id at 265-66.
45. See id at 266-67.
46. See id at 265-66. Nor does it have to be the "dominant" or "primary" motivation
behind an official decision. See i. at 266 ("Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that
the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.").
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discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the decision.47 Such
outcomes provide only "an important starting point." 8
Instead, the Court stressed the need to look beyond evidence of
disparate impact to other evidence that could determine whether the
decisionmakers were actually motivated by bias toward the group in
question.49  The search for a discriminatory purpose, the Court
reasoned, "demands a sensitive inquiry into [all available]
circumstantial and direct evidence."50 Such an inquiry could include
the following factors: (1) the historical background of the decision,
particularly if it reveals a series of actions by the decisionmaker taken
for invidious purposes; (2) the specific sequence of events leading up
to the challenged decision, which may shed light on the
decisionmaker's purposes; (3) departures from the normal procedural
sequence that demonstrate that improper motives played a role in the
decision; (4) substantive departures by the decisionmakers, particularly
if factors usually considered important by the decisionmakers strongly
favor a decision contrary to the one reached; and (5) legislative and
administrative history behind the challenged decision, such as
contemporary statements by decisionmakers. 51
At issue in Arlington Heights was a predominantly white
suburban community's decision to deny a rezoning request to a
developer seeking to build townhouse units for low- and moderate-
income tenants.52 The decision essentially required the Village of
Arlington Heights' Plan Commission to make a policy decision
regarding whether or not to change the zoning status quo in the
village.5 3 The existing policy was to preserve most of the village's
land for single-family homes. After a series of town meetings where
the issue was hotly debated, the village denied the request of the
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) to rezone a
fifteen-parcel area from single-family to multiple-family
classification. This rezoning would have enabled the construction of
the proposed units. MHDC brought a lawsuit alleging that the denial
was racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth
47. Il at 266 (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
48. ME The Court did note that in "rare" cases, such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), evidence of impact alone may
be determinative. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
49. See id at 266-68.
50. Id. at 266.
51. See id at 267-68.
52. See id at 255-57.




Amendment.Y5 Applying the type of evidentiary factors that it deemed
would be indicative of discriminatory purpose, the Court found no
evidence that the decisionmakers were actually motivated by racial
prejudice in their refusal to grant the developer's rezoning request 6
Because the challengers had failed to carry their burden of proving that
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the village's
decisions, the Court concluded that "[t]his ... ends the constitutional
inquiry" and "It]he ... finding that the Village's decision carried a
discriminatory 'ultimate effect' is without independent constitutional
significance." 57
3. Castaneda and the Impact-Inference Standard
In the same year that Arlington Heights mandated the need to
look beyond evidence of disparate impact in discerning the existence
of discriminatory intent, the Court signaled that such evidence would
nonetheless be sufficient by itself in some contexts. In Castaneda v.
55. See itd at 256. The district court denied relief, finding that the decision wasneither motivated by racial discrimination nor would it have a racially discriminatory effect.
See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211
(N.D. 1Il. 1974), rev'd, 517 E2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). But the
court of appeals reversed, finding that the "Ultimate effect" of the denial of the developer's
request was racially discriminatory and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
517 F.2d 409, 444 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In finding the village's
decision to be racially discriminatory, the court of appeals relied upon the fact that the
village's decision would have a disproportionate impact on blacks, in that blacks constituted
40% of those Chicago area residents who were eligible to become tenants of the proposed
development, and upon the historical context of the decision and its impact on the high
degree of residential segregation in that community. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 259-
60. The court of appeals also noted that, while the county was enjoying rapid growth in
employment opportunities and population, the community of Arlington Heights continued to
exhibit and indeed exploit the high degree of residential segregation by allowing itself to
become nearly all white. See id at 260. The court held that the community could not simply
ignore this problem. See id The court of appeals rendered its decision before the Court's
opinion in Washington v. Davis. See Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
56. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-70. Though it conceded that the impact
bore more heavily on racial minorities, the Court found that there was little about the
historical and contextual evidence, or totality of the circumstances, that supported an
inference of discriminatory purpose. See id. Specifically, the Court was persuaded by the
evidence that: (1) the area had always been zoned in the same particular manner since the
inception of its zoning map, (2) the community was committed to single-family homes,
(3) the rezoning request progressed according to the usual procedures, (4) statements by the
decisionmakers, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost exclusively on the zoning
aspects of the decision (versus racial criteria), (5) the current zoning policy that it chose to
keep in place has been consistently relied upon in board decisions over time, and (6) the
testimony of the board member called to testify evinced no illicit motivation. See id.
57. IR at271.
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Partida,s the Court scrutinized the application of Texas' statutory
"key-man" system 9 of grand jury ° selection based upon an
evidentiary framework similar to its early jury cases. As in these early
jury cases, the Court overturned the conviction of a black defendant
convicted by an all white jury based upon evidence of total, or near
total, exclusion of a racial group over a period of time from the
venires61 from which individual jury panels were chosen.62 This "rule
of exclusion 63 formed the core of a race discrimination claim in the
early jury cases, giving rise to an inference of unconstitutional
governmental action? 4 As in Castaneda, the fact that a selection
procedure is susceptible of abuse, or contains excessive discretion,
bolsters the inference of race-dependency raised by the statistical
showing.6 This standard has been referred to as the "impact-
inference" standard because of the Court's willingness to allow
inferences of discriminatory intent with proof close to a showing of
mere disparate impact.66
Pursuant to the Castaneda framework, evidence of disparate
impact is central to the intent inquiry. A prima facie case of
discriminatory purpose is demonstrated where the defendant
establishes that: (1) the group to which he belongs is a "recognizable,
58. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
59. This system uses "key" persons, "citizens of good standing, [who] recommend to
the court people in the community who will make responsible jurors." Ortiz, supra note 14,
at 1120 & n.75 (noting that, as of 1977, 16 states still used the key-man system). Potential
jurors are then brought in for further evaluation by the court and lawyers and are required to
meet certain criteria. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 484-85. For example, a grand juror, in
addition to being a citizen of the state and of the county in which he is to serve and a
qualified voter in the county, must be "'of sound mind and good moral character,' be literate,
have no prior felony conviction, and be under no pending indictment 'or other ...
accusation."' Id. at 485.
60. The grand jury is distinct from the regular "petit" jury in that a relatively large
amount of jurors are impaneled (as many as 23 as compared to 12). See BLACK'S LAW
DIctiONARY 596 (6th ed. 1991).
61. The venire is the group of people summoned from which the actual jury is
selected. See id at 1079.
62. See, e.g., Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1900) (holding that total
exclusion of otherwise qualified blacks from serving as grand jurors is impermissible race
discrimination). Accord Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939) (rejecting systematic
exclusion where all but one black on jury, even though many blacks called for jury service
are qualified pursuant to neutral criteria); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935)
(rejecting systematic and long-continued exclusion); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397
(1880) (rejecting total exclusion).
63. Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,480 (1954) (designating this standard the "rule
of exclusion").
64. See id. at 477-78.
65. See id at 479.
66. See Robert Nelson, Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose:
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334,337 n.23 (1986).
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distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as
written or as applied;" (2) the group has been underrepresented in the
grand jury process, demonstrated by comparing the proportion of the
group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand
jurors over a significant period of time; and (3) the selection procedure
is susceptible of abuse.67 Once evidence of disparate impact is shown
and is coupled with evidence of excessive discretion in the
administration of a jury selection procedure, the court then compels
the decisionmaker to put forth race-neutral reasons for the decision.68
The state must demonstrate that permissibly neutral selection criteria
and procedures produced the results.69 If the decisionmaker fails to put
forth an explanation, or does so inadequately, the court can allow the
inference of discriminatory purpose to stand.70 As in the early jury
cases, an unrebutted prima facie case violates the Equal Protection
Clause whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any
individual jury commissioner and "whether accomplished ingeniously
or ingenuously."7'
Applying this scheme to the facts in Castaneda, the Court first
noted that the group to which the challenger belonged, Mexican-
Americans, was "a clearly identifiable class" subject to various social
"disadvantages."72 Moreover, the statistical evidence demonstrated
that, over an eleven-year period, 39% of those summoned for grand
jury service were Mexican-Americans in a county that was 79%
67. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977).
68. See iii at 494-95.
69. See id. at 500.
70. See itL
71. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940). Moreover, in these cases, a finding of
race discrimination was not mitigated by the fact that the commissioners charged with
administering the facially neutral law and process testified that they had not "intentionally,
arbitrarily or systematically discriminated against [black] jurors" and failed to select blacks
because "they did not know the names of any who were qualified" or were "not personally
acquainted with any member of the [black] race." kd at 131-32. The Court held that
"[w]here jury commissioners limit those from whom grand juries are selected to their own
personal acquaintance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no [blacks]
as well as from commissioners who know but eliminate them." Id at 132. Accord Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942). Likewise, the Court in Castaneda held that the state was
compelled to go beyond a "simple protestation from a [jury] commissioner that racial
considerations played no part in the selection [process]" in rebutting the prima facie case.
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 498 n.19 (relying upon Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632
(1972); Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,481-82 (1954); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
598 (1935)).
72. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495. The Court cited past discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in Texas and current social disadvantages such as poverty-level




Mexican-American 3 These statistics were enough, the Court said, to
give rise to an inference of a discriminatory selection process in the
county at issue.74 However, the inference was further bolstered by the
fact that the "Texas system of selecting grand jurors is highly
subjective." 75 Based upon this evidence, the burden of proof shifted to
the state to explain its selection of the jurors in the challenger's case on
race-neutral grounds. However, the State offered no evidence either
attacking the reliability of the statistics or rebutting the inference of
discrimination.7 6 This failure caused the Court to conclude that the
selection process was racially discriminatory. As a result, the
defendant's conviction was overturned.77
4. Feeney and the Subjective Inquiry
One year after Castaneda, the Court made an abrupt shift from
the impact-inference in Castaneda to a much narrower conception of
discriminatory purpose and the evidence required to satisfy it. In
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,78 the Court
articulated a definition of intent that requires proof of a
decisionmaker's subjective desire to harm the affected group.
Moreover, the Feeney standard suggests that proof of discriminatory
impact can never be central to a finding of intent. Instead, the adverse
consequences of a decision must have been a specific goal of the
decisionmaker. Contrary to Arlington Heights, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a mental occurrence separate from the
objective factors that might infer intent. Feeney embraced a standard
of intentional action that can fairly be equated with malice, requiring a
specific desire to harm the affected group.
Feeney involved a gender-based equal protection challenge to a
Massachusetts veterans' "absolute lifetime" preference statute that
operated overwhelmingly to the advantage of males, who constituted
the majority of veterans. 79  The female plaintiff alleged that the
73. See id at 495. "Statistical analysis of the grand jury lists during the 2 -year
tenure of the State District Judge who selected the [jury] commissioners in [the challenger's]
case [also] reveal[ed] that a significant disparity existed over this time period as well." Id. at
496 n.16.
74. See id at 496.
75. Id at 497.
76. See id at 488.
77. See iL at 501.
78. 442 U.S. 256,278-79 (1979).
79. See id at 259, 270-71. The preference applied to all civil service positions in
Massachusetts and became applicable only after applicants had taken and passed competitive
examinations. Applicants were then ranked by their test results, training, and experience and
placed on an "eligible list." The preference requires, however, that veterans and family
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absolute preference formula contained in the statute "inevitably
operates to exclude women from consideration for the best
Massachusetts civil service jobs" and thus unconstitutionally
discriminates against women because of their gender.8 Specifically,
the plaintiff argued that the legislature "intended" the natural and
probable consequences of its actions, because it was undoubtedly
aware that the statute would have the inevitable effect of "cutting off"
women's opportunities.8
Reviewing the challenged legislation, the Court agreed that the
legislature had acted "intentionally" to advantage veterans and
consequently must have been aware that such an advantage would
disadvantage nonveterans, who were disproportionately women.82
The legislature's decision to grant a preference to veterans was
"intentional," in the sense that its adverse impact on women was both"volitional" and "foreseeable."83 The Court rejected the argument that
intent in the constitutional context was tantamount to intent in the
criminal and civil law context. 84 "Discriminatory purpose," the Court
reasoned, "implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.' 85  In order to meet this standard, the Feeney
plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the veteran classification was"originally devised or subsequently reenacted because it would
accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and
predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service.' 86
The effect of Feeney is to sever the objective from the subjective,
the sociological from the psychological. Unlike Arlington Heights'
epistemology of intent, in Feeney objective factors may be "signs" or
members of veterans be ranked above all other candidates, in order of their respective scores.
See id. at 263. The challenger, a female nonveteran who ranked second and third on two
different civil exams, subsequently brought this action asserting that the veterans' preference
operated to bar her from getting on certified eligible lists despite her test scores. See id. at
259. Because of the preference, she was ranked sixth behind five male veterans on one list
for dental examiners and placed in a position on another list behind 12 male veterans, 11 of
whom had lower scores. See id. at 264.
80. Id at 259.
81. See id. at 278. The district court, despite applying Davis's discriminatory intent
standard, agreed that the consequences of the absolute preference formula for the
employment opportunities of women were too "inevitable" to be "unintended," hence finding
the statute discriminatory and unconstitutional. See id at 260-61.
82. See id at 278.
83. See id
84. See id at 278-80.
85. Id at 279 (emphasis added).
86. Id (emphasis added).
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"symptoms," but not alone constitutive of intent.' Proving intent here
requires an "isolated 'inner' mental event" separate from the social
and historical context in which the action arises. 8 Conceding that
what a legislature is "up to" may be reasonably inferred by the results
that its actions achieve, the Court made clear that something more
subjective is required. Even where the adverse consequences of a law
upon an identifiable group are "as inevitable as the gender-based
consequences of [the veterans' preference statute and] a strong
inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be
drawn," such an inference is "a working tool, not a synonym for
proof."89 This inference "fails to ripen into proof' if the disparate
results are an unavoidable consequence of an otherwise legitimate
policy and if the statutory history indicates no express discriminatory
purpose.90 Couched in these terms, the Court easily found a lack of
discriminatory purpose motivating the decision to adopt the veterans'
preference. 91
B. The Different Levels of Intent
Subsequent cases applying the intent doctrine affirm this early
history. A close look at the intent doctrine reveals not only that
different evidentiary schemes are employed to ascertain intent, but also
that different levels of consciousness can satisfy the discriminatory
intent standard-and hence violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
term discriminatory intent is "hardly self-defining," as its meaning can
range anywhere from unconscious bias to conscious bias to conscious
87. See id at 294. As one commentator astutely noted:
The Supreme Court majority [in Feeney] viewed intent as an event separate from,
and not necessarily to be implied from, "objective" factors such as the statute's
impact on a particular group or the history of state action with respect to that
group.... A separate, additional inference is required to establish the existence
and nature of the intent itself No connection necessarily exists between the
symptoms and the true subjective event-the intent: the intent might not be
discriminatory no matter how strong the evidence of discrimination provided by
the symptoms.
Weinzweig, supra note 5, at 293-94 (emphasis in original).
88. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 303. 'The social context which must be included in the
characterization of the action will necessarily include the immediate, inevitable and
foreseeable consequences of ... an action in that context. Choice of action in a given
situation depends upon the alternatives available." Id. at 302.
89. Id at 279 n.25.
90. Id
91. See id, at 280-81. Indeed, the Court found the legislative history to indicate, "[t]o
the contrary," that the "benefit of the preference was consistently offered to 'any person' who
was a veteran." Id
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desire to harm.92 Though the Court in Feeney set out to define the
meaning of discriminatory purpose, as the following cases illustrate,
adherence to the Feeney conception of intent has been selective. In
some cases, the Feeney standard is explicitly invoked and relied upon
by the Court. In other cases, this narrow conception of intent is
virtually ignored.
Those decisions invoking Feeney require a showing that the
decisionmaker was motivated by a specific discriminatory intent.93 I
refer to the Feeney standard as specific intent because it requires a
special mental state above and beyond general discriminatory intent.94
A specific intent exists where the decisionmaker consciously desired
the adverse consequences of its action on a particular group.95 Other
cases, relying explicitly on the Davis/Arlington Heights framework,
accept a showing that the decisionmaker was motivated by a more
general discriminatory intent.96  A general intent exists when the
decisionmaker has actual or constructive knowledge of the adverse
consequences substantially certain to result from the decision. General
intent can exist regardless of whether the decisionmaker subjectively
desired to accomplish the harmful result.97 General intent can be
proven by objective, circumstantial evidence indicating what facts
were known or knowable by the decisionmaker at the time of the
decision. Still another set of cases accepts a showing that the
decisionmaker was motivated by an unconscious bias against the
affected group.98  These cases explicitly rely upon the Castaneda
framework, often finding a discriminatory purpose based primarily
upon disparate impact evidence. Like earlier jury cases, the ultimate
92. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
Cni. L. RFv. 935,956-65 (1989).
93. See discussion infra Part l.B.1.
94. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTN W. SCOT, JR., CIMiNAL LAw 223-24 (2d ed.
1986) (describing common usage of term "specific intent"); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICnoNARY 973 (6th ed. 1991) (stating that "most common usage ... is to designate a
special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with
respect to the actus reus of the crime").
95. See 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 130 n.18 (1981).
96. See discussion infra Part H.B.2.
97. See Weinzweig, supra note 5, at 307 ("One can know that a certain event will
occur as a result of one's actions, or even aim at bringing about that action, without desiring
that it occur."). See generally LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 94, at 224 (describing general
intent as the mental element requiring general knowledge and awareness); BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 559 (6th ed. 1991) (defining intent broadly as a state of mind that presupposes
knowledge).
98. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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determination of intent; thus takes place "'whether or not it was a
conscious decision on the part of [the decisionmaker]."' 99
1. Requiring Specific Intent
In the following cases, the Court specifically invokes and applies
the Feeney specific intent standard. Many of the Arlington Heights
circumstantial factors, or other objective indicia, won't suffice to
demonstrate intent in these cases. As in Feeney, the Court "restrict[s]
the scope of historical and social inquiry in determining" intent.'O°
Moreover, evidence of disparate impact from the decision is virtually
irrelevant to the discriminatory purpose inquiry. Neither the degree of
impact nor knowledge of the inevitability or foreseeability of harm
resulting from the decision will garner any significant judicial scrutiny.
The Court severely limited the relevance of historical and
statistical evidence to demonstrating a specific discriminatory intent in
McCleskey v. Kemp.'°' There, the Court rejected a challenge to
Georgia's death penalty statute relying upon a sophisticated,
comprehensive statistical study performed by Professors David
Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (hereinafter the
"Baldus study"). 02 The Baldus study demonstrated racial disparities
in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on both the
race of the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant.0 3
McCleskey wanted the Court to infer from the statistical evidence that
the state legislature acted with discriminatory purpose in adopting the
capital sentencing statute and in allowing it to remain in force despite
its discriminatory administration. To bolster the inference suggested
by the statistical evidence, McCleskey also offered historical evidence
of Georgia criminal laws in force during and just after the Civil War
99. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (quoting Hemandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475,482 (1954)).
100. Weinzweig, supra note 5, at 289.
101. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
102. See id. at 297.
103. See id. at 286-87. According to the Court, the Baldus study demonstrated that
even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing
white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants
charged with killing blacks. According to this model, black defendants were 1.1
times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants. Thus, the Baldus
study indicates that black defendants ... who kill white victims have the greatest
likelihood of receiving the death penalty.
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that expressly differentiated between crimes committed by and against
blacks and whites.'04
Despite its acceptance of the statistical validity of the Baldus
study, the Court rejected McCleskey's challenge to the legislation,10 5
relying on the failure of the statistical evidence alone to demonstrate
the requisite legislative intent."' 6 The Court summed up its view of the
relevance of this evidence succinctly: "Apparent disparities in
sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. 10 7
The type of historical background of the decisionmakers that the Court
found indicative of intent in Arlington Heights and Davis was deemed
irrelevant in this context unless it was reasonably contemporaneous
with the decision.108 The historical evidence, the Court reasoned, was
too attenuated from the decision to support an inference of
discriminatory intent. Citing Feeney, the Court concluded that the
evidence had failed to prove that "the Georgia Legislature enacted or
maintained the death penalty statute because of' either an anticipated
racially disparate effect or the racial disparity suggested by the
multiple regression study.1 9 Notably, as I discuss later, the Court did
not apply the Feeney standard to McCleskey's second claim, that his
sentence was part of a pattern of discriminatory administration of the
death penalty.10
Similarly, in Wayte v. United States,"' the Court held that
selective prosecution claims are subject to the discriminatory intent
standard of Feeney. There, the plaintiff challenged a prosecutorial
policy of "passive enforcement," under which the Selective Service
System would investigate and prosecute young male citizens who
failed to register for the draft during a specified week. 2 Plaintiff fell
within the class of people who did not register and was prosecuted.
He claimed that "he and the other indicted nonregistrants were 'vocal'
opponents of the registration program who had been impermissibly
targeted ... for prosecution on the basis of their exercise of First
104. Ma at 298 n.20; see also id at 329-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (summarizing the
history of Georgia's criminal laws and making the argument that they bolster the statistics).
105. McCleskey's second claim, involving discriminatory administration of the death
penalty, is discussed infra Part IV.
106. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
107. Ma
108. See id at 298 n.20; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269 (relying on the history of
the village's previous zoning decisions); Davis, 426 U.S. at 235 (relying on the history of
number of people on the force and the Department's pattern of recruitment).
109. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298.
110. See discussion infra Part V.A.




Amendment rights.' '113 The Court held that, in order for a plaintiff to
prevail, he must "show both that the passive enforcement system had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose.""'  The plaintiff failed in his claim, the Court reasoned,
because even if the passive policy had a discriminatory effect the
plaintiff failed to show that the Government specifically intended such
a result." 5  At most, the evidence demonstrated only that the
Government was "aware" that the passive enforcement policy would
result in prosecution of vocal objectors and that they would probably
make selective prosecution claims. 1 6  Such general knowledge and
awareness was not enough to satisfy the specific intent Feeney
standard. Quoting the Feeney standard, the Court concluded that the
plaintiff "has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because
of his protest activities."'"17
The specific intent standard was satisfied in Washington v. Seattle
School District No. I1"8 by direct evidence of discriminatory purpose.
Seattle School District involved a challenge to a statewide initiative
terminating the use of mandatory busing to achieve racial integration
in public schools." 9 Because racial integration was deemed to
primarily serve the interests of racial minorities, the initiative's demise
was thought to disparately affect African-Americans.120 The Court
found that it was beyond reasonable dispute "that the initiative was
enacted 'because of," not merely "in spite of' its adverse effects
upon' busing for integration. '' 2 This conclusion was based upon
statements by sponsors of the initiative emphasizing the fact that the
challenged initiative prohibited busing only for purposes of
113. Il at 604 (footnote omitted). Like race, selective prosecution on the basis of
other protected categories-such as religion or the exercise of statutory or constitutional




117. l This specific intent standard has been subsequently upheld in United States v.
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996), in the context of a racially selective prosecution
claim. The Court's opinion dealt primarily with the discovery threshold in selective
prosecution cases. It held that a claimant must produce credible evidence that "similarly
situated" defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but were not. See id. at 1487-
88. The Court reasoned that the rigorous standard of proof adopted in Wayte for these claims
demands a correspondingly rigorous standard of discovery. See id. at 1488.
118. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
119. Seeidat461-64.
120. See id. at 474.




desegregation.12 2 Moreover, the text of the initiative itself expressed
its clear purpose, despite its facial neutrality.Y23 As such, it seemed
clear to the Court that those involved did not have "any difficulty
perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350."' 124
Thus, the Court concluded, "there is little doubt that the initiative was
effectively drawn for racial purposes."'2
2. Accepting General Intent
As opposed to the specific intent standard of the above cases, in
the following cases discriminatory intent was demonstrated by
evidence that the decisionmaker knew, or should have known, that
adverse consequences were substantially certain to result from its
decisions. Such knowledge is imputed to the decisionmaker from
evidence of what actually happened, informed by the social and
historical context. Tellingly, nowhere is the Feeney standard
mentioned or relied upon in these cases. Instead, the Court more
loosely applies the Arlington Heights totality of the circumstances
framework. Pursuant to that framework, disparate impact evidence is
not central to the inference of intent. However, when taken together
with other socio-historical evidence, it can provide powerful
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Unlike the above
cases, historical evidence need not be contemporaneous with the
decision to be probative of discriminatory intent. Thus, the history of
past decisions made by the decisionmaking entity, as well as evidence
of past and present social conditions that may be in the
decisionmaker's knowledge, are highly probative of discriminatory
122. See id
123. See id (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1008 (W.D.
Wash. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 633 E2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457
(1982)). The Court went on to state:
mhe text of the initiative was carefully tailored to interfere only with
desegregative busing. Proponents of the initiative candidly 'represented that there
would be no loss of school district flexibility other than in busing for desegregation
purposes'.... Initiative 350 in fact allows school districts to bus their students 'for
most, if not all' of the nonintegrative purposes required by their educational
policies.
124. Id "lhe Washington electorate surely was aware of this, for it was 'assured' by
CiVIC officials that '99% of the school districts in the state'-those that lacked mandatory
integration programs-'would not be affected by the passage of 350."' Id (quoting Seattle,
473 F Supp. at 1008-09). This fact also led the Court to apply the rule of Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1968), supporting the conclusion that the initiative restructured the political
processes along racial lines. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467-70.
125. Seattle, 458 U.S. at471.
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intent.' 26 And courts readily exercise their interpretive judgments in
finding a discriminatory intent based upon the sociology of the
decision and its impact. 27
Knowledge and awareness of the adverse consequences flowing
from the adoption of a voting scheme were enough to invalidate state
legislation in Rogers v. Lodge.128  The Court invalidated an at-large
legislative electoral system, finding that the scheme, while "neutral in
origin," was nevertheless "maintained for invidious purposes." 129
There, black citizens of Burke County, Georgia alleged that the
county's system of at-large elections unconstitutionally diluted the
voting power of blacks in electing the governing Board of
Commissioners.1 30 Citing Davis and Arlington Heights, the Court was
careful to point out that "discriminatory intent need not be proved by
direct evidence," but can be shown by various types of circumstantial
evidence.13' Then, relying on earlier, pre-Davis vote dilution cases, the
Court adopted a standard that took into account an aggregate of
various historical and social factors from which it could infer that the"system was 'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to
further racial ... discrimination.',, 1 32
Purposeful discrimination in the vote dilution context can be
demonstrated if the evidence indicates that "blacks have less
126. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977) (allowing inquiry into the historical background of the challenged decision as well as
other past decisions made by the decisionmaking body); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (holding that Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973),
supports the legal understanding that "actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate
impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose").
127. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 369-76 (explaining courts' competence to make
interpretive judgments in assessing the cultural meaning of actions having a racially disparate
impact).
128. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
129. l at 622-23 (holding that the lower courts' factual findings were not clearly
erroneous).
130. See icL at 615. Plaintiffs also alleged that the system violated various other
constitutional and statutory rights. See id
131. Id at618.
132. Ia at 619 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
661 (1980) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 14, 149 (1971))). The Court was forced
to review what appeared to be a distinct standard for vote dilution claims applied by the
lower courts, in accordance with pre-Davis vote dilution cases. See id at 619-22. This
standard allowed a finding of discriminatory intent based on an "aggregate" of evidentiary
factors. See id at 620 (relying on Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 E2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.
1973)). The Court upheld the validity of the so-called Zimmer factors, noting that the very
same court (the Fifth Circuit) had later upheld them against the background of Davis and it
progeny, deeming them relevant to the ultimate inquiry- "'whether the districting plan
under attack exist[ed] because it was intended to diminish or dilute the political efficacy of
that group."' Id. at 621 (quoting Nevett v. Sides,'571 F.2d 209, 226 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect
candidates of their choice. ' 33 The evidence in this case demonstrated
that no black had ever been elected in Burke County, Georgia,
although blacks accounted for 53.6% of the population and 38% of
those required to vote. 1 As in earlier cases, the Court in Rogers
relied upon a combination of historical discrimination in other areas of
life that affected low voter registration among blacks,135 the presence
of block racial voting, the unresponsiveness and insensitivity of
elected officials to the needs of the black populace, 136 and the current
depressed socioeconomic conditions that created barriers to blacks'
participation in the political system.137 That the officials were aware,
or should have been aware, that the current system would result in
these barriers to the political process was clear. The same elected
county officials who had been "unresponsive and insensitive to the
needs of the black community" were the ones who had chosen to
maintain the system that "'minimized the ability of Burke County
Blacks to participate in the political system.' ' 138 As such, the Court
affirmed the lower court's conclusion that overwhelming proof
133. Id. at 623-24. This standard was later adopted in the amendments to section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1971) in 1982, which embraces an "effects" standard.
This standard is similar to the one articulated in Rogers, requiring a showing that blacks have
less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.
134. See id at 614-15. This evidence alone, however, was not enough absent the other
social and historical evidence. Though this evidence of exclusion bore "heavily on the issue
of purposeful discrimination," the Court nevertheless conceded that such disparate impact
evidence was "insufficient" in and of itself, absent "proof that blacks have less opportunity to
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice." Id at 623-24.
135. Historical discrimination, the Court reasoned, was particularly relevant
to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination, particularly in cases such as
this one where the evidence shows that discriminatory practices were commonly
utilized, that they were abandoned when enjoined by courts or made illegal by civil
rights legislation, and that they were replaced by laws and practices which, though
neutral on their face, serve to maintain the status quo.
Id at 625.
136. See id at 623, 625. For instance, this evidence included
infrequent appointment of blacks to county boards and committees; the overtly
discriminatory pattern of paving county roads; the reluctance of the county to
remedy black complaints.., and the role played by the County Commissioners in
the incorporation of an all-white private school to which they donated public funds
for the purchase of band uniforms.
Id at 626.
137. See id at 626.
138. It. at 625-26; see also id. at 625 n.9 (noting that "unresponsiveness is an
important element but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in
determining whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred").
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demonstrated that the at-large system was maintained for a
discriminatory purpose."'
Even when there is direct evidence of a decisionmaker's mental
state and that evidence can satisfy the specific intent standard, the
Court nonetheless has indicated that a less demanding level of intent
applies. With similar reliance on the Arlington Heights evidentiary
framework, the Court in Hunter v. Underwood' easily inferred the
existence of discriminatory intent in a portion of the Alabama
Constitution from several historical studies, proceedings of the
constitutional convention, and the testimony of two expert
historians. 14 1 At issue was a provision of the Alabama Constitution
providing for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of certain
enumerated felonies and misdemeanors, but that had disenfranchised
disproportionately more blacks than whites.142  The Court was
ultimately persuaded by the testimony at the time of the provision's
adoption. 43 This testimony and the historical events surrounding the
political convention at which it was adopted demonstrated that an
explicit purpose of the constitutional provision was to disenfranchise
blacks on account of race. 44  Given this direct and circumstantial
evidence of intent, the Court rejected the State's attempt to explain
other legitimate purposes motivating adoption of the provision.141
Because the inference of intent proved irrebuttable, the Court
concluded that the "original enactment was motivated by a desire to
139. See id. at 616. It should be noted that another post-Davis case, City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), also wrestled with applying the intent standard in a vote dilution
context. However, though the Court agreed that the intent standard applied to such claims, no
majority agreed on how intent could be demonstrated or whether it was present in that case.
See id at 65-74,95-103 (White, J., dissenting).
140. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
141. See id at 229.
142. See id at 226-27 (citing evidence that the statute had disenfranchised ten times as
many blacks as whites).
143. See id. at 233.
144. See id. at 229 (citing the president of the convention's statement that the purpose
was to "establish white supremacy in this State" and the fact that this "zeal for white
supremacy ran rampant at the convention" (quoting 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITrTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, May 21, 1901 to Sept. 3, 1901,
p.8 (1940)).
145. See id at 232. The State had argued that: (1) the provision did not offend equal
protection, because the framers had an additional intention to disenfranchise poor whites in
order to prevent a resurgence of populism and (2) the overall purpose of denying the
franchise to those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude alone rendered the provision valid
given the legitimacy of that purpose. See id. at 230-32. The Court rejected the first
argument, holding that "an additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not
render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all blacks." Id. at 232. Similarly, it
found the second argument unpersuasive, opining that disenfranchising people guilty of
crimes of moral turpitude "simply was not a motivating factor." Id. at 232.
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discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section
continues to this day to have that effect" and "[a]s such ... violates
equal protection under Arlington Heights."'46
146. Id, at 233. At least one federal circuit court of appeals has interpreted Arlington
Heights' evidentiary scheme as consistent with a general intent standard, requiring
knowledge and foreseeability. The Eleventh Circuit, in a line of cases involving racially
disparate provision of municipal services, employed a version of the Arlington Heights
factors in discerning the requisite discriminatory intent. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d
982 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (following Eleventh Circuit
decisions). Revising the Arlington Heights framework slightly, the Eleventh Circuit employs
the following factors in determining discriminatory intent: (1) the nature and magnitude of
the disparity-the disparate impact, (2) the foreseeability of the disparate impact of the
official action, (3) the legislative and administrative history of the decisionmaking process,
and (4) the knowledge that the action would cause the disparate impact. See Ammons, 783
F.2d at 988. Courts have found constructive knowledge where '[a] brief visit to the black
community makes obvious the need for street paving and storm water drainage control."' Il
at 988 (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F Supp. 1375, 1383 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Each of the cases involved extremely stark disparities in the provision of services,
sufficient to give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. See Ammons, 783 F.2d at
985 n.2 (noting that the city spent 90% of its street resurfacing funds in the white community
and only 10% in the black community); Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1185 n.3 (noting that 42% of
the streets in the black community remained unpaved compared to 9% in the white
community; 60% of the streets in the white community had curbs or gutters, whereas the city
provided none for the black community); Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 581 (see table comparing the
provision of street paving services to whites and blacks). The history of the legislative and
administrative practices, as well as the history of racial discrimination in the municipality,
provided sufficient historical support for the finding of discriminatory purpose. See idL at
587-88. Unlike the Feeney standard, here the history need not be contemporaneous with the
challenged decision at issue. For instance, in Dowdell, the court held that the legislative and
administrative pattern of decisionmaking, covering nearly a half century, "indicate[d] a
deliberate deprivation of services to the black community." Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186. In
making this judgment, the court considered various historical facts, such as the
underrepresentation of blacks in government and a municipal ordinance that remained in
force until 1968 segregating the black community to the south side of the railroad tracks. See
id, Similarly, in Ammons and Baker, the courts took into account the histories of race
discrimination in every aspect of city life, from municipally enforced segregation to
maldistributed municipal services. See Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 588; Ammons v. Dade City,
594F Supp. 1274, 1279-85 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
In each of these cases, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, when a city knowingly
allocates greater resources to white communities with the foreseeable outcome of depriving
black communities of the same resources, that constitutes a discriminatory purpose sufficient
to violate the Equal Protection Clause. "[W]hen it is foreseeable ... that the allocation of
greater resources to the white residential community ... will lead to the 'foreseeable outcome
of a deprived black residential community' then a discriminatory purpose ... is properly
shown." See id at 988 (quoting Ammons, 594 R Supp. at 1302 (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted)); Dowdell, 698 F2d at 1186 ("[The continued and systematic relative deprivation of
the black community was the obviously foreseeable outcome of spending nearly all revenue
sharing monies received on the white community in preference to the visibly underserviced
black community.").
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3. Accepting Unconscious Intent
In another set of cases, involving jury selection, the Court has
specifically invoked and applied the Castaneda evidentiary
framework. This framework, as explained below, allows unconscious
bias to satisfy the discriminatory purpose standard. Disproportionate
exclusion of members of an identifiable group is central to the
inference of discriminatory purpose. Relying upon earlier jury cases,
the Court has continued to adhere to the proposition that "[p]roof of
systematic exclusion from the venire raises an inference of purposeful
discrimination because the 'result bespeaks discrimination." 'A47 Once
the prima facie case is established, the decisionmaker must justify the
challenged decision or decisions. After this explanation, it is up to the
trial court to determine whether the requisite discriminatory purpose
exists based upon its observation of the entire proceedings and
consideration of all relevant circumstantial evidence.' 48 If the decision
goes unexplained or is insufficiently explained, the trial court is free to
find a discriminatory purpose based upon the prima facie case-
consisting primarily of evidence of disparate impact.149
In Batson v. Kentucky,150 the defendant objected to the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 51 to strike all four black
persons on the venire panel, resulting in a jury composed only of white
persons.152 Using the same "combination of factors" as in Castaneda,
the Court held that an inference of discrimination could be based upon
a prima facie showing of a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors."'53
This inference was strengthened, the Court reasoned, when coupled
with the assumption that the highly discretionary peremptory
challenge "permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
147. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475,482 (1954)).
148. See id at 96-98. For instance, the prosecutor's questions and statements during
voir dire examination can be relevant to the intent inquiry. See id at 97.
149. See id at 93-98.
150. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
151. This a procedural mechanism used by attorneys in a trial that gives them the
unfettered right to challenge a juror without assigning a reason for the challenge. See
BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 787 (6th ed. 1991) (citing FED. R. CIM. P. 24). In most states,
each party has a specified number of such challenges. See id. Once the party has used all of
its peremptory challenges, he can only challenge subsequent jurors for cause. See iL
152. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
153. See id at 96-97. The pattern of strikes is but one indicium of intent, albeit a
predominant one. The Court left it up to trial judges "experienced in supervising voir dire...
to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors." ML at 97. Other facts that
trial judges could rely upon would include the prosecutor's questions and statements during
voir dire. See id.
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discriminate.' '1 54 Once this prima facie case is established, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the inference of discriminatory purpose
by putting forth a racially neutral explanation. Though the explanation
need not rise to the level of justifying a challenge for cause, it must be
"clear and reasonably specific," "legitimate,". and "related to the
particular case to be tried."' 55 The prosecutor cannot rebut the prima
facie case by merely stating "that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that
they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.' ' 56
Nor can a prosecutor satisfy his burden by "denying that he had a
discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith.' 57
Peremptory cases following Batson continue to employ this
evidentiary framework in finding discrimination in jury selection. 58
Evidence of a "pattern" of strikes invariably gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory intent.159 In the end, the trial court has a duty to
determine if the proffered prosecutorial reasons are actually race-
neutral or pretextual.' 6° The trial court can choose to reject the
explanation, either on the basis of the prosecutor's credibility or the
substance of the explanation. 61 It is at this stage of the Batson inquiry
154. Il at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953)).
155. IL at 98 & n.20. Ultimately, the Court remanded this case back to the trial judge
for such an assessment. See id. at 100. But see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)
(noting that reason need not be "persuasive, or even plausible").
156. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see, e.g., Johnson v. Love, 40 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1994). In
Johnson, the prosecutor struck from jury selection a young African-American woman in the
trial of a young African-American male accused of killing a white man. The prosecutor
explained that he believed that young African-American women would be less likely to
convict an African-American defendant of the murder of a white man. The court held that
the explanation was not race-neutral, because it was based upon the assumption that African-
American women's objectivity would be impaired because they were African-American. See
id. at 668-69.
157. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769.
158. Batson has been extended beyond prosecutorial challenges on the basis of race.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 181 (1994) (extending to gender discrimination);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (extending to criminal defense attorney);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616-18 (1991) (extending to federal civil
actions).
159. See Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991) (finding a prima facie
case of racial discrimination satisfied by evidence that the prosecutor challenged the only
three prospective jurors with definite Hispanic surnames); see also United States v. Valley,
928 E2d 130, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding three strikes against African-Americans
sufficient to establish prima facie case); United States v. Roberts, 913 E2d 211, 214 (5th Cir.
1990) (finding four of seven strikes against African-Americans sufficient to establish prima
facie case); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
strikes of all four African-Americans sufficient to establish prima facie case).
160. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59.
161. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769-70 (upholding state court's finding of no racial
motive, "which turned primarily on an assessment of credibility").
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where unconscious bias can violate the Equal Protection Clause. As
the Court has recently confirmed, "implausible or fantastic
justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for
purposeful discrimination."1 62  If this happens, the inference of
discriminatory purpose survives, often made solely on evidence of a
"pattern of strikes," without any demonstration that the decisionmaker
was either aware of or desired the discriminatory consequences.1 63
However, even if a court believes the prosecutor's explanation,
the court may still decide that the explanation is not sufficient. Here,
the court can uphold the inference of discriminatory purpose based
upon unconscious bias in a number of ways. For instance, the court
can look to the face of the prosecutor's asserted reason and determine
that it rests on stereotypical assumptions about the group.164 Or, the
court can conclude, based upon its observation of the voir dire
proceedings, that the reasons given for excluding members of the
cognizable class were not relied on to exclude non-class members. 65
Lastly, courts can decide that a facially neutral criterion used to
exclude jurors is in fact a surrogate for racial bias or correlates with
162. ld. at768.
163. But see Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. Revising its Batson framework, the Court in
Hernandez cited Feeney and required a showing that the prosecutor be motivated by a
specific intent to discriminate, versus unconscious bias against the group. See id at 360-62.
In evaluating the prosecutor's explanation, the Court held that "[n]othing in the prosecutor's
explanation shows that he chose to exclude jurors who hesitated in answering questions about
following the interpreter because he wanted to prevent bilingual Latinos from serving on the
jury." Id. at 362. This citing of Feeney, and the specific intent standard, appears to be
inconsequential as the Supreme Court has subsequently affirmed that a trial court may choose
to disbelieve the prosecutor's stated reasons based on an assessment of credibility and
determine that the justification is a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See id. As
numerous lower court cases confirm, the Batson framework easily allows a finding of
unconscious intent by the trial court. See Howard v. Moore, 131 E3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, applying the Feeney
standard here is erroneous, given the reasons for increased judicial intrusion in these cases.
See infra Part lIl.
164. For instance, one court has held that the "invocation of residence" under the facts
of the particular case "both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious
stereotypes." Bishop, 959 E2d at 825. The Ninth Circuit found pretextual a prosecutor's
claim that he did not strike an African-American panelist because of her race but rather
"because she lived in Compton, a poor and violent community whose residents are likely to
be 'anesthetized to such violence' and 'more likely to think that the police probably used
excessive force."' Id.
165. This was the reasoning of the Eight Circuit in Davidson v. Harris, 30 F.3d 963
(8th Cir. 1994). There the court held that counsel's explanation for striking an African-
American was pretextual, because whites with the same characteristics were not stricken.
See id. at 965-66.
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race.' 66 In each of these scenarios, there is no showing that the actor
was even aware that he was treating others differently because of their
group characteristic. 67  More often than not, a finding of
discriminatory purpose is made regardless of the actor's state of
consciousness.
C. An Explanation
The Court's incoherence has not gone unnoticed. The most
thorough critique and explanation of the Court's intent jurisprudence
has been offered by Professor Daniel Ortiz, who opines that "[t]he
Supreme Court has developed the intent requirement so unevenly that
it now fails to fit either its name, the Court's description of it, or the
theory its champions and opponents alike claim gave it birth.' ' 6 8 His
critique is that the Court's application of intent is largely inharmonious
with the democratic process theory from which it arose, in that it fails
in most instances to assess the inputs to governmental decisionmaking
166. In Hernandez, for example, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that
excluding jurors because they speak a foreign language could serve as a surrogate for racial
hostility. As the Court explained:
Just as shared language can serve to foster community, language differences can be
a source of division. Language elicits a response from others, ranging from
admiration and respect, to distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. Reactions
of the latter type all too often result from or initiate racial hostility. In holding that
a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge means a reason other than race,
we do not resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept
or race should be defined for equal protection purposes.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371; cf. Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825 ('To strike black jurors who reside in
[poor, predominantly black] communities on the assumption that they will sympathize with a
black defendant rather than the police is akin to striking jurors who speak Spanish merely
because the case involves Spanish-speaking witnesses.').
To be sure, the application of Batson has been inconsistent and unpredictable in the
lower courts. Attorneys have offered, and courts have accepted, explanations that either
correlate with race or have obvious racial overtones. See, e.g., United States v. Maseratti, 1
F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1993) (allowing a prosecutor to strike an Hispanic woman juror
because "experience in Hispanic culture" told him that women are used to doing "what the
male in the species is telling her to do"); United States v. Payne, 962 E2d 1228, 1233 (6th
Cir. 1992) (finding race-neutral that African-American potential jurors were members of
black "activist groups"); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 175
(1989) (noting that the Court's acceptance of racial surrogates evades the goal of Batson).
Nevertheless, that does not negate the fact that the Batson framework can be, and has been,
used to find a discriminatory purpose based upon unconscious bias. If anything, it argues for
more sensitivity by courts to the use of racial surrogates and purported race-neutral reasons as
a cover (unconscious or conscious) for racial bias.
167. See Strauss, supra note 92, at 960 ("[U]nconscious bias exists when a person
honestly believes that he is treating blacks and whites alike but is in fact treating them
differently.").
168. Ortiz, supra note 14, at 1134.
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processes. 6 9 Rather, the intent doctrine actually more consistently
evaluates the outcomes of governmental decisionmaking to assess its
constitutionality.'1"
Ortiz offers a "positive theory"'171 of the Court's jurisprudence by
filtering it through the lens of classical liberal theory. He views the
intent doctrine as serving to allocate burdens of proof between the
individual and the state depending upon the substantive context and
the nature of the individual right at issue.172 Specifically, he argues, the
doctrine allocates these burdens in a manner that balances the
individual and state interests in accordance with the ideology of
traditional liberalism. The intent doctrine thus
distinguishes between two types of goods. The first kind, which it
fairly aggressively protects, consists primarily of political, criminal, and
educational rights. The second kind, over which it allows the state
much control, consists of "ordinary" social and economic goods, like
jobs and housing. In making this distinction, intent doctrine reflects our
prevailing political ideology-liberalisn--which is a system of values
rooted in the belief that the state should allow every individual to
pursue his own conception of the good.173
Ortiz observes that, in accordance with where the individual
interest or right falls on classical liberalism's "hierarchy of value," the
intent doctrine either requires a plaintiff to show current actual
discriminatory motivation behind the decision at issue or it allows the
plaintiff to show something less stringent than subjective motivation
before the governmental decisionmaker must explain its reasons for its
decision. 74 In other words, "[t]he nature of the case makes all the
169. Seeid. at 1134-42.
170. See id
171. See id
172. Seeid. at 1107.
173. L at 114142. Moreover,
[s]ince such an aim requires the state to remain neutral between competing
conceptions of the good, the state can legitimately act only to allow individuals
more fully to pursue their own private conceptions.... Like [its most extreme
form,] libertarianism, liberalism aggressively protects those basic rights, like
voting, education, and freedom from unwarranted physical restraint, which are
necessary for a person to be able to choose her own ends. And, like libertarianism,
liberalism also relegates most remaining social behavior to the market. Liberalism
does, however, differ from libertarianism in permitting the state to interfere
somewhat in the market-certainly to overcome market failure and also to ensure a
certain minimum level of dignity and welfare to all individuals.
Id at 114142 (footnote omitted).
174. See id at 1135-37. For example:
In the housing and employment cases, the plaintiff must show current, actual
discriminatory motivation; in the others, current disparate effects plus some other
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difference.' '175  For instance, examining the Davis and Arlington
Heights decisions, Ortiz concludes that the intent doctrine is most
loyal to its origins in employment and housing cases, in that "it
allocates to individuals the burden of producing evidence of
discriminatory motivation; if this is shown, it then shifts the burden of
proof to the state to show legitimate reasons for the disparate
treatment."' 176 In contexts other than housing and employment, such as
jury selection and voting, Ortiz demonstrates that the intent doctrine
"fails to test for impermissible motivation" by allowing "individuals to
establish [inferences of discrimination] with something less than
motivation-in some cases, in fact, with something close to a showing
of mere disparate impact" and by allowing "the state to rebut an
inference of discriminatory motivation with something partially
irrelevant to purpose.' '17
However, what seems like doctrinal incoherence, Ortiz believes,
is actually the Court aggressively protecting those rights and liberties
that enable the individual to pursue her own version of the good life. 178
Hence, the Court is permissive in its supervision of government
intervention in traditional economic and social markets:
Where (as in housing and employment) this ideology either relegates
decisionmaking to markets or allows the state much leeway in
allocating goods, intent makes judicial supervision of decisionmaking
difficult. On the other hand, where liberal ideology insists on particular
types of nonmarket allocation (as in voting, jury selection, and
sometimes education), intent makes judicial intervention more likely. 179
showing-at most of motivation in the past or in decisions unrelated to the one
under consideration-suffice. Not only is it much more difficult to prove intent in
the housing and employment cases, but, more interestingly, they involve a
completely different kind of inquiry.
Md at 1137.
175. M at 1107.
176. I at 1110-15, 1135.
177. Id. at 1119. Thus,
in the jury selection cases [like Castaneda and Batson], the doctrine places on
individuals the burden of showing adverse impact on an identifiable group and the
susceptibility of the selection procedure to manipulation; if this is met, it then shifts
the burden to the state to show that valid reasons underlie the selection of particular
jurors.
In the voting cases [like Roger v. Lodge], intent requires that the individual
show adverse impact in voting plus discrimination in other areas of life, and then
shifts the burden to the state to offer a compelling reason for the electoral
discrimination.
Id, at 1135.
178. See id. at 1142.
179. M at 1107.
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Ortiz is right that judicial intervention is more liberal in some
areas and significantly less so in others. Ortiz is also right that in some
cases the Court requires actual, conscious motivation while in others
something less than conscious motivation suffices. However, as the
previous section demonstrates, even where the Court requires "actual"
or conscious motivation, different levels of consciousness are required
in different cases. Ortiz also persuasively demonstrates that
substantive concerns influence the Court's posture, or level of
deference, towards a challenged decision. Nevertheless, as I will
demonstrate, substantive concerns are only one part of a more gestalt-
like approach to judicial review of facially neutral decisions.
There is a set of concerns that the Court is equally, if not more,
responsive to when reviewing an official decision. That set of
concerns is rooted in democratic process theory and the related theory
of motive review. A closer look at the Court's intent jurisprudence
reveals that the Court is openly responding to concerns underlying
process theory when reviewing different types of challenged
government decisions and actors. Process theory provides both a
fuller account of the intent doctrine and corresponds to the Court's
openly stated normative commitments. However, Ortiz's
demonstration of the Court's sensitivity to substantive concerns is not
preempted by the process explanation. In fact, there is a significant
degree of interaction between these concerns. This overlap is not
surprising, given that the dual concerns stem from different aspects of
the same philosophical tradition. In Part II, I will articulate these
process concerns and their interaction with the substantive
considerations illuminated by Professor Ortiz.
III. MoTIVE REvmw AND THE PROCESS TRADmON
The doctrine of intent in equal protection is a direct descendant of
process-based constitutional theories. The intent doctrine has its roots
in democratic process theory-theoretical thought expanding from the
early twentieth century to the present.'80 I focus my analysis primarily
on the more specific theory of "motive review." As with its broader
antecedent, motive review theorists adhered to the principle of judicial
restraint toward other government actors. This restraint was "based on
a conception of democracy that prefers majoritarian forms of societal
180. For a very fine summary of the various strands of "process" theory and their
influence on constitutional decisionmaking, including motive review, see Flagg, Enduring
Principle, supra note 8, at 940-49 (discussing the first, second, and third generation process




decisionmaking ... [and] then proceed[ed] to find a justification for
judicial review in an analysis of institutional competence." ' 81 Motive
review proponents proposed an exception to this rule of judicial
restraint, taking into account democratic process concerns underlying
judicial restraint. Paul Brest and John Ely were the earliest, and
remain the most influential, motive review proponents. Both Brest
and Ely argued for judicial review of facially neutral decisions to
ensure that unconstitutional motives, particularly those based on racial
prejudice, have not been pursued in the course of governmental
decisionmaking 2
In this Part, I will uncover the core principles underlying
democratic process theory and their corollary premises in motive
review theory. A closer look at the doctrinal development of the intent
requirement reveals a significant reliance upon these tenets. 3
Moreover, I will demonstrate that substantive concerns-the
individual right at stake-interact with institutional process principles
in a way that reinforces democratic process theory. Making these
principles and premises explicit, and uncovering their influence in
shaping the intent doctrine, is critical to my thesis that these principles
contain guiding criteria for understanding the application of the intent
standard to various forms of governmental decisionmaking.
A. Validating the Democratic Process: Motive Review as Process-
Corrective
One of the main principles of democratic process theory that has
clearly influenced motive review theory is that of "judicial restraint."
This principle comes out of the preference for democratic processes of
decisionmaking and respect for other branches and levels of
government. In its preference for majoritarian forms of
decisionmaking, process theory counsels that judicial review is
relatively undemocratic. Particularly with respect to constitutional
issues, the judiciary is seen as a "counter-majoritarian" institution-
181. Flagg, Enduring Principle, supra note 8, at 949.
182. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 115-18; JoHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 136 (Harvard 1980).
183. Some have contended that the link between motive review theory and the Court's
jurisprudence in this area is unclear. See Flagg, Enduring Principle, supra note 8, at 959
(arguing no direct connection evidenced by the lack of discussion in the Davis opinion of
process theorists' work and lack of any mention of the institutional factors that counsel
against motive review, but conceding that the abrupt change of heart by the Court must have
been precipitated by something and the most plausible candidate would be appearance of
process-based arguments). However, as I will demonstrate, both the Davis and Arlington
Heights opinions demonstrate significant reliance on these principles.
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less responsive and accountable to majority will than either executive
or legislative bodies.' 8' Hence, when reviewing the work of more
representative branches, courts are urged to exercise judicial restraint
so as not to upset their policy decisions. Because policymaking often
involves "controversial value judgments," its task is best left to the
"laboratory of democracy"-except where the policymaker has
violated a clear and determinative constitutional provision. 85  Any
other course would render the Court no more than a "naked power
organ," freely substituting its policy preferences for those of other,
more representative and accountable actors and calling into question
its own legitimacy. ' 86
Doctrinally, in constitutional law, this judicial restraint is
translated into a highly deferential standard-rational basis-when
approaching a challenged legislative or executive action. The theory
behind this deference is that "even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process.' 87 However, there
are exceptions to this deference. In antidiscrimination law, the
paradigm exception is express racial classifications, which supply a
reason to infer antipathy. Judicial scrutiny can also be justified for
facially neutral decisions when it is found that governmental
decisionmakers pursued illicit motives.
In accordance with process theory, motive review proponents
positioned the Court as a corrector of democratic process defects.
More particularly, judicial review could justifiably cleanse the political
process of the effects of majoritarian prejudice on minorities. Where
illicit factors, like prejudice, "materially" influence either legislative or
administrative policy choices, both Brest and Ely concluded that "due
process of lawmaking is denied.' 88 Even if the illicit motivation was
not the "but for" or sole or even dominant cause of the decision,
184. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR oF PoLmcs 16-17 (1962) ("[When the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of
the prevailing majority, but against it."); Peller, supra note 180, at 593-94 (discussing Hart
and Sacks' premise of "democratic supremacy").
185. See PelIer, supra note 180, at 600.
186. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 33 (1959).
187. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (quoting Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
188. See ELY, supra note 182, at 159-60; see also Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note
22, at 117 ("[Slince the decisionmaker has (by hypothesis) assigned an incorrect value to a




judicial review was nevertheless warranted because the political
process had been distorted by the faulty judgment of policymakers and
thus they had failed to rationally and accurately assess the costs and
benefits of their decision.189
The political process breaks down, according to Ely, when
"prejudice," a "lens that distorts reality," lurks in the hearts and minds
of policymakers.' 9° As a "nation of minorities," the political process
depends on "the ability and willingness of various groups to apprehend
[the] overlapping interests that can bind them into a majority on a
given issue."191  Prejudice blinds policymakers to the "overlapping
interests that in fact exist," unites groups 'that have little else in
common than their antagonism for the racial minority,"' and thus
provides the majority with that "'common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens that Madison believed improbable in a pluralistic
society.' ' 92 Judicial scrutiny is reserved, in particular, for prejudice
towards minority groups who are "barred from the pluralist's bazaar
and thus keepoI finding [themselves] on the wrong end of the
[policymaker's] classifications."' 93 Because such groups are often the
objects of majoritarian prejudice, policymakers are likely to rely on
stereotypes that reflect "us" and "them" social categories and are
employed in legislation to benefit "uS."194
To be sure, neither Ely nor Brest focused exclusively on the
elected branches in justifying motive review. Both also explicitly
189. See ELY, supra note 182, at 155-57. Ely went on to state:
It is inconsistent with constitutional norms to select people for unusual deprivation
on the basis of race, religion, or politics, or even simply because the official doing
the choosing doesn't like them. When such a principle of selection has been
employed, the system has malfunctioned: indeed we can accurately label such a
selection a denial of due process. Perhaps a properly functioning system would
have generated the same result, perhaps it wouldn't. But that typically is true when
due process has been denied, and the remedy, save only in cases of clearly
nonprejudicial error, is to reject the product of the malfunctioning process and start
over.
Id at 137 (footnotes omitted).
190. See id at 153.
191. Id
192. Id (quoting Frank Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALL. REV. 275,313 (1972)).
193. Id at 152 (noting that, while "of course the pluralist model does work sometimes,
and minorities can protect themselves by striking deals and stressing ties that bind the
interests of other groups to their own," the fact remains that the pluralist model of democracy
often breaks down-most notably in the case of African-Americans).
194. See id at 159; accord Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1141, 1143-44 (1978) [hereinafter Brest, Reflections]; see also Flagg, Enduring
Principle, supra note 8, at 948 (noting problems that occur when courts fail to recognize
shared interests).
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referred to "administrative" motivation, 95 out of recognition of the
tripartite functions performed by many administrative actors. That is,
they concur with others in the view that "daily, the [different
governmental] departments each perform legislative, executive, and
judicial function."'96 Indeed, the principle of legislative supremacy
has been destabilized, resulting in both the Court and commentators
"reimagin[ing] [administrative actors] as bastions of politics,
democratically superior to courts."' 97 As such, the Court and process
theorists have similarly counseled judicial deference in reviewing the
policy choices of those actors, particularly when such choices are
authorized by legislative delegation. 8 The net result has been that
administrative bodies, with respect to their policymaking capacity, are
increasingly seen as possessing similar, though not the same,
195. See ELY, supra note 182, at 136; Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 128-
30 (referring to "policymaking agenc[ies]"); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
196. Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of Powers:
THE FEDERAuST PAPERS as Political Narrative, 74 Tx. L. REv. 447, 448 (1996). For
instance, the original conception of administrative agencies as technically specialized bodies
that could apply their expertise to statutory interpretation and execution is now only partly
descriptive of the functions of those agencies. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975) (analyzing the historical and
contemporary order of administrative agencies); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 59-68 (1985) (discussing the interaction between interest
groups and administrative agencies).
197. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 593, 616 (1995).
198. The Court set forth this rationale in one recent case upholding its deference to an
administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute:
Judges... are not part of either political branch of the Government.... In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statue in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984); accord Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42-43 (1983); see also Schacter, supra note 197, at 614 ("By relinquishing the interpretive
authority over ambiguous statutes that the court would otherwise enjoy by default, and by
giving that authority to an executive agency that enforces the disputed statute, the court




deliberative capacity and majoritarian influence as legislatures. As
such, the Court is properly hesitant to upset their policy choices
without evidence of a decisionmaking process defect-like prejudice.
This democratic validation approach to legislative and
administrative policymaking has been echoed by the Court as part of
its rationale for adopting the discriminatory purpose rule. In Arlington
Heights, the Court, as motive review proponents had done,
accommodated the need for judicial restraint underlying democratic
process theory while carving out a role for judicial review of illicitly
motivated policy decisions:
Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating
under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single
concern, or even that a particular purpose was the "dominant" or
"primary" one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are
properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations
that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a
showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not
just another competing consideration. When there is proof that a
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision ...
judicial deference is no longer justified.1 9
Judicial scrutiny thus serves to remedy a malfunctioning democratic
process and preserve the Madisonian ideal of democracy in a
pluralistic society.
B. Institutional Competence Limitations: Avoiding the Costs of
Inappropriate Restraint
A corollary principle of process theory that influenced motive
review is the notion of "institutional settlement."' The idea behind
199. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Brest, Legislative Motive, supra
note 22, at 116-18); accord Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (explaining that
the disparate impact standard "involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference
to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under
the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed").
200. See HENRY M. HARr, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW § I, at 3 (1958).
[The central idea of law... [is] the principle of institutional settlement.... When
the principle ... is plainly applicable, we say that the law "is" thus and so, and
brush aside further discussion of what it "ought" to be. Yet the "is" is not really an
"is" but a special kind of "ought"-a statement that ... a decision which is the
duly arrived at result of a duly established procedure for making decisions of that
kind "ought" to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until it
has been duly changed.
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this concept is that certain institutions are more competent, and hence
appropriate, to make certain types of decisions than others."0 The
implications of this principle meant that the legislature, by virtue of its
representative character, is deemed the "ultimate authority" over
substantive decisionmaking and policymaking vis-h.-vis other
institutions-courts, administrative agencies, and private parties.0 2
Administrative agencies, relying on their particular "expertise," were
best at implementing broad standards to carry out the more general
policies of elected officials.203  Courts were best at "'reasoned
elaboration,' ... a sense of craft within which the judiciary could
elaborate principles and policies contained within precedent and
legislation to reach a reasoned, if not analytically determined, result in
particular cases. '2°4  In reaching a result in constitutional law in
particular, courts were urged to adhere to apolitical, "neutral
principles."2 5 If the issue could not be resolved through reasoned
elaboration according to neutral principles, and instead involved mere
"preference" or "sheer guesswork," arguably it was beyond a court's
competence to decide the issue.r°
In making the case for motive review, its proponents had to
overcome objections regarding the institutional impropriety of judicial
inquiries into the motives of legislative bodies and executive
officials.2 7 Motive review proponents were mindful of the limited
institutional competence of courts, particularly in assessing legislative
decisions.2 s In focusing on the relationship between legislatures and
lI at 4-5; see also Peller, supra note 180, at 568-72 (describing the principle of "institutional
settlement" as developed after the advent of Hart and Sacks' work).
201. Hart and Sacks explained the theory of institutional settlement in terms of the
competence that distinguished each institution's unique place in a democratic government.
See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 200, at 3. For instance, "the special
competence of the legislature lay in its ability to resolve general questions of substantive
value in a democratic manner; the competence of administrative agencies was found in the
notion of agency expertise, and so forth." Flagg, Enduring Principle, supra note 8, at 944.
202. See Peller, supra note 180, at 571.
203. See HART & SACKS, TIm LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 200, at 1092-1143; Peller,
supra note 180, at 597.
204. Peller, supra note 180, at595 (citing HART& SACKS, supra note 200, at 193)).
205. See Wechsler, supra note 186, at 2-10.
206. See Peller, supra note 180, at 595 (citing HART & SACKS, supra note 200, at 123).
207. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268 n.18 (1977) ("'his Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, [10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810),] that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation
represent substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government."); see also
Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 128-30 (discussing impropriety as an argument
against judicial review of motivation).
208. See Brest, Reflections, supra note 194, at 1142 ("If the motives underlying an
administrative decision or a legislative enactment should be insulated from judicial review, it
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courts, they acknowledged the limited competence of the judicial
process to assess the policymaking process and argued against a
standard of motive review that would grant judicial license to easily
intrude into the legislative process. Moreover, they warned of the
institutional costs of inappropriate judicial restraint toward
democratically superior actors.
1. The Dangers, and Inadequacy, of an Outcome Standard
Ely, along with Brest, rejected the notion that courts could
adequately assess defects in the policymaking process solely by
reference to its outcomes. In assessing policy decisions by
democratically superior actors, courts were urged to be tolerant of
statistically valid generalizations in the policymaking process. Using
legislatures as the paradigm policymakers, Ely argued that
"[l]egislation on the basis of 'stereotype' is thus legislation by
generalization, the use of a classification believed in statistical terms to
be generally valid without leaving room for proof of individual
deviation."2°9  As such, legislative generalizations cannot be
"intelligibly evaluated simply in terns of the number or percentage of
false-positives they entail."21  To be otherwise intolerant of
stereotypical generalizations would impose an "unbearable cost" on
the policymaking process by requiring government to create
"procedures for deciding every [issue] on its individual merits."21'
Thus, even though statistical generalizations are often both under- and
overinclusive, the court does not require a policymaker to achieve a
"perfect fit," which would undoubtedly involve some added cost.
Instead, the Court "ordinarily, and rightly, refuses to second-guess the
legislative cost-benefit balance." 212
The Court in Feeney echoed the relative institutional
competencies between legislatures and courts and the need for judicial
tolerance of legislative generalizations:
The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the States all power of classification. Most laws classify, and
may affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats
must be for institutional rather than jurisprudential reasons-courts cannot properly
undertake the inquiry or act on its findings.").
209. ELY, supra note 182, at 155.
210. Id. at 156.
211. Id at 155. Indeed, "[a] mode of review geared to whether the incidence of
counterexample is 'too high' is thus indistinguishable from the unacceptable theory that
courts should intervene in the name of the Constitution whenever they disagree with the cost-
benefit balance the legislature has struck." Id.
212. Id at 156.
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them no differently from all other members of the class described by
the law. When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven
effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no
constitutional concern. The calculus of effects, the manner in which a
particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial
responsibility. In assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is
called upon only to measure the basic validity of the legislative
classification.213
The Court has also been up-front about the costs of an outcome-
based standard, such as disparate impact, in judging the cost-benefit
balance involved in lawmaking. From a process perspective, an
outcome-based standard is a slippery slope, disrupting institutional
roles and power in our democratic system.2 4 As the Court in Davis
articulated, a disparate impact standard might be "far reaching,"
raising "serious questions" and "perhaps invalidat[ing]" a range of
statutes and regulations that burdened one group over another.215
Later, in Arlington Heights, the Court was even more precise about the
significance of disparate policy outcomes to the ultimate constitutional
inquiry. Such outcomes, the Court curtly summed up, reflect nothing
more than the "the heterogeneity of the Nation's population. 216
2. The Suspect Classification Doctrine as Precedent
In making the case for judicial review of unconstitutional
motives, the longstanding suspect classification doctrine provided a
useful precedent. It was precedent both for the propriety of judicial
inquiry into legislative motives and for illustrating the relationship
between the legislative product and the process that generated it. The
doctrine reflects a "generic suspicion" that certain classifications are
213. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) (citations
omitted).
214. As one scholar summed up:
[A]pplying strict scrutiny in all disparate impact cases would engage the courts too
extensively in overseeing social policy. Such activity arguably would be
institutionally inappropriate solely by virtue of the volume of decisions involved; it
is not seemly for the Court to appear to have a hand in managing such a wide range
of policy choices. From the process perspective, an "effects test" would
contravene the principle favoring limited use of the power ofjudicial review.
Flagg, Enduring Principle, supra note 8, at 952-53.
215. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). In accordance with this
deference and fear of intrusion on legislative prerogatives, the Court also reserved the
ultimate policy question of whether to extend the disparate impact rule "beyond those areas
where it is already applicable by reason of statute" for "legislative prescription." Id
216. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n.15 (1977) (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972)).
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motivated by prejudice.217 In requiring a perfect fit between the
suspect classification and a constitutional state goal, the doctrine is
aimed at flushing out unconstitutional motivations such as racial
prejudice.2"' Hence, review under the suspect classification rule was
one example of the Court already engaging in motive review, albeit
indirectly.219
Bolstering the case for the propriety of motive review, in light of
institutional competence limitations, is the fact that motive review is
"intrinsically less intrusive than substantive judicial review" per the
suspect classification doctrine.220 That is, the suspect classification
doctrine, with its focus on the legislative product as the trigger for an
inquiry into legislative motives, involves a "direct (and problematic)
inquiry into the integrity of the decisionmaking process. 22' Unlike
motive review, heightened judicial scrutiny under the suspect
classification doctrine is not contingent upon a finding of illicit
motivation; rather, it is the criterion itself that initiates the demand for
an "extraordinary" justification from the decisionmaker. Once
invoked, judicial scrutiny pursuant to the suspect classification
doctrine permits a complete judicial reassessment of the legislative
cost-benefit analysis.222  This reassessment occurs when the Court
places on the legislative body a heavy burden of justification.
217. See Brest, Reflections, supra note 194, at 1145; see also Brest, Legislative
Motive, supra note 22, at 109 (noting the view that it is "highly probable that a racial
classification reflects prejudice on the decisionmaker's part"); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989) (restating the rule that the proper standard of
review is not affected by the race of those protected or discriminated against).
218. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (noting that racial classifications carry the danger
that they are based on group stereotypes; "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry ... there is
simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics"); Klarman, supra note 8, at 256 (describing suspect classification rule as
containing the virtue of"purg[ing] the legislative process of racial hostility and stereotypes").
219. See ELY, supra note 182, at 146. The suspect classification rule "lacks the proof
problems of a more direct inquiry [into motivation] and into the bargain permits courts (and
complainants) to be more politic, to invalidate (or attack) something for illicit motivation
without having to come right out and say that's what they're doing." let Thus, the argument
goes, for the same reasons that overt and covert racial classifications are subject to judicial
scrutiny, courts should likewise be able to inquire "whether impermissible criteria or
objectives played a role in the decisionmaking process when the same result might have been
achieved by the consideration of legitimate criteria or justified in terms of legitimate
objectives." Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 115.
220. Brest, Reflections, supra note 194, at 1143.
221. Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 3, at 15.
222. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 108 (noting that this burden of
justification "requires the court to reassess the legislative decision by balancing the benefits




Substantive review per the suspect classification doctrine hence allows"courts to second-guess other agencies' judgments and orderings of
social facts and values. 223 Moreover, if the court decides that the
wrong balance was struck, the decision is rendered "substantively, and
hence permanently, invalid."' 4
3. Ensuring Appropriate Restraint
In order to ensure that judicial review would not inappropriately
intrude upon the policymaking process, motive review proponents had
to be careful about defining the type of process defect that could
justify judicial review. Ely was up-front about the need to focus on the
"psychology of the decision.' 2 5  In Ely's terminology, before
requiring a lawmaker to justify its decision, judicial review would
need to identify instances of discreditable "legislative
misapprehension.2 26  A legislative misapprehension is a policy
generalization whose incidence of counterexamples is not merely "too
high," but is actually significantly higher than the decisionmaker
appears to have thought it was.27 The difference between these two
standards is that the first focuses simply on "the legislative product"
and the second rightly focuses on the "process that generated it" to
identify some "factor or factors that suggest the likelihood" of
prejudice. 28 In order to identify those generalizations that are the
product of prejudice, Ely would go beyond the outcomes and
investigate the history of the decision and the particular interests
motivating the decisionmaker. He would thus investigate "where [the
generalization] came from-who came up with it and whether it is one
that serves their interests. 2 2 9 Further, where a minority group suffers
223. Brest, Reflections, supra note 194, at 1143-44.
224. Id. at 1144.
225. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 182, at 153 (focusing on the "psychology of [the]
decision, possesses the additional virtue of relating rather directly to what we found to be the
functional significance of a theory of suspect classifications, one of flushing out
unconstitutional motivations").
226. See id at 157.
227. See iL Similarly, Brest described an "illicitly motivated" policymaker as one
who "treats as a desirable consequence [a goal] to which the lawfully motivated
decisionmaker would be indifferent or which he would view as undesirable." Brest,
Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 116.
228. ELY, supra note 182, at 157.
229. Id. at 158. He further explained:
Thus generalizations to the effect, say, that whites in general are smarter or more
industrious than blacks, men more stable emotionally than women, or native-born
Americans more patriotic than Americans born elsewhere, are likely to go down
pretty easily-and in fact we know they have-with groups whose demography is
that of the typical American legislature. Few will suppose there aren't
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political losses because of that misapprehension, resulting in policies
that disadvantage "them" while protecting "us," intrusion into the
otherwise sacrosanct legislative process is justified.
Feeney solidified the unique, psychologically oriented inquiry
that accompanies motive review of facially neutral legislation. This
highly subjective standard virtually dictates that facially neutral laws
will rarely be heavily scrutinized by the Court.2'0 Motive review is
thus a way of uncovering unconstitutional motives without the
intrusion-judicial redoing of the cost-benefit balance-of the suspect
classification doctrine. Facially neutral laws will not garner the strict
scrutiny allowed by the suspect classification doctrine, absent "'a
reason to infer antipathy."'' In this way, motive review is responsive
to considerations of democratic invalidation and relative institutional
competencies underlying process theory.232 Motive review avoids an
unnecessary intrusion into the political process and a concomitant lack
of proper respect for the government's chief policymaking agencies.
However, even where an illicit motive is found, the policymaker can
save the decision from invalidation by demonstrating that the same
decision would have been made absent that motive.1 3 By doing so,
motive review ultimately "cedes" the cost-benefit balance to the
political agencies.234 The judiciary's only role vis-h-vis motive review
is "to assure that, in the process of accommodating competing
counterexamples, but the overall validity of such a generalization is likely to be
quite readily accepted. By seizing upon the positive myths about the groups to
which they belong and the negative myths about those to which they don't, or for
that matter the realities respecting some or most members of the two classes,
legislators, like the rest of us, are likely to assume too readily that not many of
"them" will be unfairly deprived, nor many of "us" unfairly benefited, by a
classification of this type. Generalizations of the opposite sort, which attribute
superiority to a group to which most legislators do not belong-say.., that Jews are
better students-are a different matter. A generalization of this sort may
occasionally find grudging acceptance, but here we can be sure that the imperfect,
statistical nature of the claim will be well appreciated, and in addition that there
will be explanations ... that will prevail in the legislature to assure an
individualized test or at least that the statutory presumption will be rebuttable.
Id. at 159.
230. See generally Binion, supra note 13, at 408 ("The intent rule itself would not
reflect judicial restraint unless it significantly reduced either the opportunity or the need for
judicial intervention in the policymaking process.").
231. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,272 (1978) (quoting Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
232. See Brest, Reflections, supra note 194, at 1144 n.11 (citing Alexander M. Bickel
& Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process. The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957)).
233. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270-71 n.21 (1977).
234. See Brest, Reflections, supra note 194, at 1144.
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interests, these agencies do not commit the constitutional accounting
error of treating the infringement of a constitutional right as a benefit
rather than as a cost. 235
C. The Outcome-Process Link: Overcoming Evidentiary Obstacles
in Ascertaining Motive
The other side of the institutional competence coin is the ability
of courts to discern the motives of policymakers. The inquiry into
motive involves detailing how a court can assess the policymaking
process while maintaining the judicial restraint that is the hallmark of
process-based theories of constitutional review. Both Brest and Ely
embraced a clear "processual" approach to identifying unconstitutional
motives.236 However, both Ely and Brest also acknowledged that the
outcomes, or distributional patterns, of the policymaking process could
yield extremely persuasive evidence of the likely nature of that
process.237 Though rejecting an outcome-based approach to defining
the constitutional harm, the relationship between decisionmaking
outcomes and the content of a decisionmaking process are not as
severable on an evidentiary level. In fact, their relationship is even
more inseparable when various types of governmental decisionmaking
processes-that is, other than policymaking-are examined for
impermissible motives.
1. The Connection Between Outcomes and Motive
In addressing the evidentiary difficulty of making a direct judicial
inquiry into motive, motive review proponents conceded that direct
235. Il Moreover, even where the policymaker fails to adequately justify an illicitly
motivated decision, institutional competence reasons prevent the Court from completely
invalidating the underlying substantive issue, once again affirming the primacy of the
policymaker. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 115 ("A legislative decision
held invalid because it was impermissibly motivated may in theory be made again, in
identical form, provided only that it is made for licit reasons."); Brest, Reflections, supra note
194, at 1144 (stating that, even where "a court invalidates a law on the ground that the
process was affected by an illicit motive, the court in effect reaffirms the primacy of the
policymaker by remanding to allow the agency to reconsider the underlying policy issue").
236. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at II1 (noting that motive inquiry
"focuses on the process by which a rule was adopted"); ELY, supra note 182, at 136 ('The
constitutionality of most distributions... cannot be determined simply by looking to see who
ended up with what, but rather can be approached intelligibly only by attending to the
process that brought about the distribution in question.").
237. See ELY, supra note 170, at 136; see also Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note




evidence of motive would be rare for obvious reasons.2 8 As such,
Brest recognized that the "chief method" of ascertaining motive
involved making inferences about a decisionmaker's true objectives.? 9
This assessment would be based on drawing inferences from the
decisionmaker's conduct, as viewed "in the context of antecedent and
concurrent events and situations."'"' This inference could be based
upon a number of factors, which the Court in Arlington Heights
eventually saw fit to adopt, relying on Brest's groundbreaking work on
motive review.241
One of the primary factors Brest that argued would aid courts in
drawing inferences about a decisionmaker's motives was the content
of the decision as reflected by its outcomes.242 Brest drew a distinction
between two inquiries. The first inquiry asks: "Why did the
decisionmaker make a particular decision?"; whereas the second
inquiry asks: "What (if any) operative rule is the decisionmaker
systematically employing?"243 The second inquiry is concerned with
uncovering the "content" of a rule or decision itself.244 Like the
suspect classification inquiry, it is concerned with the end state of
affairs.245  In contrast, the first inquiry seeks to ascertain the
"objectives" or "purposes" behind a rule or decision---"the state of
affairs or effects that the decisionmaker seeks to establish or retain by
promulgation of the rule."2 6 It is a direct inquiry into "the process by
which the rule or decision was made; it asks what criteria or objectives
the decisionmaker took into account."247  This second processual
inquiry is the classic inquiry into motive.
238. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 124 (citing "the ease with which
one can lie successfully about one's motives .... the costs of obtaining the testimony of the
members of multimember decisionmaking bodies" and "legal doctrines that immunize
legislators and high executive officials from having to account for their decisions").
239. See i. at 120-21.
240. ML
241. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n.12 (1977) (referring to Brest's work as a "scholarly discussion of legislative
motivation"); see also id. at 267-68 (using the same factors advocated in Brest, Legislative
Motive, supra note 22, at 120-24).
242. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 111-12.
243. Id at1ll.
244. See icL at 104-05. The content of the rule can, and many times does, involve a
fixed set of "operative criteria" that the decisionmaker is employing. See iL at 105.
245. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that sometimes an
indisputable pattern emerges from the effect of state action that is not subject to explanation
on grounds other than race); see also Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 114 n.104
("[Tihe methodology for establishing that a decisionmaker is covertly employing an illicit
operative rule or criterion has been basically that, of statistical analysis.").
246. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 104.
247. I at 115.
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Brest argued, and the Court has concurred, that the connection
between the content of a rule and its motive explains many of the pre-
Davis cases. In some of these earlier cases, the unconstitutionality of
facially neutral official decisions was ascertained through an inference
based upon their content, determined from the outcomes of the
decisions. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,248 for instance, "the probability
that a nonracially motivated [legislative] delineation of Tuskegee's
boundaries would have the [racially exclusionary] effect it did is so
minimal that, even without knowledge of the racial attitudes prevalent
in Alabama, one could not but conclude that the law was designed to
exclude [blacks] from the city." 49 Similarly, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,1°
"[tlhe Supreme Court inferred from the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors' pattern of granting and denying laundry permits that the
board was systematically denying permits to Chinese applicants
because of their nationality."" 1  The early jury cases are also examples
of the use of content analysis to ascertain motive.z2 When there is the
type of total exclusion indicated in those cases, the line between
discriminatory purpose and effect is significantly blurred. z3
By first inquiring into a decision's content, the suspect
classification doctrine's evidentiary methodology also proved to be a
"handmaiden" for motive review analysis but without the substantive
intrusion that characterizes that doctrine. That is, requiring an
248. 364U.S. 339 (1960).
249. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 121 (footnote omitted).
250. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In NIck Wo, the plaintiff, a Chinese resident of San
Francisco, was convicted of violating a local ordinance prohibiting operation of laundries
located in wooden buildings without a permit issued by the board of supervisors of San
Francisco. See id. at 357. When laundry operators applied for permits to resume operation,
all but one of the white applicants received permits, but none of the over 200 Chinese
applicants were successful. See id. at 359. The Court unanimously reversed Yick Wo's
conviction and found the stark racial disparity to require the conclusion that the racially
neutral law had been discriminatorily applied. See id. at 374.
251. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 112.
252. The Court, explaining its reasoning in one early jury case, assessed the
evidentiary significance of the total exclusion of a racial minority group from the jury pool as
follows:
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain class will
serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But it taxes our
credulity to say that mere chance resulted in their being no members of this class
among the over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks
discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious design on the part of any
individual jury commissioner.
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (emphasis added).
253. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[W]hen the disproportion is as dramatic as in Gomillion v. Lighifoot or Yick Wo v. Hopkins,




explanation from a decisionmaker on the basis of the legislative
"product," or outcomes, is another way to ascertain motive, but
without reassessing the cost-benefit balance. An inference that an
illicit "covert" criterion is being systematically employed can be
determined by its outcomes 5 4 Once a covert criterion or rule has
been discovered, it "should trigger the same demand for a defense that
would be triggered by an overt rule [or criterion] having the same
content."5 5 The explanation, however, is not like the "extraordinary
justification" (compelling state interest) required under the suspect
classification doctrine. It is much less intrusive, requiring only a
rebuttal of the inference of race-dependency. If the decisionmaker
rebuts the inference, that signals the end of judicial scrutiny. If he does
not, the inference stands and the content of the decision is deemed to
be the decisionmaker's true motive. 6 Hence, in Gomillion, the
original inference of illicit motive based on the outcomes of the
legislative decision easily survived where the legislature failed to
explain the outcomes at all. 7
Not surprisingly, the Court has sought to limit this method of
inferring motive. Both ick Wo and Gomillion are cited in the Court's
contemporary jurisprudence as the "rare cases in which a statistical
pattern of discriminatory impact [alone] demonstrated a constitutional
violation." 8  Only when the pattern of outcomes is as "stark" as it
was in those cases is "the evidentiary inquiry" deemed "relatively
easy." 9 At the same time, the Court has excepted one class of cases
254. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 111 ('That the rule is made
manifest only through systematic application does not make it less 'real'-or less harmful-than
an overt regulation.").
255. l at 111 n.90.
256. See id. at 118. From there, the nature of judicial review will depend upon the
nature of the motive inferred from the decisionmaker's conduct. If the motive behind a
particular decision is found to be illicit-for instance, a purpose to exclude blacks-the
decision is rendered invalid altogether. See id If the motive is found to be "constitutionally
suspect"--for instance influenced by racial considerations-the decisionmaker must offer a
compelling state interest justifying the use of a suspect rule or operative criteria. See id. If a
compelling state interest can justify the use of the suspect criterion under the circumstances,
then the decisionmaker's motivation is licit. See id. If the justification is not compelling
enough, "the decisionmaker's motivation should invalidate the decision-for the same reasons
that his consideration of an objective that is illicit per se should invalidate it." Id
257. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342, 347-48 (1960). It was indeed
crucial to the Court's scrutiny of that statute that the state legislature "never suggested, either
in [its] brief or in oral argument, any countervailing [purpose] which [the statute] is designed
to serve." Id at 342.
258. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 n.12 (1987); see also Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (noting that
the statistical patterns in Gormillion and ick Wo were "stark" and "rare").
259. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
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from this "rar&' category and even expanded the content-motive
inquiry in these cases. In the jury selection cases, something less than
a "stark" disparity can support an inference that a particular decision
was unconstitutionally motivated. Because of the "nature of the jury-
selection task," the Court has "permitted a finding of constitutional
violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach the
extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion."26
Indeed, as earlier jury cases confirm, "the total or seriously
disproportionate exclusion of [blacks] from jury venires" is enough to
make an inference of racial content sufficient to demand a justification
from the decisionmaker.2 61
2. The Difference that the Process Makes
The Court has never expressly explained what is different about
the "nature of the jury selection task" that allows a less than extreme
statistical pattern to satisfy the threshold for judicial intrusion. The
answer to the "special nature of the jury selection task" may lie in an
important point that Brest made. Unlike a one-time, "ad hoc" policy
decision-like the decision to adopt a rule of general applicability-
the jury-selection decision occurs within the context of a pattern of
similar decisions.262 As Brest explained, "[s]tatistical techniques
generally are of less assistance in explaining the basis for a particular
decision than in explaining the basis for a pattern of decisions." 263
Such a pattern of decisions yields a better quality of evidence from
which to infer whether an illicit criterion is being applied by the
decisionmaker.264
260. Id.at266n.13.
261. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
262. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that "[riules
themselves are seldom, if ever, generated by higher-level ... rules. Rather they are adopted
through an ad hoc process in which the decisionmaker considers and weighs a large variety
of factors.").
263. Id. at 115n.104.
264. The court thus
hypothesizes the illicit rule ("reject Blacks"), [or] posits other factors... that could
conceivably explain the decisionmaker's pattern of conduct, and asseses the
likelihood that one or another factor-or randomness-accounts for the
decisionmaker's behavior. In testing a hypothesized operative rule one usually can
identify a relevant datum ... and enough events often have occurred to allow
control for other possible explanatory variables.
MaJ at 114 n.104; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 72 n.17 (1980) ("Tihe
racially exclusionary jury cases ... typically have involved a consistent pattern of discrete
official actions that demonstrated almost to a mathematical certainty that [Blacks] were being
excluded from juries because of their race.").
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It is more difficult to infer the content of a rule from the outcome
of a unique, one-time legislative (or other official policy) decision than
it is from a pattern of similar decisions applying the same rule or
policy. Thus, "it often is not clear what events count as salient data for
the inference, the sample is likely to be small, and the data are likely to
consist of events so lacking in similarity so as to preclude systematic
analysis."2 65 Indeed, as earlier cases indicate, absent a total or stark
disparity, the Court will not easily infer existence of an
unconstitutional motive from outcomes of a legislative decision.266
Where there is a pattern of similar decisions with racially
exclusionary outcomes, courts have been willing to infer from the
outcomes alone that a decisionmaker was most likely employing a
covert illicit rule or criterion. From there, courts will infer that a
specific challenged decision is an application of that rule 67 and shift to
the decisionmaker "the burden of proving that a particular [challenged]
decision. . . was not an instance of the application of an impermissible
rule."268 It is in the process of this explanation that the motive inquiry
265. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 115 n.104.
266. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Four years after Gomillion,
the Court was once again solely concerned with actual motivation in a similar type of racial
gerrymandering claim. In Wright, the New York legislature had reapportioned the state's
congressional districts according to the 1960 decennial census. Plaintiffs, a class of nonwhite
and Puerto Rican origin citizens, challenged the concentration of black voters in three
Manhattan congressional districts and their exclusion from other districts. See id. at 53-54.
Even though, as in Gomillion, there was a statistical disparity (the three challenged districts
were made up predominantly of nonwhites) and the district boundaries were irregularly
drawn, the Court rejected the challengers' equal protection claims. Because the disparity had
not been as stark as it was in Gomillion, the Court concluded that the disparity was open, at
best, to conflicting inferences regarding the existence of race discrimination. See id. at 56-57.
Indeed, as the Court in Wright explained: "Mhe concentration of [nonwhite] voters in one
area in the country made it difficult ... to fix districts so as to have anything like an equal
division of these voters among the districts." k1 at 57; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
644-47 (1993) (explaining the significance of the legislation in Gomillion as so "bizarre on its
face" that it was "unexplainable on grounds other than race"). Hence, the evidence failed to
rise to an unmistakable conclusion either that the New York Legislature was "motivated by
racial considerations" or that the statute "was the product of a state contrivance to segregate
on the basis of race or place of origin." Wright, 376 U.S. at 56, 58. Wright thus illustrated
the difficulty of determining from legislative outcomes whether the decisionmaker
purposefully distinguished between voters on the basis of race.
267. That is, courts will assume that the "cases coming within the terms of the rule
must be controlled by it .... All other things being equal, the fact that a decisionmaker is
known to follow a rule lends support to the inference that a particular decision consistent with
the rule was generated by it." Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 22, at 112-13.
268. Id at 113; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (noting that in
the early jury cases the burden "'shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of
unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and




takes place.2 69 As in the jury selection cases, if the decisionmaker's
reasons fail to dispel the inference that the specific decision is an
instance of the application of the covert criterion, the court is free to
assume that the challenged decision was motivated by an
impermissible purpose.
This "type of decision" distinction adequately explains the
difference between Gomillion, or legislative enactments, and the early
jury cases. However, it does not suffice to differentiate the early jury
cases from Yick Wo, both of which involve systematic administration
of a policy or rule, versus the one-time ad hoe adoption of a general
rule or policy. The Court continues to cite Yick Wo as the "rare" case
in which outcomes from a pattern of administrative decisions will give
rise to an inference of motive.270 Yet, it continues to liberally infer
illicit motives from less-than-stark outcomes in the administration of
jury selection procedures. The one difference between the two cases,
the fact that Yick Wo involves distributing laundry permits as opposed
to selecting jurors, seems inconsequential to all of the aforementioned
institutional concerns underlying process theory. However, this
contextual difference is significant according to another factor. The
"rareness" of the increased judicial intrusion in cases like Yick Wo, and
the corresponding frequency with which judicial intervention occurs in
jury cases, can-be explained by the substantive right at issue.
D. Twin Strands of One Tradition: The Interaction of Process and
Substantive Values
Process theorists, including motive review proponents,
successfully positioned the Court to police the democratic process.
Part of that policing function was to ensure that certain rights critical to
the proper functioning of that process were not unnecessarily burdened
by governmental action. These rights are deemed political rights in
that they are essential to individual participation in the democratic
process. More often than not, these rights are also constitutionally
guaranteed. When these political rights have been burdened, they pose
the same threat as does prejudice, or other illicit considerations, to the
proper functioning of the democratic process. Hence, the substantive
right affected by the .allegedly invidious decision is important to
motive review, even if indirectly. Judicial intrusion can be properly
heightened without reducing the institutional legitimacy of the court
269. I thank Michael Dorf for this insight.
270. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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where those interests essential to individual participation in the
democratic process are at stake.
In making the case for judicial review of facially neutral actions,
Ely argued that motive review was particularly justified where the
decision affected "constitutionally gratuitous" rights and benefits-
rights that are not explicitly guaranteed by the language of the
Constitution.2 ' Legislation that burdens "fundamental" rights
historically has been presumed unconstitutional absent a compelling
governmental interest. However, where a state law does not impair a
right or liberty protected by the Constitution, there is no occasion to
"depart[] from the settled mode of constitutional analysis of
[legislation] involving questions of economic and social policy."272 As
Professor Ortiz has explained,27 3 rights involving economic and social
goods, such as employment and housing, are considered
constitutionally gratuitous because they are left to market allocation.
Constitutionally guaranteed and "political" rights involve such
activities as voting and jury service. These rights are not only
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, but are "critical to the
functioning of an open and effective democratic process."274
The paradigm of active judicial review for political rights is in the
First Amendment context, where the Court is heavily involved in
scrutinizing impediments to free speech. Unlike constitutionally
gratuitous rights, here "false-positives" must not be tolerated and
"[c]ourts must police inhibitions on expression and other political
activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so: ins have a
way of wanting to make sure the outs stay out."275 Similarly, any
blockages to the voting process, like denial of the right to vote, are
actively scrutinized.276 The right to vote "includes the right to have the
vote counted at full value without dilution or discount."277 Hence,
271. See ELY, supra note 182, at 136.
272. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-33 (1973).
273. See supra Part II.C.
274. ELY, supra note 182, at 105.
275. l at 105-06 ("Judicial review in this area must involve, at a minimum, the
elimination of any inhibition of expression that is unnecessary to the promotion of a
government interest.").
276. See id at 117. Because, like free speech, "[w]e cannot trust the ins to decide who
stays out," it is "incumbent on the courts to ensure not only that no one is denied the vote for
no reason, but also that where there is a reason ... it had better be a very convincing one."
l at 120.
277. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964) (quoting South v. Peters, 339
U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544,569 (1969) ("The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well
as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.").
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claims involving "malapportionment" or "vote dilution" gamer
significant judicial scrutiny. Malapportionment occurs where
districting practices have the effect of making an individual's vote in a
heavily populated district less significant than an individual's vote in a
smaller district. Vote dilution occurs where individuals of a
particular group are effectively excluded from participation such that
the political processes are not equally open to participation by the
group in question.279 The propriety of judicial review in this area is
buttressed by the judicial manageability of the "one person, one vote"
principle, a violation of which forms the basis of vote dilution
claims.280
Likewise, the right to serve on a jury involves a potential juror's"'participat[ion] in the administration of justice,"'28' and hence in the
democratic process. Quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, the Court has
forcefully reasoned that jury service "preserves the democratic
element of the law" in that it "invests each citizen with a kind of
magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to
discharge towards society; and the part which they take in the
Government." 282  As such, a potential juror's exclusion not only
violates the right of a criminal defendant to a trial by a jury of his
peers, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, but equally as
importantly "forecloses a significant opportunity [for the excluded
jurors] to participate in civic life."283
That substantive concerns, or the right at issue, affect the Court's
motive review modus operandi has been persuasively argued by
278. This type of claim is to be distinguished from one in which districting only
affects "the political strength of various groups that compete for leadership in a
democratically governed community." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
279. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-68 (1978). "[Cultural incompatibility
... conjoined with the poll tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures in the
nation ha[d] operated to effectively deny Mexican-Americans access to the political
processes in Texas."' l (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 347 R Supp. 704, 731 (W.D. Tex.
1972)).
280. See ELY, supra note 182, at 122-24. Adding to the propriety of judicial review
are recent constitutional amendments "extend[ing] the franchise to persons who previously
had been denied it... reflecting a strengthening constitutional commitment to the proposition
that all qualified citizens are to play a role in the making of public decisions." Iel at 123.
281. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (quoting Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258
U.S. 298,310 (1922)).
282. Id at 406-07 (quoting ALExis DE TocQuEvILE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-
37 (Schocken ed., 1st ed. 1961)).
283. Id at 409; see also Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation
Akin to Voting, 80 CoRNELLL. REV. 203 (1995) (arguing that 'jury service was conceived of
as a political right").
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Professor Ortiz.' However, the argument that these concerns alone
dictate the application of intente 5 to the exclusion of institutional
"process" values286 is incomplete.
Instead, as I will demonstrate below, these substantive concerns
interact with institutional process principles to cohere the Court's
application of various levels of intent. 7
IV. COHERIG INTENT
The intent doctrine coheres when viewed through the lens of
democratic process principles. In this Part, I apply the institutional
process and substantive considerations discussed above to the judicial
posture toward different governmental actors and actions.
Specifically, the degree of judicial restraint depends upon: (1) the
actor making the decision (democratic validation), (2) the type of
decision made (institutional competence), and (3) the substantive right
affected by the decision. The degree of judicial restraint is linked, in
turn, to the ability of disparate impact evidence to trigger the demand
for a justification from the decisionmaker. In other words, as the
reasons for judicial deference decline, the relevance of disparate
impact to the intent inference escalates. This evidentiary variation, in
turn, significantly determines the degree of consciousness-or level of
intene 88-that can violate the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, the
intent doctrine can be conceptualized along a continuum, instead of a
284. See supra Part II.C. Juridical distinctions between "political" and other rights-
such as social and civil rights-have strong historical roots, arguably perpetuated in the
Court's intent jurisprudence. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1119-29,
1138-39 (1997).
285. See Ortiz, supra note 14, at 1136-37. Ortiz argues that the Court follows a
familiar hierarchy [that it] employs in the fundamental rights strand of equal
protection in deciding what level of scrutiny to accord various kinds of interests.
In that area voting and certain criminal process rights, along with the right to
travel, receive heightened scrutiny; education receives somewhat elevated scrutiny
... and traditional economic interests receive reduced scrutiny.
ML (footnotes omitted).
286. See id at 1106-07. Ortiz argues that process theory presents an intelligible
explanation for an intent requirement, but not the intent requirement actually in use. Instead,
the doctrine coheres only as a way of "judging substantive outcomes ... by allocating
burdens of proof between the individual and the state ... differently in different contexts."
Id
287. To be fair, Ortiz seems to admit some interaction between these two strands when
he argues that the "seemingly disparate strands" of equal protection doctrine-the
"fundamental rights" and "suspect classification" doctrines-meet in the Court's intent
jurisprudence. See id. at 1137. Nevertheless, in the end, he insists on characterizing the
Court's modus operandi as solely based upon the right at issue. See id. at 1139-42.
288. See supra Part II.B.
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bright line, separating the decision's impact from the decisionmaker's
intent.
A. Super Restraint: Requiring Specific Intent
On one end of the continuum are policy decisions made by
legislative and executive actors that do not substantially affect the
challenger's political or fundamental rights. These decisions receive
the highest degree of judicial deference. The Court exercises "super
restraint" toward these decisions, refusing to reassess the cost-benefit
calculation absent evidence of specific intent. As such, judicial
intrusion is virtually precluded by a presumption of regularity attached
to the decisions. The challenger has an extremely heavy burden to
demonstrate that the decisionmaker was motivated by a specific desire
to harm the group adversely impacted by the decision. Judicial inquiry
ends once the Court is satisfied that the decision, or the policy
underlying the decision, is rationally based.
1. Legislative and Executive Decisions and Other Majoritarian
Processes: The Fear of Democratic Invalidation and Deference
to Respective Institutional Competencies
Both democratic validation and institutional competence
considerations drive the judicial posture toward the most majoritarian
actors and decisionmaking processes. The paradigm exercise of super
judicial restraint is in the context of legislative policy decisions. Like
Feeney, challenges to legislation invoke the most fundamental
institutional process concerns arising from judicial interference in
other branches' policymaking. Courts will refuse to inquire beyond
the basic rationality of the policy absent clear and convincing reasons
to inquire further into the decisionmaking process. The Court in
McCleskey, for instance, reflected the appropriate level of judicial
restraint in rejecting a challenge to Georgia's capital sentencing
legislation. The Court deferred to the "wide discretion" that
legislatures have "in the choice of criminal laws and penalties" and the
presumptively "legitimate reasons" for adoption and maintenance of
the capital punishment statute.289 Absent a showing of specific intent,
the Court refused to scrutinize the policy any further for fear of
significant democratic validation costs. 290
289. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,298-99 (1987).
290. See id at 315 (fearing that "if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty").
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Moreover, the Court was careful to articulate the respective
institutional competence boundaries in resolving challenges to facially
neutral legislation:
McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It
is not the responsibility-or indeed even the right--of this Court to
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the
legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that are
"constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of
the people." Legislatures are also better qualified to weigh and
"evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts.
' 2 9 1
The Court conceded, however, that its function was to "determine on a
case-by-case basis whether these laws are applied consistently with the
Constitution., 292  As I will argue later, the Court's adjudication of
McCleskey's second claim, involving discriminatory application of the
death penalty in his case, illustrated its reluctance to live up to a task it
is competent to perform.293
Executive decisions-for instance, those made by prosecutors-
receive the same level of restraint as legislatures when a "core power"
is challenged.294 Selective prosecution claims, like that brought in
Wayte v. United States,295 invoke similar institutional process concerns.
Specifically, such challenges "ask[] a court to exercise judicial power
over a 'special province' of the Executive.', 296  Prosecutors are
entrusted with broad discretion to enforce the nation's criminal laws
through their power to prosecute and to charge appropriately.297
Judicial supervision of these decisions involves significant democratic
validation costs: "Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the
criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting
the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and
may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the
Government's enforcement policy.,298
291. Id. at 319 (citations omitted) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383
(1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
292. Id.
293. See infra Part V.A.
294. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996).
295. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
296. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833
(1985)).
297. See id. The Court noted that federal prosecutors "are designated by statute as the
President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed."' Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
298. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
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Institutional competence considerations also weigh in favor of
the highest degree of deference for prosecutorial charging decisions.
Specifically, the relative competence of prosecutors and courts in this
area demands a high threshold of judicial deference. As the Court
succinctly explained in Wayte: "Such factors as the strength of the
case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's
enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake."2 99  Absent "clear
evidence to the contrary," that is a showing of specific intent to harm
the group in question,300 a "presumption of regularity" attaches and the
courts assume that prosecutors have properly discharged their duties.30'
Like challenges to legislative and executive officials exercising
core constitutional duties, a presumption of regularity also
accompanies challenges to forms of direct democracy-such as the
initiative process. 02 As the Seattle School District case illustrates,
courts give broad leeway to initiatives passed by a majority of the
electorate0 3 for the same democratic validation reasons underlying
super judicial restraint toward other majoritarian processes. In the
absence of a clear constitutional violation, the Court reasoned in
Seattle School District, policy decisions covered by an initiative are
299. Id.
300. Selective prosecution claims require the challenger to demonstrate the Feeney
standard of specific discriminatory intent, as well as to demonstrate that the policy has a
discriminatory effect. See id. at 608-09. If the challenger is claiming racially biased
prosecutorial selection, the "effect" requirement can only be satisfied by showing that
similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. See Armstrong, 116 S.
Ct. at 1487.
301. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486. The Court stated that, "'[s]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."' I. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357,364 (1978)).
302. An initiative is an
electoral process whereby designated percentages of the electorate may initiate
legislative or constitutional changes through the filing of formal petitions to be
acted on by the legislature or the total electorate. [It involves t]he power of the
people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls,
independent of legislative assembly.
BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY, 540 (6th ed. 1991). See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 n.4 (1982) (quoting WASH. CoNsT. art. 2, § 1, which gives the
people "the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls,
independent of the legislature" and requires 8% of state voters to sign a petition).
303. In Seattle School District, the initiative at issue passed with 66% of the statewide
vote. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 463.
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properly resolved "through the political process."3 '4 Initiatives that
allocate governmental decisionmaking power according to "neutral
principles" are not "subject to equal protection attack," even though
they may make it more difficult for minorities to achieve favorable
results.0 5 So long as the political majority places obstacles in the path
of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action, the
resulting disproportionate burden on one group is constitutionally
unproblematic. However, a "non-neutral" action by the political
majority, such as "explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to
determine the decisionmaking process," constitutes the type of process
defect that justifies judicial intervention.3 6 Because the initiative in
Seattle School District clearly and explicitly was motivated by a
specific desire to harm African-Americans, judicial intrusion was fully
justified.307
2. Evaluating the Burden on Substantive Rights
The above analysis assumes that the challenged legislative and
executive actions do not burden the challenger's political or
constitutionally guaranteed fights. This assumption may be too hasty.
In both McCleskey and Wayte, the substantive right at issue arguably
could have favored more aggressive judicial review. In Wayte, the
challenger claimed that the prosecutorial charging policy directly
burdened his First Amendment rights, as it targeted vocal
nonregistrants of the draft.08 In McCleskey, the legislation did not
involve a political right per se. Nevertheless, McCleskey's claim did
affect a substantive interest that the Court has carved out as justifying
increased judicial scrutiny. The Court's Eighth Amendment
304. Id at 474. Here, the initiative overturned a school district policy mandating
busing for desegregation purposes. However, initiatives that seek to amend state
constitutions may appropriately require more than a majority vote. See Lynn A. Baker,
Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. CoLO. L REv. 143, 152-58 (1995)
(exploring a "super-majority" requirement for constitutional amendments by initiative).
305. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 470 ("Because such laws make it more
difficult for every group in the community to enact comparable laws, they 'provid[e] a just
framework within which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete."'
(quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 243 U.S. 385, 393 (1969))).
306. Id
307. That is,
[sltate action of this kind ... "places special burdens on racial minorities within
the governmental process," thereby "making it more difficult for certain racial and
religious minorities ... to achieve legislation that is in their interest." Such a
structuring of the political process [is] "no more permissible than [is] denying
[members of a racial minority] the vote, on an equal basis with others."
lit (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391,395).
308. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,603-04 (1985).
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jurisprudence has repeatedly confirmed that "death is different." 309
However, in both cases the Court was careful to explicitly rule out any
significant threat to these rights. In doing so, any argument for
increased judicial scrutiny on the basis of the substantive right, and
hence a lower level of intent, was resolved by the Court itself.
In Wayte, the Court was openly dismissive of the challenger's
claim that the prosecutorial policy infringed upon his right to political
speech. 3 ° At most, the Court ruled, the only right burdened was the"asserted 'right' not to register" for the draft, a right that was "without
foundation either in the Constitution or the history of our country."'31'
Nevertheless, even if the policy arguably posed an "incidental
restriction" on the challenger's fundamental right, increased scrutiny
would still not be appropriate where, as here, the government placed
no more limitation on speech than was necessary to ensure
registration, and the policy was the only effective interim solution
available to carry out the government's interest.312
The McCleskey Court likewise carefully articulated the
limitations of its "death is different" principle. When applied to
legislative challenges, this principle is designed to ensure that capital
sentencing legislation provides procedures for fairly imposing the
309. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a
year or two."); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) ("Mhe Eighth
Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding than would be true in a
noncapital case."); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) ("In capital cases, we have
required additional protections because of the nature of the penalty at stake."); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) ("Proportionality review is one of several respects in
which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protection that the
Constitution nowhere else provides.").
310. The Court reasoned:
The Government's "beg" policy [whereby prosecutors made an effort to persuade
nonregistrants to change their minds] removed most, if not all, of any burden
passive enforcement placed on free expression. Because of this policy,
nonregistrants could protest registration and still avoid any danger of prosecution.
By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selective Service,
nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter continue to protest
registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration immunized them from
prosecution. Strictly speaking, then, the passive enforcement system penalized
continued violation of the Military Selective Service Act, not speech.
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 611 n.12.
311. IA
312. See id at 611 (citing the rule that "when, as here, 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms" (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968))).
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death penalty on individual defendants.3"3 Once the Court is satisfied
that these particularized procedural requirements have been met, the
judicial inquiry ends. The legislature has done all that it can to ensure
against an arbitrary capital sentencing determination and that
defendant's sentence rests on an individualized inquiry.314  In
McCleskey, the Court held that the Georgia legislation satisfied these
procedural requirements. 3 5 Hence, the "death is different" principle
did not justify further scrutiny of the adoption of the Georgia
legislation. However, whether the capital sentencing legislation has
been fairly administered by the jury goes to the heart of individual
cases like McCleskey's. Though the constitutional inquiry into the
challenged legislation is limited to the procedures by which a death
sentence is imposed, the "death is different" principle is also employed
by the Court to "probe[] the application of statutes to particular
cases. '3 16  In reviewing McCleskey's discriminatory administration
claim, the Court was thus presented with another opportunity to
closely review the fairness of the capital sentencing determination,
pursuant to the "death is different" principle. As discussed later,317 the
manner in which the Court adjudicated this task invokes different
considerations than were at issue in McCleskey's discriminatory
legislation challenge.
B. Intermediate Restraint: Accepting General Intent
The normal mode of "super" restraint toward legislative and
executive actors can be tempered when either democratic validation or
institutional competence concerns are decreased, or where the decision
threatens to burden a political or fundamental right of the challenger.
313. For instance, this includes channeling discretion, narrowing the range of eligible
defendants to cases in which at least one aggravating circumstance is found beyond a
reasonable doubt, and requiring a particularized individual determination. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,302-03 (1987).
314. In Georgia, the statute provides for automatic appeal to the state supreme court,
which is required to assess whether a sentence is "imposed under the influence of passion or
prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate to sentences imposed in generally
similar murder cases." Id. at 303. Additionally, the trial court aids the reviewing court by
answering a questionnaire about the trial, "including detailed questions as to 'the quality of
the defendant's representation [and] whether race played a role in the trial.' Id. (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 167 (1967)).
315. See iL at 302 (noting that, among other things, the statute "bifurcates [the] guilt
and sentencing proceedings ... narrows the class of murders subject to the death penalty...
[and] allows ... any relevant mitigating evidence that might influence the jury not to impose
a death sentence").
316. Id. at304-05.
317. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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When one of these factors is present, the Court has a tendency to
exercise "intermediate restraint." Because of the existence of these
factors, more aggressive judicial review poses less risk of undermining
the Court's institutional legitimacy. Practically speaking, intermediate
restraint reflects an easier evidentiary burden on the challenger to
trigger closer judicial scrutiny of the decision. This increased scrutiny
translates into greater judicial willingness to look beyond the stated
legislative or administrative rationale to the social and historical
context of the decision. This broader evidentiary approach in turn
allows general intent to violate the Equal Protection Clause. A finding
of general intent will render the decision presumptively
unconstitutional, requiring a justification from the decisionmaker. In
deference to the relative democratic superiority of the actor, however,
the decisionmaker can save the decision from invalidation by
demonstrating that the same decision would have been made absent
any discriminatory intent.318
1. Administrative Agency Policy Decisions: Decreased Democratic
Validation Concerns
Democratic validation concerns are decreased if the policyrnaker
is not a legislative body or high level executive official. Policy
decisions by administrative bodies, as in Davis and Arlington
Heights,319 thus receive less judicial restraint than if the same decision
would have been made by a legislature or more accountable executive
actor. Decisions made by administrative bodies lack the level of direct
accountability that would otherwise accompany a similar legislative
decision. Moreover, these bodies often act pursuant to broad
discretion and with very little direct supervision from more
accountable political actors.320 This discretion, coupled with the lack
318. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,270-71 n.21 (1977).
319. In Arlington Heights, the zoning policy was adopted by the village's Plan
Commission and the Board of Trustees. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 257-58. In
Davis, the decision to adopt Test 21 was made by the Police Commission in conjunction with
the Civil Service Commission. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,234-35 (1976). Both
of the cases involved challenges to a policy decision made by the administrative body. For
instance, in Davis, the challenge was to the Washington, D.C. police department's decision to
adopt a criterion, Test 21, for admission to the department based upon its determination that
communication skills were important to the quality of its workforce. See id. Similarly, in
Arlington Heights, the city council made a decision not to rezone a portion of land to
accommodate a development that did not conform to the city's existing zoning ordinance
only after weighing the various interests of its constituents and the future impact it would
have on them. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 254-58.
320. Ely summarized the role of administrative bodies as follows:
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of accountability, provides enough of a rationale to allow courts to
police administrative policymaking to "ensure not only that
administrators follow ... legislative [and executive] policy directions
that do exist... but also that such directions are given."321 Courts thus
take a "hard look" at administrative bodies' decisionmaking processes,
encouraging "reasoned decisionmaking" and bringing to public view
the considerations underlying administrative policy decisions, as well
as checking for fidelity to the governing statute or other policy
322whr32directive. Particularly where there is no legislative directive,"
judicial review ensures that administrative policy decisions are based
on objective fact-finding and consideration of all relevant factors and
policy options.32a
This "hard look" approach has, not surprisingly, spilled over to
judicial review of administrative policy decisions alleged to be in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The totality of the
Much of the law is ... effectively left to be made by the legions of unelected
administrators whose duty it becomes to give operative meaning to the broad
delegations the statutes contain. The point is not that such "faceless bureaucrats"
necessarily do a bad job as our effective legislators. It is rather that they are neither
elected nor reelected, and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who are.
(In the federal executive, of course, the only elected officials are the President and
the Vice President.
ELY, supra note 182, at 131; see also KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1
ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 7.9, at 351 (Little Brown, 3d ed. 1994) (noting that,
because of the lack of legislative or executive guidance, "it is increasingly difficult to identify
a source of political and constitutional legitimacy for most [agency] policy decisions").
321. ELY, supra note 182, at 133.
322. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
40-44 (1983).
323. The Supreme Court has developed a two-step analytical approach for addressing
administrative agency interpretations of statutory law:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statue, as would be necessary in 'the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is,silent~or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is wltether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the seatute .'
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Cddhcil, 41,'T.S: 837, 842-43 (1984)
(footnotes omitted). This is called the "Chevron doctrine." Judicial deference under this
doctrine applies only where there is congressional delegation of administrative authority. See
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (W0). Where there is no legislative
delegation, the court is even less deferential towards agepcy aqtioil. -
324. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43 (finding that a reviewing court must satisfy
itself that the agency has "examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory
explanation for its action").
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circumstances approach articulated in Davis and further developed in
Arlington Heights suggests a cautious, but thorough, inspection of
administrative bodies' policymaking processes. For example, key
factors at issue in Arlington Heights were the consistency with which
the local administrative body relied upon and applied various policy
considerations to deny the plaintiffs' rezoning request and any
procedural irregularities in the decisionmaking process.3"
A similar degree of scrutiny of a legislative decision would be
unthinkable; courts would not go beyond ensuring the rationality of
the stated objective.326 However, if a court is skeptical of the predicate
facts or reasoning underlying an administrative body's policy decision,
the Arlington Heights "hard look" framework allows omissions or
inconsistencies in the administrative record to support an inference of
general intent-that the decisionmakers were substantially certain of,
even if they did not desire, the harmful consequences of their
actions.327 The Arlington Heights evidentiary framework thus enables
courts to walk a fine line between deference to largely unaccountable
325. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267 (1977). The Court in Arlington Heights stated:
For example, if the property involved here always had been zoned R-5 but
suddenly was changed to R-3 when the town learned of [petitioner's] plans to erect
integrated housing, we would have a far different case. Departures from the
normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are
playing a role. Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the
factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a
decision contrary to the one reached.
IJ (footnote omitted).
326. The most the Court will do in reviewing a legislative decision is to look at the
statutory history to determine the rationality of the legislature's stated reasons for the
classifications at issue. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-80
(1979); see also 1 DAvIs & PIfECE, supra note 320, § 7.5, at 322 ("Legislatures and courts
are not required to provide any evidentiary support for the facts on which they predicate rules
of law. Courts often require agencies to provide some evidentiary support for the legislative
facts that provide the predicate for agency rules. ..
327. This mode of review toward administrative bodies similarly explains many lower
courts' application and liberal interpretation of Arlington Heights' evidentiary scheme to the
local administrative decisions challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. Lower courts
have applied the Arlington Heights framework to administrative action that was found to be
intentional based upon its disparate impact, the foreseeability of the impact, and the
knowledge that the decision would cause the impact. See supra note 146 (discussing
Eleventh Circuit cases finding discriminatory intent in the racially disparate provision of
municipal services); see also R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 R Supp. 1144, 1147-49 (E.D. Va.
1991) (applying the same framework to challenged discriminatory sitings of solid waste
landfills by municipal agencies), aff'd, 977 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bean v.
Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F Supp. 673, 677-81 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(applying the Arlington Heights framework to allegations that the State Department
discriminated against plaintiffs in a decision choosing the site of a solid waste facility), aff'd
without opinion, 782 F2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
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administrative bodies and closer scrutiny of the administrative policy
process with little or no cost to its institutional legitimacy.
2. Legislation Burdening a Political or Fundamental Right
The normal mode of "super restraint" toward legislative and
executive decisionmaking processes can also be tempered by the
existence of a substantive right affected by the challenged decision.
The Court's increased intrusion in Rogers v. Lodge3 21 can be explained
by this factor. In that case, the multimember voting scheme was
challenged as discriminatory in large part because it "diluted" the vote
of a minority group.329 Claims of vote dilution involve violation of the
"one person, one vote" principle, granting each voter the right to "have
his vote weighted equally with those of all other citizens."33°  In
Rogers, the Court was openly concerned that the districting scheme
used to elect local officials effectively excluded minority voters from
equal participation in the electoral process.331 Consequently, the Court
demonstrated its willingness to look beyond the legislative history
pertaining to the challenged at-large election system in concluding that
the system was maintained for discriminatory purposes.332 Evidence
of disparate impact plus historical discrimination against blacks in
other aspects of life allowed the Court to impute a general intent to the
legislature, thus establishing the legislative's knowledge, and the
likelihood, of the adverse consequences of maintaining the voting
scheme.333
Moreover, the Court is far less deferential to legislative rationales
where political or fundamental rights are burdened. In Hunter v.
Underwood,334 the State sought to justify a disenfranchisement
328. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
329. As the Court explained:
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting
strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all
representatives of the district. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic,
economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-
large election, yet may be able to elect several representatives if the political unit is
divided into single-member districts. The minority's voting power in a
multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are
cast along strict majority-minority lines.
Id at 616.
330. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court recognized
that a voter's right to have "an effective voice" in the election of representatives is impaired
where representation is not apportioned substantially on a population basis. See id.
331. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623-26.
332. See i. at 624-27.
333. See id.
334. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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provision in the Alabama constitution by asserting its "legitimate"
interest in denying the franchise to those convicted of select crimes.
Unlike in McCleskey, the Court refused to defer to the normally broad
discretion given to the legislature in choosing appropriate criminal
penalties.335 In Hunter, the penalties had a direct burden on the right to
vote by denying that right to persons covered by the statute, and this
effect seemed to make all the difference in the Court's posture toward
the legislative rationale.336 Relying on historical evidence, the Court
concluded that the State's interest in denying the franchise to those
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude was "simply not a
motivating factor" in light of other evidence suggesting that race
heavily influenced the decision to adopt the challenged provision.37
This conclusion was buttressed by the fact that, in addition to the
general phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude," the suffrage
committee selected other crimes that "were thought to be more
commonly committed by blacks. 338  Like Rogers, the Court was
willing to look beyond stated legislative rationales to the social and
historical contexts in determining whether the decision reflected a
discriminatory purpose. Thus, the Court makes clear that legislative
bodies have a higher burden to meet when their policy decisions
burden fundamental rights.
C. Minimal Restraint: Accepting Unconscious Intent
On the other end of the impact/intent continuum, courts exercise
"minimal restraint" toward a governmental decision. A combination
of two or more institutional processes or substantive right
considerations decrease the threat to judicial legitimacy arising from
closer scrutiny of the decisionmaking process. The cases falling under
this category, namely Castaneda and the prosecutorial peremptory
challenge cases, involve decisions burdening the right of citizens to
participate in civic life by sitting on a jury. No less important, they
implicate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross section of the community. Both types of decisions are also
administrative in nature339 and thus present lessened institutional
335. See id at 232.
336. See id at 229-33.
337. Id at 232.
338. Id
339. 1 refer to "administrative" in this context to describe the process of
decisionmaking as opposed to the nature of the actor. Specifically, "administrative" describes
a process of administering a policy or law to specific individuals or applying it to specific
factual situations. This is to be compared with what I have described throughout the Article
1132 [Vol. 72:1065
INTENT AND INCOHERENCE
competence concerns. Moreover, unlike challenges to prosecutorial
decisionmaking, judicial scrutiny of the decisionmaker in Castaneda
does not pose a threat of democratic invalidation. Because of the
combination of these three mitigating factors in Castaneda,
unconscious bias more easily violates the Equal Protection Clause than
in the peremptory challenge context, where only two factors weigh
against super judicial restraint.
This minimal restraint means that a challenger need only make a
very minimal showing in order to trigger the demand for a justification
from the decisionmaker. This minimal showing generally consists of
disparate impact evidence coupled with excess administrative
discretion.' 40 Unlike the decision to adopt a one-time, unique policy
decision, the cases here involve a pattern of decisions administering a
facially neutral rule to specific individuals. This trail of decisions
often provides enough evidence to enable courts to draw reliable
inferences about the content of the challenged decision. Additionally,
as the Court has long recognized-beginning with Yick Wo-the
existence of unchecked discretion in administering facially neutral
laws bolsters the case for judicial scrutiny of the challenged
decision."' Where suspicious outcomes exist, heightened judicial
as "policymaking," the ad hoe process by which general rules or policies are adopted by
legislative and executive actors.
The distinction between the policymaking process and the administrative process is
theoretically akin to the administrative law distinction between the administrative agency
processes of "rulemaking" and "adjudication." Rulemaking is the agency process by which
an agency issues a prescriptive rule or course of action "designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)-(5) (1997).
Administrative rulemaking is akin to the legislative political process whereby all competing
considerations are canvassed, a range of parties and interests are assessed, and cost/benefit
analysis is considered before crafting a rule. Adjudication, on the other hand, generally
involves an agency determination of whether an individual party has conformed with, or fits
within, a rle. See id § 551(6)-(7). Adjudication involves fact-finding and the application of
a preexisting policy to particular facts. Thus, the essence of the difference between
rulemaking and adjudicating is that the former must be applied in a further proceeding before
the legal position of any particular individual will be definitely touched by it, whereas the
latter generally operates concretely upon individuals in some type of enforcement
proceeding. Though these two distinctions can seem theoretically obscure, indeed with much
potential for overlap, there is rarely any practical confusion between the two. One process is
akin to the what legislatures do, while the other is akin to what judges do. See ALFRED C.
AMAN & WiUjAM T. MAYrON, ADMmhSrRATrvE LAW 101-03 (West 1993); DAvIs & PIERCE,
ADMRNITRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 320, § 7.5, at 321-33.
340. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating decisionmaker's
action based on disparate impact and discretion).
341. In lick Wo, the fact that all 200 Chinese applicants were denied permits to operate
their businesses with no stated reason, except the mere "will and consent of the supervisors,"
and at the same time 80 non-Chinese applicants were permitted to operate their businesses
under similar conditions, led the Court to conclude that discrimination had taken place
regardless of the intent of the ordinance as adopted. See id at 368, 374.
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review properly serves as a check on these decisionmaking processes
to ensure that they are not influenced by prejudice and bias.
1. Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges: A Functional Approach to
Institutional Competence
The peremptory challenge cases offer two reasons for minimal
judicial restraint. In addition to the substantive right at issue, the
nature of peremptory challenges also pose different, and lessened,
competency issues than a "core" prosecutorial function like the
charging decision. Unlike a prosecutor's charging decision, the
administration of the peremptory challenge procedure involves a
process not particularly within the prosecutor's special competence,
nor one which courts are incompetent to assess. As explained above,
judicial review of prosecutorial charging decisions threatens to intrude
upon a specialized policy decision of another branch. As to other
types of prosecutorial decisions, however, judicial review has not been
so formalistic. The Court has recognized the need to draw process
distinctions when deciding on the level of judicial review of decisions
by governmental actors who perform a variety of functions.
For example, a unanimous Court settled on a "functional
approach" in deciding whether to grant absolute immunity, versus the
more general standard of qualified immunity, to a prosecutor's
decisions.342 This approach recognizes that the level of judicial
restraint should not follow from the identity of the actor, but rather
from the type of decision. The Court distinguishes between a
prosecutor's quasi-judicial functions and her administrative or
Central to the Court's holding in ick Wo, and a rarely noted aspect of the case, was the
fact that the process of administering a facially neutral law was defective by reason of the
unusual "naked and arbitrary" discretion to grant permits for operating the laundries vested in
the supervisors by the ordinance. See id at 366. The Court was, in the first instance,
disturbed that the ordinance conferred on its administrators "not a discretion to be exercised
upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case," but rather arbitrary power to grant
the permits without "guidance nor restraint." Id. The Court explained:
[The ordinance] does not prescribe a rule and conditions for the regulation of the
use of property for laundry purposes, to which all similarly situated may conform.
It allows without restriction the use for such purposes of buildings of brick or
stone; but, as to wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those in previous use, it
divides the owners or occupiers into two classes, not having respect to their
personal character and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature
and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one
side of which are those who are permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will
and consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is
withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.
Ial at 368.
342. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
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investigatory functions in determining the appropriate level of
immunity from litigation that is conferred on a prosecutors.3 ' A
prosecutor's traditional functions of initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution-including presentation of a case for trial-garner
absolute immunity, because such functions are "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process."" 4  These functions
deserve special protection, above and beyond the norm of qualified
immunity, for the same reasons that judges need protection to perform
their public duties 4-5 In contrast, the further a prosecutorial act is from
the judicial process of trial and its preparation, and the closer it gets to
investigatory or administrative functions, the less immunity is
accorded to the prosecutor.3 46 Hence, under this functional approach,
the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune just because
they are performed by a prosecutor.347 Because qualified immunity is
the norm for administrative officers, a prosecutor only receives
qualified immunity when a challenge is brought to one of his
administrative functions.34
Similarly, many prosecutorial decisions other than the charging
decision do not present the same reasons for judicial restraint in
reviewing them for racial or other bias. Courts are not asked to
second-guess the amorphous process of weighing the costs and
benefits of a charging decision. Rather, they are called upon to
evaluate a series of decisions administering the same policy to specific
individuals. This is a process that courts are competent to evaluate.
The Court in Batson expressed confidence in a trial court's ability,
based on its "experience[] in supervising voir dire," to "decide if the
circumstance[] concerning the prosecutors' use of peremptory
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black
343. Seeidaat270-71.
344. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976).
345. See id at 422-23 (discussing common law immunity of prosecutor as based upon
same considerations that underlie common law immunity of judges-including concerns of
"harassment by unfounded litigation" and undermining independence of judgment required
of public servants).
346. See Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. at 270-71 (refusing to draw a strict line, but
recognizing a continuum).
347. See id at 273.
348. See id (finding prosecutor's alleged misconduct while endeavoring to determine
source of bootprint at crime scene was an investigatory/administrative function, and fact that
prosecutor later called grand jury to consider allegedly false evidence from the investigation
did not retroactively transform that work from administrative into prosecutorial); see also
Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490, 492-96 (1991) (finding act of prosecutor giving legal
advice to police on hypnotizing a suspect and on whether probable cause existed to arrest a
suspect is entitled to qualified immunity; in contrast, prosecutor's act of participating in
probable cause hearing entitled to absolute immunity).
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jurors."3 49 Though the prosecutor is endowed with complete discretion
in using the limited number of such challenges, courts are essentially
bystanders in the jury selection process and hence more competent to
detect potential bias:
During jury selection, the entire res gestae take place in front of the trial
judge. Because the judge has before him the entire venire, he is well
situated to detect whether a challenge to the seating of one juror is part
of a "pattern" of singling out members of a single race for peremptory
challenges. He is in a position to discern whether a challenge to a black
juror has evidentiary significance; the significance may differ if the
venire consists mostly of blacks or of whites. Similarly, if the
defendant makes out a prima facie case, the prosecutor is called upon to
justify only decisions made in the very case then before the court. The
trial judge need not review prosecutorial conduct in relation to other
venires in other cases.350
Moreover, because of the trial court's unique position in relation to the
administration of peremptory challenges, its determination regarding
the "ultimate question of discriminatory intent" is "accorded great
deference on appeal., 351 Thus, a trial court's determination that a
prosecutor was motivated by unconscious bias will likely be
undisturbed by appellate courts.
2. Low Level Administrative Actors
a. The Absence of Institutional Process Concerns
In Castaneda, three factors weigh in favor of decreased judicial
deference and greater intrusion into the official decisionmaking
process. In addition to the existence of the substantive right, here both
democratic validation and institutional competence considerations are
virtually nonexistent, or at least at a minimum. Unlike challenges to
prosecutorial peremptory challenges, democratic invalidation fears are
reduced, because the decision is being made by a few select citizens
who are not politically accountable.
Under the key-man system of jury selection, appointed jury
commissioners select between fifteen and twenty "key" persons,
citizens from different portions of the county.5 2 These key person
349. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,97 (1986).
350. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1488 (1996) (citations omitted).
351. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,364 (1991). This deference is also due in
part to the fact that the trial court's determination involves an evaluation of credibility.
352. Under the statutory "key man" procedure, potential juror qualifications are not
tested until each is summoned before the district court. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482,484-85 (1977). The procedure was described by the Court in Castaneda as follows:
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panels are given complete discretion in choosing individuals for the
list from which the actual jury is to be composed. As in the
peremptory challenge cases, the Court was willing to require jury
commissioners to testify to the procedures under which key persons
chose the jurors from the community.35 3 This willingness arose from
the fact that the statutory process left complete and unguided
discretion both to jury commissioners and to key persons. Discretion
here is even more of a reason for judicial scrutiny because of the
nature of the actor. Unlike prosecutors, individual administrators are
largely unaccountable and their decisions are completely unchecked
by other political actors. Judicial scrutiny thus provides the necessary
accountability that more visible official decisionmakers receive
elsewhere.
As in the peremptory challenge cases, institutional competence
concerns are lessened in Castaneda because of the administrative
nature of the decisions. However, unlike the peremptory challenge
cases, courts' increased ability to assess those decisions are not due to
the trial court's contemporaneous observation of the process. Rather,
the type of decisionmaking process involved in choosing the venire
leaves behind a "pattern" of similar decisions sufficient to allow
appropriate statistical inferences of discrimination from which an
inquiry into motive can be made. Specifically, when analyzed through
accepted statistical methods, courts are able to infer whether race has
influenced the administration of an otherwise facially neutral policy.
In making an inference of race-dependency, courts assume that the
racial criterion applied over time has been applied in the challenged
decision. Once an inference of racial content is made from this
pattern, courts shift the burden to the decisionmaker to explain the
The procedure begins with the state district judge's appointment of from three to
five persons to serve as jury commissioners. The commissioners then "shall select
not less than 15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of different portions of
the county" to compose the list from which the actual grand jury will be drawn.
When at least 12 of the persons on the list appear in court pursuant to summons,
the district judge proceeds to 'est their qualifications." The qualifications
themselves are set out in [Texas Code of Criminal Procedure] Art. 19.08: A grand
juror must be a citizen of Texas and of the county, be a qualified voter in the
county, be "of sound mind and good moral character," be literate, have no prior
felony conviction, and be under no pending indictment "or other legal accusation
for theft or of any felony." Interrogation under oath is the method specified for
testing the prospective juror's qualifications. The precise questions to be asked are
set out in Art. 19.23, which for the most part, tracks the language of Art. 19.08.
After the court finds 12 jurors who meet the statutory qualifications, they are
impaneled as the grand jury.
Id. (citations omitted).
353. See id at 497-98.
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challenged decision. The decisionmaker must then rebut the inference
as to the particular challenged decision, arguing that the particular
decision was not an instance of the application of the racial criterion.
If the decisionmaker fails to demonstrate the race-neutrality of the
decision, then the Court assumes from the inference of race-
dependency and the exclusionary outcomes that the decision was
illicitly motivated.
b. Statistical Inferences of Bias
As motive review proponents correctly noted, evidence of
decisionmaking outcomes can be indicative of whether
decisionmakers employed a covert racial criterion in administering an
otherwise facially neutral law.154  Statistical analysis of the type
accepted in Castaneda is widely known as "inferential statistics."3 55
Using a pattern of past similar decisions, inferential statistics allow the
fact-finder to analyze quantitative data to determine whether such data
supports or fails to support an inference of the existence of certain
factors in the administration of a decisionmaking system. 6  The
primary manner in which inferences are drawn from a pattern of past
decisions is by "hypothesis testing." For example, in order to test the
hypothesis "Decisionmaker X is employing race as a criterion in the
decisionmaking process," the fact-finder must reject or accept an
antecedent null hypothesis, such as "Decisionmaker X is not
employing race as a criterion in the decisionmaking process., 357  To
reject the null hypothesis requires the fact-finder to formulate and deny
a "consequent" assumption,358 which describes the range of likely
outcomes if the null hypothesis were true.359 Statistical analysis, using
354. See supra Part III.C.2.
355. See DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANrITATIVE
EVIDENCE 31 (1983) (describing the theory of inferential statistics).
356. See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World
of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 390-91 (1985) (describing the fundamental
agreement by legal commentators on the theoretical and conceptual application of probability
or inferential theory to the legal proof process); id. at 394 (describing the argument that "the
preponderance of the evidence standard employed in civil litigation ... is satisfied by
demonstrating that the probability of the existence of the facts supporting liability exceeds
0.5").
357. See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 2-10 (1994).
358. As one commentator explains, the "hypothesis is tested by following the logical
form of denying the consequent (or modus tollens): If X is true (the antecedent), then Y is
true (the consequent). Yis not true. Therefore X is not true." Id at 2-10 (citing IRVING M.
COPI, INTRODUCnON TO LOGIC 202-03 (3d ed. 1968)).
359. For instance, in an employment discrimination case where 20% of the
applications received were from blacks, it might be said that the consequent assumption
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adequate data, is crucial in formulating this consequent assumption.
Certain types of decisions provide the necessary data to perform this
analysis, enabling a reliable consequent assumption to be formulated
in order to reject the null hypothesis.360 Specifically, where there is a
pattern of similar previous decisions that can be analyzed, this
enhances the quality of data necessary to render a confident judgment
denying or granting the consequent assumption.361 Once the actual
results disprove the consequent assumption, then the fact-finder can
reject the null hypothesis.362
In Castaneda, for instance, the Court relied upon this statistical
method to test the hypothesis that race became a criterion in the
process of summoning potential grand jurors.363 The antecedent or
null hypothesis of random selection first had to be rejected before
inferring that the hypothesis was true. In order to reject the null
hypothesis, the fact-finder had to formulate a reliable consequent
assumption: that, in the absence of racial considerations, the racial
makeup of people summoned to be grand jurors would roughly mirror
the racial makeup of a random selection of people in the population
from which the jurors were drawn. This consequent assumption was
determined by a statistical analysis that analyzed various data from the
outcomes of the process. First, the analyst had to posit other factors
means that the proportion of blacks hired out of 100 hires would be quite close to 20.
Further, applying the generally accepted standard deviation range, the consequent would be
that, in the absence of race discrimination, the number of blacks hired will be between 12 and
28. See id. at 2-11 to 2-12.
360. For instance, in employment discrimination cases, the consequent assumption is
based on the criteria necessary to render a potential employee eligible for the position at
issue. The consequent is generally that, in the absence of discrimination, an employer's work
force will tend to be representative of the population from which the employer hires-either
the general population or some other defined population (e.g. actual applicant data or the
availability of qualified persons in the work force). See id. at 2-11; see also DAVID C.
BAiDus & JAMES W.L. COLE, STArISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 4.11 (1980)
(discussing the "general presumption in favor of actual applicant data").
361. See Cohen, supra note 356, at 397-98 (noting that confidence in the accuracy of
statistical judgments differs dramatically due to the difference in the amount of data upon
which they were based).
362. This would translate into the following null hypothesis testing in the employment
hypo, see supra note 359, assuming that 10 blacks were hired:
If it is true that Employer A is not discriminating [the antecedent or null
hypothesis), then it should also be true that the number of [blacks] hired by A will
be between 12 and 28 [the consequent]. The number of [blacks] hired by A [10]
does not fall between 12 and 28. Therefore, it is not true that Employer A is not
discriminating and, as a result, an inference of discrimination is appropriate.
PATZOLD & WH.LBORN, supra note 357, at 2-12 (footnote omitted); see also THAD R.
HARSHABARGER, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS: A DECISION MAP 196 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing
the basics of hypothesis testing).
363. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,496-97 & n.17 (1977).
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that could account for the results, using the statutory criteria-which
defined the relevant pool of people who were eligible to be
summoned.3 64 Next, these factors were compared to the racial makeup
of the eligible people actually summoned by the decisionmakers over a
representative period of time.365  Finally, a statistical procedure was
employed---"binomial distribution' 36 6-that enabled the analyst to
determine the range of likely outcomes if the process were a product
of chance or randomness. Comparing the actual outcomes from the
data with past selection patterns, the Court was able to reject the null
hypothesis and infer that the hypothesis was true in the case at hand. 67
c. Relevant Factors in Shifting the Burden
To be sure, the fact-finder's information at this point only
provides data on the probability that the disparity between the
expected and observed outcomes occurred by chance. 68 This leaves
364. Under the Texas method of selecting grand jurors, qualifications are not tested
until the persons are summoned to appear before the district court. See supra note 352
(describing the procedure for choosing jurors under the key-man system).
365. This information was gathered from the county grand jury records over an 11-
year period. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495. "[T]he degree of under-representation must be
proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion
called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time." Id at 494.
366. Seeid at496-97n.17.
367. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
If the jurors were drawn randomly from the general population, then the number of
Mexican-Americans in the sample could be modeled by a binomial distribution.
Given that 79.1% of the population is Mexican-American, the expected number of
Mexican-Americans among the 870 persons summoned to serve as grand jurors
over the 11-year period is approximately 688. The observed number is 339. Of
course, in any given drawing some fluctuation from the expected number is
predicted. The important point, however, is that the statistical model shows that
the results of a random drawing are likely to fall in the vicinity of the expected
value. The measure of the predicted fluctuations from the expected value is the
standard deviation, defined for the binomial distribution as the square root of the
product of the total number in the sample (here 870) times the probability of
selecting a Mexican-American (0.791) times the probability of selecting a non-
Mexican-American (0.209). Thus, in this case the standard deviation is
approximately 12. As a general rule for such large samples, if the difference
between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three
standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would
be suspect to a social scientist. The 11-year data here reflect a difference between
the expected and observed number of Mexican-Americans of approximately 29
standard deviations. A detailed calculation reveals that the likelihood that such a
substantial departure from the expected value would occur by chance is less than 1
in 10.
Id. (citations omitted).
368. That is, the inference chain used in inferential statistics is a weaker form of the
prior logical version as it depends on probability claims: "If X is true, then Y is probably true.
Y is not true. Therefore X is probably not true, and, as a result, the assumption that X is true
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the hypothesis of race-dependency open to alternative hypotheses. In
Castaneda, the rejection of the null hypothesis was based upon a
statistical judgment of the unlikelihood that chance or randomness
caused the shortfall of summoned Mexican-Americans. Because the
logic of statistical analysis operates negatively by rejecting factors,369
eliminating randomness (the null hypothesis), it leaves open a host of
other possibilities and explanations that could account for the
outcomes.370 To justify the inference of race-dependency, other
plausible explanations ideally should be tested in the same manner in
order to reject the likelihood that they explain the pattern of
decisions.3 7' That is, "[b]y eliminating chance as an alternative causal
explanation and by showing that there is a weak relationship between
other [factors] and the outcome, '372 the inference of race-dependency
would be more defensible. Making the inferential jump from rejection
of one null hypothesis to inferring the hypothesis-here, that the
pattern of decisions are race-dependent-undoubtedly involves a risk
of error.37
3
However, as the Castaneda Court recognized, the issue is more
appropriately which party should bear this risk of error.374 In
Castaneda, two factors provided guidance in answering this question.
The first factor was discretion-the lack of specificity or detail guiding
the selection process-leaving the process open to impermissible
criteria being employed by the decisionmaker. This lack of guidance
strengthened the inferential jump from the rejection of the null
hypothesis of randomness to the acceptance of the hypothesis of race-
dependency. In the Court's own words: "Supporting this conclusion
[of race-dependency] is the fact that the Texas system of selecting
grand jurors is highly subjective .... [and] is susceptible of abuse as
should be rejected." PAETZLD & WLLBORN, supra note 357, at 2-12. Therefore, because
the logic of this type of statistical analysis operates negatively by rejecting possible causative
factors, the statistics can never affirmatively prove discrimination. See id.
369. See BARNES, supra note 355, at 3.
370. Indeed, the decisionmaker posed one of these possibilities, hypothesizing that the
racial disparity was due to differing educational levels between Mexican-Americans in the
county and other groups who may have been summoned in greater numbers. See Castaneda,
430 U.S. at 488 n.8.
371. See BARNES, supra note 355, at 31; PAE=ZOLD & WLBORN, supra note 357, at
2-15.
372. BARNES, supra note 355, at 31; see also PAETZOLD & WLLBORN, supra note 357,
at 2-12.
373. "In rejecting the hypothetical assumption of no discrimination, one can never be
certain that the correct inference is made; a chance of error results from the small probability
... that [the] [decisionmaker] was not discriminating ....." P-rzotD & WILLBoRN, supra
note 357, at 2-13.
374. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 488 n.8.
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applied."3 75 The risk of error is hence placed on the decisionmaker,
who must expose the error or demonstrate that the challenged decision
at issue was in fact race-neutral. Where excessive discretion is left to
the decisionmaker and the factors influencing the decision are not
known or obvious, it is only fair to put the risk of inferential error on
the party with the most information about the decisionmaking
process--especially because the challenger lacks the needed
information to submit other explanations to hypothesis testing. As the
Court in Castaneda concluded, when the decisionmaking process is
subject to abuse, it is the decisionmaker who is in the best position to
explain to the fact-finder the method of selection employed and the
reasons behind the selection.3 76  On the other hand, where the
decisionmaking process involves objective, identifiable constraints and
guidelines, the risk of error should fall more on the challenger,
requiring him to resent the factors most likely to influence the
outcome.377
The second factor influencing the allocation of the risk of error is
the size of the disparity. The larger the difference between the
expected and actual outcomes, the less likely it becomes that the actual
outcomes have occurred by chance.378 Hence, the Court in Castaneda
concluded: "If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it
is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related
375. See id. at 497.
376. The majority rejected the suggestion that the statistical analysis was insufficient
because it failed to test for educational differences that could have explained the discrepancy
between the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the total population and the percentage on
the grand jury lists. See id. at 488-89 n.8. In refusing to accept this challenge to the statistical
analysis, the Court cited the lack of any criteria in the policy defining, in terms of education,
the eligibility of the summoned population, and hence the need to place the burden of
persuasion on the decisionmaker applying the policy:
[U]nder the Texas method of selecting grand jurors, qualifications are not tested
until the persons on the list appear in the District Court. Prior to that time,
assuming an unbiased selection procedure, persons of all educational
characteristics should appear on the list. If the jury commissioners actually
exercised some means of winnowing those who lacked the ability to read and
write, it was incumbent on the State to call the commissioners and to have them
explain how this was done. In the absence of any evidence in the record to this
effect, we shall not assume that the only people excluded from grand jury service
were the illiterate.
liL at 488 n.8.
377. For instance, multiple regression analysis has been embraced by courts as an
effective way to test the influence of various independent variables on the decisionmaking
process. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385,400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also discussion supra Part IV.C.
378. See PAMzoLD & WiLLBORN, supra note 357, at 2-15.
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factors entered into the selection process. 379 Moreover, the eleven-
year sample further buttressed this conclusion, because increasing the
sample size correspondingly reduces the probability of inferential
error.380
Once the inference of bias has been made by the fact-finder, the
burden rightly shifts to the decisionmaker to demonstrate the race-
neutrality of the decision being challenged.381  That is, the inference
that the decisionmaking process, a pattern of similar decisions, has
been based on race also supports the inference that the challenged
decision at issue was likely based on race. If the decisionmaker fails
to put forth a convincing race-neutral explanation, then the inference
of motive, whether conscious or unconscious, should stand.382
V. A FINAL CHALLENGE: DocnuNAL COHERENCE AND RACIAL
EQUALITY
I have argued that conceptualizing the different levels of intent on
a continuum according to various institutional process and substantive
criteria provides a coherent account of the intent doctrine. The
account that I have offered also provides a framework in which to
assess the Court's fidelity to its normative and doctrinal commitments.
In this Part, I identify two areas where judicial review of facially
neutral laws raises problematic questions in this regard. The first area
involves the discriminatory administration of facially neutral laws. In
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court refused to apply its Castaneda/Batson
379. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at494n.13.
380. See Cohen, supra note 356, at 398-400; PAEZOLD & WILlBORN, supra note 357,
at 2-14 n.23.
381. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497-98 (noting that "[t]he showing made by [the
challenger] therefore shifted the burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of ...
discrimination"); see also BARNES, supra note 355, at 31 ("The opposing attorney's task is
then to show that there is little connection between the events, that there are innocent
explanations for the relationships observed, or that the circumstantial evidence offered as
proof by the other party is unpersuasive.").
382. In Castaneda, the decisionmaker failed to offer an explanation regarding the
method of selection. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 498. Consequently, the Court resolved the
inference of motive in the defendant's favor.
Without some testimony from the grand jury commissioners about the method by
which they determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to the
statutory time for testing qualifications, it is impossible to draw any inference
about [the qualifications of] literacy, sound mind and moral character, and criminal
record from the statistics about the population as a whole. These are questions of
disputed fact that present problems not amenable to resolution by an appellate
court. We emphasize, however, that we are not saying that the statistical disparities
proved here could never be explained in another case; we are simply saying that




evidentiary framework to a claim by a black defendant that Georgia's
death penalty statute had been discriminatorily administered. Had the
Court followed the evidentiary framework established in these cases, it
would have been virtually impossible to reject McCleskey's claim. 383
Though acknowledging these precedents, the Court declined to apply
them, citing three reasons. These reasons invoke the very criteria that
I have argued provide guidance in determining the level of, and
evidentiary framework for, the application of intent to various types of
government action. As judged against these criteria, the Court failed
to adequately justify its infidelity to its Castaneda/Batson evidentiary
framework.
The second area involves judicial review of facially neutral
redistricting legislation. In these cases, the Court has invalidated
legislation having the effect of creating "majority-minority" districts.
These districts have been largely responsible for increasing African-
American political representation and participation in the political
process. The Court has yet to adequately justify its level of intrusion
into this highly political fray. Moreover, I argue, its current
"predominant motive" standard for strict judicial scrutiny puts it on a
collision course with its previously articulated institutional process
constraints. Both areas arguably illustrate a new type of incoherence
in equal protection jurisprudence. Despite well-established principles
underlying judicial restraint toward some actors and appropriate
judicial scrutiny toward other actors and types of decisions, the Court
nonetheless pushes the boundaries of fidelity to its precedent and
normative commitments. The result has been increased skepticism
toward the Court's institutional legitimacy in policing the boundaries
of state-enforced racial inequality.
A. Discriminatory Administration of Facially Neutral Laws:
McCleskey v. Kemp
As explained earlier, the Court easily dismissed McCleskey's
discriminatory legislation claim, relying on the failure of the statistical
evidence to demonstrate specific discriminatory intent.3" McCleskey
made a second claim, alleging racial bias in the administration of the
legislation. McCleskey was convicted in Fulton County, Georgia, of
robbing a furniture store and killing a white police officer during the
383. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,352-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(applying Castaneda/Batson test and concluding that McCleskey's evidence made out a
prima facie case under that standard).
384. See discussion supra Part lI.B.1.
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course of the robbery.385 A jury including only one black juror386
sentenced McCleskey to life imprisonment and death.387 Pursuant to
the Georgia death penalty statute, the jury considered various
mitigating and aggravating circumstances surrounding McCleskey's
conduct388 before recommending the death sentence. McCleskey
sought to overturn his death sentence, arguing that the Georgia capital
sentencing process had been administered in a racially discriminatory
manner.38 9  Specifically, he alleged that persons who murder whites
were more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who murder
blacks and that black murderers are more likely to be sentenced to
death than white murderers. Thus, as a black defendant convicted of
murdering a white victim, McCleskey claimed that he was
discriminated against because of his race and because of the race of his
victim.
The Court's rejection of McCleskey's discriminatory
administration claim did not come easily. McCleskey had two lines of
Supreme Court precedent in his favor. The first was the long line of
cases, ranging from Smith v. Texas to Batson v. Kentucky, alleging
racial discrimination in the administration of highly discretionary jury
selection procedures. In those cases, the Court readily inferred the
existence of discriminatory purpose from statistical disparities much
less sophisticated than those presented by McCleskey. The second line
of precedent affirmed the ability of a multiple regression analysis, like
that presented by McCleskey, to isolate the effect of race. This line of
precedent involved allegedly discriminatory employment decisions
challenged under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.390 While
385. See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 E Supp. 338, 334-46 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S.
279 (1987).
386. Seeid at377n.15.
387. See id. at 346.
388. The jury found two aggravating circumstances to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt: the murder was committed during the course of an armed robbery, and the murder
was committed upon a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 284-85. McCleskey offered no mitigating evidence. See id. at 285.
389. See id at 286. Although the defendant in McCleskey submitted statistical
evidence challenging as racially biased the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty,
the Court focused on the validity of the empirical evidence in challenging the jury's decision
to impose the death penalty. See id. at 287-91. Nevertheless, in addition to McCleskey's
evidence regarding the actual imposition of death sentences by juries, a study he also
submitted found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of cases involving black
defendants and white victims, 32% of cases involving white defendants and white victims,
19% of cases involving white defendants and black victims, and 15% of cases involving
black defendants and black victims. See idL at 287.
390. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (concluding that statistical disparity of salaries paid to blacks as compared to
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these "pattern and practice" cases did not involve an explicit
requirement of discriminatory purpose, the Court nevertheless had to
determine the appropriate relationship between statistical outcomes
and the independent effect of race in producing those outcomes.
The Court's refusal in McCleskey to make the statistical
presumption of bias, as it had in the long line of jury selection cases,
was based partly on the claimed incompetence of statistical analysis to
support similar inferences in the capital sentencing process. The Court
summarized its reasoning as follows: the "nature" of the capital
sentencing decision at issue in McCleskey, and the "relationship of the
statistics to that decision," are "fundamentally different from the
corresponding elements in the venire-selection or [employment]
cases."391  Hence, "the application of an inference drawn from the
general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing simply
is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from
general statistics to a specific venire-selection or [employment]
case."392 These claims are factually questionable, as I argue below.
More importantly, however, the Court's reasoning indicates that it
may have misconstrued both the effectiveness of statistical analyses
that it has accepted in previous cases and the relationship of those
statistics to the nature of jury decisionmaking.
1. Statistical Inferences, Judicial Competence, and Jury
Decisionmaking
At the heart of both of McCleskey's equal protection claims was
a statistical study performed by Professors David Baldus, Charles
Pulaski, and George Woodworth. The Baldus study data was derived
from an examination of over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in
Georgia during the 1970s.393 Consistent with conclusions reached by
various other studies,394 the Baldus study demonstrated racial
disparities in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia, based
similarly situated whites, taking into account four independent variables, supported a finding
of a pattern and practice of discrimination with respect to salaries); see also International Bd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (concluding that, where gross
statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie
proof of a pattern and practice of discrimination).
391. McCleskey,481U.S. at294.
392. Id at 294-95.
393. See id at 286.
394. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. Ray. 27,
38-49 (1984); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1396 nn.25-27 (1988) (citing various studies that
correlate with the Baldus study findings).
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both on the race of the victim and, to a lesser extent, on the race of the
defendant.395
To isolate the effect of race, McCleskey presented various
multiple regression analyses contained in the Baldus study, which took
into account some 230 nonracial variables that could have explained
the stark disparities on nonracial grounds.396 One of the models that
the Baldus study used adjusted for thirty-nine nonracial statutory and
nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances that it regarded
as potentially influential in explaining which defendants ultimately
received a death sentence.397 Even after controlling for the thirty-nine
nonracial variables, this model concluded that someone like
McCleskey, charged with killing a white person, was 4.3 times more
likely to be sentenced to death than a defendant charged with killing an
African-American. 398  This data was supplemented with evidence
specific to Fulton County; though based upon smaller samples, this
county data was as revealing as the statewide data.399
395. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87. For instance, as to the race-of-the-victim
disparity, the raw data indicated that defendants charged with killing white persons were 10
times more likely to receive the death penalty than defendants charged with killing blacks.
See ia A smaller disparity was found as to the race of the defendant. There, the study
demonstrated that 4% of the black defendants received the death penalty, as compared to 7%
of the white defendants. See id When the race of the victim and race of the defendant were
combined, however, the study concluded that the death penalty was assessed in 22% of the
cases involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims;
and 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims. See id. at 286.
396. Seeid.at287.
397. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances adjusted for included whether the
murder occurred during a rape or robbery, whether the murderer had a prior criminal record,
or whether more than one victim was killed. See David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the
"Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of its
Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359, 365 (1994)
[hereinafter Baldus, Reflections] (describing their study); see also David Baldus et al., Law
and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 251, 259 nn.4-5 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992)
(explaining that the factors they considered "conceptually important" are those that are
"widely recognized by criminologists, courts, prosecutors, and legislators as significant
determinants of death-sentencing outcomes;" and the factors they considered "statistically
important" were those variables that in fact "strongly correlated with the likelihood of a death
sentence").
398. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. "[A]mong black-defendant cases with a level of
criminal culpability comparable to McCleskey, white-victim cases resulted in death sentences
in approximately 34% of the cases, while similar black-victim cases resulted in death
sentences in only 17% of the cases." Baldus, Reflections, supra note 397, at 366.
399. The data indicated that the death sentencing rate in white-victim cases was 47%,
compared to 13% in black-victim cases-a 34-point disparity. After adjustment for the
different levels of criminal culpability, the race-of-victim disparity in the Fulton County cases
was 28 percentage points. In the category where McCleskey's case was located, the race-of-




The Supreme Court accepted the statistical validity of the Baldus
study, as had the court of appeals below.400 However, the Court was
forced to find institutional process reasons for rejecting the hypothesis
of a race-dependent decisionmaking process established by the study.
One of the elements that made statistical evidence less probative in this
case, the Court explained, was the fact that the statistics relate to fewer
decisionmaking entities in the jury selection context than in the capital
sentencing context. The fundamental issue, as the Court saw it, was
that it was "incomparably more difficult" in the capital sentencing
context to "deduce a consistent policy" of the decisionmakers.40' The
Court reasoned that, because "the decisions of a jury commissioner [as
in Castaneda] ... over time are fairly attributable to the commission
... ' [a] statistical discrepancy can be said to indicate a consistent
policy of the decisionmaker."4 2 On the other hand, in the capital
sentencing context, the Court deemed it "incomparably more difficult"
for a statistical analysis like the Baldus study to "deduce a state'policy' by studying the combined effects of the decisions of hundreds
of juries that are unique in their composition."
The Court's distinction between the number of entities reflected
in Castaneda and McCleskey seems to misunderstand the nature of the
decisionmaking process in Castaneda. As a factual matter, the
challenged decisions were the decisions of numerous "key" person
panels, selected by jury commissioners over a significant period of
time and across numerous cases. Similarly, at issue in McCleskey was
the pattern of decisions made by numerous petit jury panels, selected
by prosecutors over a significant period of time and across numerous
cases. In neither case is it easy to discern a state "policy" in a system
of decisionmaking that relies upon numerous actors. More
importantly, however, it is not necessary to deduce such a policy. The
Court's distinction indicates a fatal misconception of the nature and
function of statistical analysis reflecting the type of administrative
decisionmaking processes at issue in both cases. Inferential statistical
analysis properly focuses on identifying factors that have influenced a
decisionmaking process. A multivariate analysis' purpose is not, as
the Court characterizes it, to identify a "policy" of the
400. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.





decisionmaker. 4 Rather, it seeks to determine the likelihood that a
criterion has influenced the decisionmaking process. This
identification properly takes place in the type of multiple regression
analysis contained in the Baldus study.4°5 The Baldus study, as with
similar types of statistical analysis accepted by the Court, identified the
likelihood that racial bias influenced the capital sentencing
decisionmaking process in Georgia and in the county where
McCleskey was convicted. As in Castaneda, neither the number of
decisionmakers involved nor the presence or absence of coordination
between decisionmakers in a system has any effect on the ability of a
multivariate regression analysis to accomplish this task.406
As the Court recognized, however, the ability of statistical
analysis to identify influential decisionmaking criteria does depend
upon the application of a uniform, common standard in the
decisionmaking process. In McCleskey, the Court seized on this
crucial element as its second reason for refusing to draw an inference
of race-dependency from the statistical study. It reasoned that, in
addition to the statistics' relating to fewer entities in the jury selection
process, they also relate to "fewer variables":
404. See generally Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980) (explaining the use of multiple regression analysis).
405. As the Court has acknowledged in the employment context, the "very purpose of
a regression analysis is to organize and explain data that may appear to be random" and
control for permissible factors that may explain a pattern of outcomes. Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385, 403 n.14 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, in order to isolate the
effect of impermissible considerations such as race, an effective multiple regression analysis
need not include every conceivable variable that a decisionmaker could have taken into
consideration, as long as it includes those variables that account for the major factors that are
likely to influence decisions. See Fisher, supra note 404, at 705-06.
406. As one commentator has explained:
MIhe capacity of a multivariate statistical analysis to identify factors that are
influencing a decision-making system is not a function of the number of decision-
makers in the system. If decision-makers apply similar selection criteria, a well-
constructed regression analysis will identify those criteria no matter how many
people participate in the processing of each case and no matter how many different
cases each participant handles. A multiple regression analysis has the same ability
to identify commonly applied selection criteria in a system that requires a series of
people to handle each case and that limits each person's participation to only a
single case, as it has in a system that requires the same person to process each case
in a single decision. Moreover, the presence or absence of coordination between
decisions-makers in the system has no effect on the capacity of statistical analysis
to identify the underlying criteria used to make decisions. In the other areas, the
criteria that the decision-makers believed they were applying ... has not been
determinative. The ultimate concern was with the criteria that, in fact, were
applied, which is precisely what a properly designed multivariate statistical
analysis can reveal.
PAET.OLD & WI.LBORN, supra note 357, at 11-26 to 11-2 (footnotes omitted) (citing St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
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In [jury]-selection cases, the factors that may be considered are limited,
usually by state statute.... These considerations are uniform for all
potential jurors, and although some factors may be said to be
subjective, they are limited and, to a great degree, objectively
verifiable.... In contrast, a capital sentencing jury may consider any
factor relevant to the defendant's background, character, and the
offense. There is no common standard by which to evaluate all
defendants who have or have not received the death penalty. 4W
Notably, this alleged distinction goes against the well-established
institutional constraint on jurors in capital sentencing cases. The Court
has required specificity in death penalty and other sentencing
guidelines, thereby channeling jury discretion and narrowing the range
of eligible defendants. 4°' In Georgia, as in other states, the jury is
guided by an objective, common standard, pursuant to Supreme Court
precedent.4° Nevertheless, it is true that the capital sentencing process
leaves ample discretion in applying the statutory criteria. However, as
the Court acknowledged, "while some jury discretion still exists [in the
Georgia capital sentencing process], 'the discretion to be exercised is
controlled by clear and objective standards.', 410  Hence, though the
capital jury is "called upon to make a highly subjective, 'unique,
individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular
person deserves,' 4 .1 the jury has no authority to create and follow
407. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.14 (citations omitted). The Court attempted to
make a similar distinction with respect to employment decisions:
While employment decisions may involve a number of relevant variables, these
variables are to a great extent uniform for all employees because they must all have
a reasonable relationship to the employee's qualifications to perform the particular
job at issue. Identifiable qualifications for a single job provide a common standard
by which to assess each employee.
Id
408. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 355, 371-89 (1995) (describing the history of the "narrowing" and "channeling"
requirements in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence).
409. See discussion of McCleskey supra Part IV.A.2; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
206-07 (1976) ("No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it
is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.").
410. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302-03 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615
(1974)). The same can be said for the guidelines governing the jury selection process, which
usually involve specific and objective minimal eligibility requirements for jury service. See
Ortiz, supra note 14, at 1144 n.201 (citing the Texas statute at issue in Castaneda, which "did
not guide, let alone limit, key persons' discretion in selecting for the venire," but noting that
"[i]t did, however, set out somewhat detailed minimal qualifications.").
411. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1986) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment))).
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nonprescribed factors in imposing the death penalty.412 This narrowing
of discretion further heightens the ability of a sophisticated
multivariate analysis to identify racial factors in the decisionmaking
process. In the final analysis, the capital sentencing determination is
no more subjective than the jury selection determination in
Castaneda.4 13
Lastly, the Court decried that "[h]ere, the State has no practical
opportunity to rebut the Baldus study," whereas, in the jury selection
context, "the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical
disparity."" This objection once again seems to misconceive the role
of statistical inferences from past decisions and their relationship to the
challenged decision. Statistical inferences of factors influencing a
decisionmaking process, taken from a pattern of past decisions, need
no rebuttal. As the Court has said in the jury selection context,
explaining or rebutting the statistical disparity evidence is unnecessary,
and even futile. That is, the "self-serving testimony of actors in the
system that they did not rely on racial factors is given limited weight;"
and the "state's inability to present such testimony would appear to be
of little consequence since, even if allowed, it would do little more in
the great majority of cases than result in a general denial of racial
motivation."415
412. That is,
if, in fact, no common standard could be discerned in the operation of Georgia's
capital sentencing system, the system would have been in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Furman, which condemned a death sentence imposed in
Georgia because there was "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which it [was] imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not."
PAmEZOLD & WnLLBORN, supra note 357, at 11-28 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
313 (1972)) (alterations in original).
413. As one commentator has explained:
State law usually does not meaningfully limit the factors that key persons may
consider in selecting the venire, although state law usually sets fairly specific and
objective minimal eligibility requirements for jury service, just as it sets more
specific criteria for eligibility for death sentencing. In fact, a discretionless
standard would prove incompatible with the key-man system's aim of choosing
civically responsible adults for jury service, for "good citizenship" cannot be
measured objectively. In the end, no matter how the state expresses it, the standard
of civic responsibility guiding the selection of jurors is no less subjective and
discretionary than the standards which guide the jury's determinations in death
sentencing.
Ortiz, supra note 14, at 1144.
414. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296.
415. PAMrzoLD & WILLBORN, supra note 357, at 11-29. The Court has held that a key
person's testimony that he was not influenced by race cannot rebut a prima facie case. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (same standard for prosecutors); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 498 n.19 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972);
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The only relevant explanation to the motive inquiry is the one
pertaining to the decision at hand. Once it is established that race
became a covert criterion in the administration of a facially neutral
procedure, the court will infer that it likely influenced the challenged
decision. This inference of intent can establish motive if the
decisionmaker in the case at hand fails to sufficiently explain the
decision by race-neutral criteria. It is in the explanation that the fact-
finder is then able to assess whether the reason reflects a conscious or
unconscious racial bias. As in Castaneda and Batson, courts are quite
competent to make this assessment by determining whether the
explanation has any relationship to the specifics of the case or is based
upon factors that are surrogates for racial bias. The state thus needs
only to explain the reasons for imposing the death penalty in
McCleskey's case to rebut the inference of illicit motive made from
past decisions of the State.4 16 The Court's fear that the State will be
called to defend decisions often years after they were made is simply
not germane to the statistical inquiry.417
b. Statistical Truths and Judicial Deference
Despite its acceptance of the statistical validity of the Baldus
study, the Court was nevertheless inclined to limit its conclusion to the
narrowest possible interpretation. The Court correctly stated that
"[s]tatistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor
entered into some decisions."'4 8 It then went on to pronounce:
Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does not
include the assumption that the study shows that racial considerations
actually enter into any sentencing decisions in Georgia. Even a
sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the Baldus study can
only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital
sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into
any particular sentencing decision.419
see also Ortiz, supra note 14, at 1145 (noting that, "although a court may be more willing to
explore the mind of a key person than the mind of a juror or prosecutor, it will not likely find
anything there to explain away a statistical disparity").
416. This task was made even easier in McCleskey's case because in Georgia, as in
most states, death penalty legislation requires jury to "designate in writing ... the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt." See
GEORGIA CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 (1997).
417. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296.
418. Id. at308.
419. Id at 291 n.7. Later the Court pointed out: "Even Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions or that
race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case. Statistics at most may show only a
likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions." d at 308 (footnote omitted).
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This reduction of the Baldus statistical findings to a truism in statistical
theory-that such analysis can only show a likelihood of influential
factors-is inconsequential. The issue is more appropriately who
should bear the burden of the risk of error of these findings.
The two factors that the Castaneda court identified as relevant in
shifting the risk of statistical error to the state were present in
McCleskey. The first factor involves unchecked discretion in the
decisionmaking process. A very significant aspect of the Baldus study
involved its observation that the most significant racial disparities
occurred where the most discretion lay in the capital sentencing
decisionmaking process. In this context, that meant that the most
dramatic racial disparities in capital sentencing were in the so-called
"mid-range" of cases,420 where the decisionmakers have a real choice
as to whether to impose the death penalty or not.421 In the most
aggravated cases, the study found that decisionmakers impose the
death sentence regardless of racial variables. Likewise, in the least
aggravated cases, decisionmakers forego imposing the death sentence
on the defendant regardless of racial variables. It was based on the
disparities in the middle range cases that Baldus concluded, in his
testimony, that "'[i]f there's room for the exercise of discretion, then
the [racial] factors begin to play a role.' 422 This part of the study, and
Baldus' corresponding testimony, was extremely significant in the
case, because Baldus concluded that McCleskey's case fell in the mid-
range of aggravated homicide cases, where racial factors play a
significant role.
The second factor in favor of shifting the burden to the State was
the size of the disparities in this discretionary range. Baldus found that
14.4% of the black-victim mid-range cases received the death penalty
and 34.4% of the white-victim cases received the death penalty.423
Moreover, the study concluded that race was as powerful an influence
in the imposition of the death penalty as formal statutory criteria-if
not more. For instance, the race of the victim was a variable nearly as
influential as a prior conviction for armed robbery, rape, or even
420. See idL at 287 n.5. 'Baldus' 230-variable model divided cases into eight different
ranges, according to the estimated aggravation level of the offense." l
421. See id These cases were those "in which the facts neither called out strongly for
life (as in a dnnken brawl among acquaintances), nor for death (as in a torture murder or
multiple slaying case)." Baldus, Reflections, supra note 397, at 366.




murder.424 Additionally, the race-of-the-victim variable proved more
influential in the imposition of the death penalty than whether the
defendant was a prime mover in the homicide, a statutory aggravating
factor.42' Given that McCleskey's case fell within the range of
discretion where racial factors heavily influence the imposition of the
death penalty, and given also the size of the disparities in this range,426
the argument for shifting the burden to the state based upon the Baldus
study was quite formidable.
2. Justifying Super Restraint
In deciding whether to shift the burden to the state to justify its
decision in McCleskey's case, the Court was forced to squarely face its
posture toward jury decisions in the capital sentencing context.
Specifically, in determining what degree of deference to accord the
decisions reflected in the Baldus study, the Court had to decide
whether to treat the jury more like a prosecutor or more like the
individual citizens administering the statute in Castaneda. The Court
justified its super restraint toward jury decisions by analogizing to its
reasons for super restraint toward prosecutorial decisions. The Court
reasoned that the "policy considerations behind a prosecutor's
traditionally 'wide discretion' in seeking the death penalty similarly
suggest the "impropriety" of requiring juries to defend their decisions
administering the death penalty.427 Hence, akin to the deference that it
would give a prosecutorial charging or sentencing decision, the Court
ended the judicial inquiry upon a finding of rationality. It simply
proclaimed that, "absent stronger proof, it is unnecessary to seek such
a rebuttal [from the jury], because a legitimate and unchallenged
explanation for the decision is apparent from the record: McCleskey
424. The study found that a prior conviction for armed robbery, rape, or murder
increases one's odds of being sentenced to death by a factor of 4.9-as opposed to a 4.3
increase for murdering a white victim. See id. at 355 nn.9-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
425. See id at 355 n.9.
426. Baldus found that 14.4% of the black-victim mid-range cases received the death
penalty and 34.4% of the white-victim cases received the death penalty. See id at 287 n.5.
427. Id at 296. In an oblique explanation, the Court reasoned that "'controlling
considerations of... public policy' dictate that jurors 'cannot be called... to testify to the
motives and influences that led to their verdict.' Iad (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264, 267 (1915); Chicago, B.& Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907)). Later, it
illuminated this statement with its central concern of intruding on the "discretion [that] is
essential to the criminal justice process." Id at 297. This discretion "counsels against
adopting [an inference that the discretion has been abused] from the disparities indicated by
the Baldus study." Id Of course, this begs the question from a democratic process
standpoint. Some actors deserve, and receive, more judicial deference for fear of judicial
tyranny over their constitutionally delegated powers. The question is where the jury fits
within this institutional structure.
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committed an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia
laws permit imposition of the death penalty."428 Later, the Court went
further by declaring that, "[w]here the discretion that is fundamental to
our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious.4 29
a. The Fear of Democratic Invalidation: The Jury as a
Majoritarian Institution?
This level of restraint toward the discretion of jurors assumes a
symmetry between the institutional characteristics of the jury and that
of elected prosecutors. This symmetry is debatable. The costs to the
democratic process of scrutinizing a jury's decision to impose the
death penalty and a prosecutor's decision charging a defendant with
the death penalty arguably are not the same. Judicial deference toward
prosecutorial discretion, particularly in their charging and sentencing
functions, stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the
performance of an executive officer in her policymaking capacity.
Judicial restraint also stems from the fact that prosecutors are directly
accountable either to the local electorate or to the executive branch.430
In contrast, the jury arguably suffers from the countermajoritarian
problem. It "lacks any significant form of public accountability... [as
i]ts members do not stand for election and cannot be easily removed
from office." '43  The risk that courts will substitute their policy
preference for that of an accountable, majoritarian policymaker is
significantly lessened. Nor are courts intruding upon another branch's
policy expertise or competence by increased review of jury decisions.
Because jurors are "one-time players," they possess "at best ... a lay
citizen's speculative sense of the long-term consequences of their
428. Id.
429. Id. at313.
430. In Georgia, district attorneys are elected by the voters in each county. See id. at
295 n.15.
431. Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries:
Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrine, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255,
1292 (1996). However, in earlier times, courts and commentators viewed broad jury
discretion as more "legitimate because.., it was assumed to serve as an accurate surrogate
for 'We the People."' Id. at 1271 n.66; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 GEo. Li. 641,684-85 (1996) (arguing that the criminal jury was designed as a
representative democratic body-a "political institution embodying popular sovereignty and
republican self-government"). Nevertheless, as Brown points out, merely because the jury is
deemed "representative" does not mean that it is accountable. See Brown, supra, at 1292.
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decisions, but they possess no institutional means to assess decisions
over time. 4 32
The argument for less restraint toward jurors is even stronger in
the capital sentencing context, given the institutional constraints on
jury decisionmaking. The "overriding concern that reshaped capital
sentencing doctrine was the same as that which animates process
theory: arbitrary decisions arising from unguided discretion,
unchecked by other decisionmakers. '433 The jury has been treated as
more akin to the individual administrators in Castaneda than
prosecutors in the capital sentencing context. Where discretion in the
jury decisionmaking process does exist, this fact has been more of a
reason for closer scrutiny than for greater restraint in checking for
conscious or unconscious bias:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportmity for racial prejudice to
operate but remain undetected.... [A] juror who believes that blacks
are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that
belief in deciding whether petitioner's crime involved the aggravating
factors specified under [the state's capital sentencing] law ... More
subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a
juror's decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be
stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might incline a juror
to favor the death penalty.434
The Court's "impropriety" objection would have been more
appropriate as applied to prosecutorial decisionmaking in this context.
Because prosecutors have historically enjoyed broad discretion in
charging and sentencing decisions, their decisions are unlikely to be
disturbed by the courts absent evidence of specific discriminatory
intent.435 Such a showing would not be accomplished by the Baldus
study alone.436 Bolstering the case for super judicial restraint toward
prosecutorial charging and sentencing decisions- is the fact that, unlike
432. Brown, supra note 431, at 1293 (noting that jurors are "empaneled for a single
case and then disbanded").
433. Id- at 1302.
434. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). In Turner, the Court authorized
questioning of jurors in capital sentencing proceedings regarding their racial prejudice. See
id. at 35-36. Without such questioning, the Court reasoned, a potential unconstitutional risk
of undetected racial prejudice would arise and possibly infect the capital sentencing decision.
See id. at 35-37.
435. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
436. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 295-96 n.15 (1987) (noting the
inadequacy of statistics to deduce a consistent policy from the decisions of many prosecutors




the jury, prosecutorial capital sentencing decisions lack statutory
guidelines and are made with reference to broader policy concerns.437
Of course, this lack of guidance could cut both ways. It could as easily
be an argument for the need for more stringent legislative procedures
in the sentencing decision to improve consistency across cases and to
prevent arbitrary or biased prosecutorial decisions 8 Nevertheless,
the case for increased judicial scrutiny of jury decisionmaking in the
capital sentencing context is quite consistent with the Court's
institutional process values and doctrinal framework.
b. Assessing Institutional Accountability
There is yet another related institutional concern that arises from
the decision whether or not to shift the burden of accountability to the
state. Though the Court never addressed this concern directly, any
argument in favor of shifting the burden of justification to the State
begs the following question: Who is the responsible party for the
State, and who is ultimately accountable for decisions administering a
law or policy? The issue of official accountability for a
decisionmaking process arises when different actors are responsible
for a pattern of decisions. In Castaneda, the legislature set the policy
by statute, the district judge chose the jury commissioners to
implement it, and the commissioners in turn chose the key persons
who exercised individual judgments in the actual implementation.
Because the statute left complete discretion to the key persons to
choose potential jurors, their decisions were unguided. Hence, the jury
commissioners in the defendant's case were deemed the responsible
party, because the key persons acted pursuant to their guidance.439 In
437. See id at 295 n.15 (noting that "[s]ince decisions whether to prosecute and what
to charge necessarily are individualized and involve infinite factual variations, coordination
among district attorney offices across a State would be relatively meaningless").
438. See id at 357 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Developments in the
Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1550-51 (1988) (discussing
the role that charging guidelines could play in curtailing abuses of prosecutorial discretion);
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1554-60
(1981) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is too broad and interferes with the fair and
equal administration of justice).
439. The Court noted that the jury commissioners could rebut the inference of motive
by detailing the procedures that they followed to select the jurors. See Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482,498 (1977). Otherwise,
[w]ithout some testimony from the grand jury commissioners about the method by
which they determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to the
statutory time for testing qualifications, it is impossible to draw any inference
about literacy, sound mind and moral character, and criminal record from the




McCleskey, the legislature set the capital sentencing guidelines for
jurors to follow. However, it is the prosecutor who selects which
defendants to charge with the death penalty and chooses the jurors to
administer the sentencing procedure. Further, the prosecutor is the one
who guides the jury, through her arguments, regarding which
aggravating factors may be present in each case. Hence, like the jury
commissioners in Castaneda who choose the individual key persons,
the prosecutor would likely be called upon to explain the capital
sentencing decision in a particular case.
Requiring the prosecutor to explain the decisions of the jurors
potentially raises the same institutional process concerns as if the
Court were inquiring into the charging or sentencing decision itself.
But there is a difference. While democratic validation concerns are
still present, because of the nature of the actor, institutional
competency concerns are reduced. The Court is not inquiring into the
broad, ad hoc policy choice regarding whether to charge one defendant
versus another with the death penalty. This choice is completely
within the particular competence of prosecutors and garners the
highest judicial deference. Rather, the Court is inquiring into a much
more constrained, and less ad hoc, process. At issue in McCleskey are
racial disparities in the decisions to impose the death penalty on
defendants already convicted of a particular crime. Institutional
competence considerations could be properly invoked if the challenge
were to racial disparities in the process of charging defendants with the
death penalty. However, the actual application of the death penalty is
not particularly within the competence of the prosecutor due to the
structure of capital decisionmaking. The prosecutor is bound by the
same constraints as jurors in imposing the death penalty in a particular
case. Neither the jury nor the prosecutor may impose the death
penalty for a reason that is not circumscribed in the state statute as a
basis for capital punishment.44
Like prosecutorial peremptory challenges, the Court is competent
to review the decision applying the statutory requirements to a
particular defendant. The process of imposing the death penalty is
440. One commentator stated:
Juries now cannot impose the death penalty for a specific reason-say, that the
victim was a police officer or a child, or the murder involved torture or another
felony-unless the legislature approves such a consideration as a basis for capital
punishment. And appellate courts now review the jury's determination with
greater scrutiny, employing the criteria specified by the legislature; they even have
limited authority in certain instances which replicate the jury's decisional process
to double-check the determination.
Brown, supra note 431, at 1305; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
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much like adjudication-applying a rule or policy to specific
individuals and factual situations, something courts are particularly
competent to assess. Requiring the prosecutor to explain the statutory
reasons behind the application of the capital sentencing decision in a
particular case does not threaten to "revealf] the Government's
enforcement policy" nor involve the Court in an assessment of the"strength of the case [relative to other defendants], the prosecutions'
general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities,
and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan." '  In assessing this case-specific application of the death
penalty, appellate courts have specific statutory authority and criteria
against which they can check the decision ensuring its competence to
assess the decisionmaking process without improperly infringing upon
a prerogative of another branch.442
3. Is Death Really Different?
The most revealing answer to the Court's reluctance to shift the
burden of accountability on to the State lay elsewhere in its opinion.
In a sentiment reminiscent of its "slippery slope" fear in Davis, the
McCleskey majority concluded with the dire prediction that
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice
system.... [1]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be
faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the
claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could
be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that
correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.
Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his victim,
other claims could apply with equally logical force to statistical
disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the
criminal justice system....
As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the type
of challenge brought by McCleskey.443
This slippery slope fear has been selectively invoked in the Court's
intent jurisprudence. In both Davis and McCleskey, this fear supports
a judicial path of least resistance. That is, in both cases, the Court has
441. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,607 (1985).
442. See Brown, supra note 431, at 1304-05 ("Appellate courts now have more
specific statutory law against which they can check (or take a "'hard look' at) the jury's law-
application decision ... ").
443. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,314-18 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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chosen the least demanding institutional role when conceptualizing
constitutional norms of racial equality.44 Nevertheless, while this fear
is justified by democratic process principles in Davis, such principles
do not legitimate the fear in McCleskey to the same extent.
The recurrent slippery slope fear-the concern that courts will be
flooded with claims of unjust sentencing determinations-is based
upon a variety of democratic process considerations, including the risk
of democratic invalidation and relative institutional competence issues.
These concerns not only serve to legitimize the fear, but also provide
limiting principles that can be used to avoid the resulting parade of
horribles from increased judicial intrusion. The McCleskey case
presented a keen opportunity for the Court to invoke these limiting
principles in a case where so much injustice was evident.
The first limiting principle that the Court could have invoked is,
as I have argued, lessened institutional process concerns. As in Batson
and Castaneda, both reduced democratic validation and institutional
competence principles allow increased scrutiny of the challenged
decision without disrupting other institutional roles or calling the
Court's institutional legitimacy into question. Second, it seems clear
that the Court "could have avoided sliding down the slippery slope of
reviewing sentencing discretion generally" by "restricting McCleskey
to its context."445 The Court's adjudication of McCleskey's sentence
occurred within a context, involving the "death is different principle,"
that requires special attention to the imposition of the death penalty on
individual defendants. Indeed, it could have invoked its own words in
so limiting the scope of its scrutiny:
The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is
especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence.
"The Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the
individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.'24
The Court's refusal to create even a rebuttable presumption of
racial bias, conscious or unconscious, in the face of gross sentencing
disparities and a sophisticated multivariate analysis may reveal an
444. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 92, at 939-44 (arguing that Washington v. Davis
"tamed" the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education by choosing the most
conservative approach to defining discrimination, despite the fact that alternative conceptions
like stigma, subordination, and second-class citizenship were available to the Court and had
significant support in precedent).
445. Ortiz, supra note 14, at 1146.




even deeper fear: "a fear of too much justice." 7 The Baldus study is
one of many studies that document the impact of racial bias at all
levels of the criminal process and across various types of decisions.448
Coupled with this empirical reality is the perception by many African-
Americans that officials in the criminal justice system are racially
biased. This perception itself threatens to undermine the sanctity of
the criminal process that the Court so heralds, as African-American
citizens protest in their own ways in an effort to bring about racial
justice in the system.4 9  These realities and perceptions must be
juxtaposed against the fact that no defendant has succeeded on a claim
of racially selective prosecution or sentencing in federal court in over
one hundred years.45 This juxtaposition also exposes the irrationality
of both the slippery slope fear and the fear of too much justice.
McCleskey was an opportunity to enforce a norm of racial equality in
the criminal justice system without falling into the threatened abyss of
the slippery slope-allowing everything that disparately impacts racial
minority groups to constitute an equal protection violation. The
Court's failure to take such a modest step forward in its equal
protection jurisprudence inevitably adds to the impression that the
Court has failed in its role as a purveyor of equality values. This
impression, along with the perception of widespread racism,
undermines the democratic process far more than if the Court had
accepted McCleskey's claim that, as a black man, he was
discriminated against in our criminal justice system.
B. The "Racial" Gerrymander Cases
The Court has not, since Feeney, suspended its super restraint
toward a facially neutral legislative decision involving constitutionally
gratuitous rights absent a specific intent to harm an identifiable group.
Recent decisions by the Court scrutinizing gerrymandered voting
447. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
448. See generally Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice
System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660 (1996) (discussing the existence of racial bias in the criminal
justice system and proposing changes); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal
Process, supra note 438, at 1525-32 (discussing various empirical studies).
449. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (setting forth a legally and morally
persuasive case in favor of black jurors acquitting black defendants in criminal cases).
450. The last reported federal case in which a defendant succeeded on such a claim
was Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also United States v. Armstrong, 116 S.
Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996) (relying on Ylck Wo as an example of the fact that selective prosecution
claims are not "impossible to prove"); Kennedy, supra note 394, at 1402 ("[N]o defendant in
state or federal court has ever successfully challenged his punishment on grounds of racial
discrimination in sentencing." (emphasis omitted)).
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districts present an exception to this pattern. At the outset, it is
important to highlight what these cases do not involve. The
challengers in recent gerrymandering cases do not claim that the
facially neutral reapportionment decisions were adopted with a
discriminatory purpose. That is, there is no claim that district lines
have been redrawn specifically to disenfranchise a particular ethnic or
gender group.45 Nor do the claimants assert that the gerrymandering
has affected their right to vote or otherwise diluted their vote. Instead,
claimants in these cases assert that race-conscious redistricting violates
their right to participate in a "color-blind' '4 2 electoral process and
causes so-called "representational" harms-that is, the redrawn
districts "convey the message that political identity is, or should be,
predominantly racial." '53
The Court treats these redistricting decisions like explicit racial
classifications, rendering them constitutionally "suspect," once a
threshold requirement of "race as the predominant motive" has been
met. Based on the "suspect" nature of the decision, the Court demands
a compelling justification from the state. Like explicit racial
classifications, it seeks to "flush out" any unconstitutional motives in
the strict scrutiny process.454 However, even in flushing out motive,
something less than a specific discriminatory intent will suffice to
invalidate the legislative classification. Where a legislative body
cannot justify the classification as "narrowly tailored" to advance a
"compelling state interest," the Court will invalidate the decision as
unconstitutional based upon predominant race-consciousness.
To be sure, the Court is quite open in these cases about the danger
to the democratic process from judicial intrusion in this area.456 It has
451. In fact, as Justice O'Connor poignantly points out, the challengers did not even
identify themselves as a racial group--"[t]hey did not even claim to be white." Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993); see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1978-79 n.9 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe 'motive' with which we are concerned is not per se
impermissible. []For that reason, this case is very different from... Arlington Heights... in
which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's action was motivated by an intent to harm
individuals because of their status as members of a particular group.").
452. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
453. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1962.
454. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653; see also Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1963 ("We subject racial
classifications to strict scrutiny precisely because that scrutiny is necessary to determine
whether they are benign ... or whether they misuse race and foster harmful and divisive
stereotypes without a compelling justification.").
455. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653.
456. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,915 (1995). There the Court stated:
Federal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the
most vital of local functions ... electoral districting is a most difficult subject for
legislatures, and so the States must have discretion to exercise the political
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acknowledged that the "sensitive nature of redistricting and the
presumption of good faith that must be accorded legislative
enactments, requires courts to exercise extraordinary caution in
adjudicating claims that a state has drawn district lines on the basis of
race." 457 However, despite its own admission of limited competence to
assess redistricting decisions and the perils of intruding into these
highly political decisions, the Court nevertheless continues to intrude
into the redistricting process. In doing so, the Court has opened itself
to proper attack and has cast doubt on its fidelity to established
democratic process principles.
1. Paying Lip Service to Judicial Restraint
The Court began its recent intrusion into the area of legislative
redistricting in Shaw v. Reno. 5 The Shaw cause of action allows the
Court to draw an inference of race-based legislative decisionmaking
based primarily upon the shape of a challenged district. However,
though the Court wants to treat facially neutral redistricting cases that"appear" race-based the same as cases involving express racial
classifications 459 it knows that it cannot. As the Court acknowledges,
premising judicial scrutiny upon an outcome-oriented standard is a
risky endeavor. On the one hand, gerrymandering appears to be a
context where "appearances do matter."'46  On the other hand, it is
very difficult to discern "from the face of a single-member districting
plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of
race," absent other evidence indicating improper purposes.46' Shaw
sought to balance this evidentiary tension by articulating a more
Gomillion-like standard as a threshold to judicial scrutiny. Invoking
Gomillion, the Court ruled that a district so "bizarre" or "highly
irregular" that it "cannot be understood as anything other than an effort
to 'segregat[e] ... voters' on the basis of race" would give rise to an
judgment necessary to balance competing interests .... [The good faith of a state
legislature must be presumed.
Il
457. Id. at916.
458. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
459. One of the rationales for treating them the same is that they pose the same risks of
racial classifications. See id. at 643 (citing dangers of stigma, racial hostility, etc.).
460. Il at 647.
461. Id at 646. Citing its holding in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), the
Court acknowledged that "a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in
one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes." Shaw,
509 U.S. at 646 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,341 (1960)).
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inference of race-based decisionmaking. 462  Absent a sufficient
justification from the legislature, the facially neutral redistricting plan
would be invalidated.
Shaw's piggybacking on the Court's ruling in Gomillion was
fraught with danger from the start. Having already declared Gomillion
the "rare" case in which judicial intrusion into facially neutral
legislative action would hinge on outcomes alone, the Shaw standard
seemed to contravene the level of restraint that the Court has
committed itself to in reviewing such challenges. The Court justified
its intrusion in Gomillion in large part because the outcomes were
unexplained by the State. Crucial to the determination that judicial
scrutiny of the statute was appropriate in Gomillion was that the state
legislature "never suggested, either in [its] brief or in oral argument,
any countervailing [purpose] which [the statute was] designed to
serve.' 463 Gomillion thus represents the paradigmatic "easy" case of
judicial scrutiny of a facially neutral legislative act solely on evidence
of legislative outcomes. It was "easy," however, only because the line
from the stark racial outcomes to an invidious legislative purpose
appeared to be clear, unobstructed, and unrefuted.464
462. Rd at 646-47 (quoting Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341). At issue in Gomillion was a
statute passed by the Alabama Legislature that redefined the boundaries of the city of
Tuskegee. According to the complaint filed by black residents of the city, the statute
transformed the city from one whose municipal limits formed a square into one which took
on the shape of a "strangely irregular" 28-sided polygon for the purpose of denying black
residents their voting rights. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. As a result, the complaint
alleged, "[t]he essential inevitable effect of this redefinition ... is to remove from the city all
save only four or five of its [black] voters while not removing a single white voter or
resident." Id at 341.
463. Id. at 341-42 (reiterating that the allegations were "uncontradicted" and
"unqualified"); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1964) (refusing to draw
conclusions from the outcomes of allegedly racially gerrymandered legislation where such
outcomes at best give rise to conflicting inferences).
464. However, the Court in Feeney rejected this Gomillion-type showing, because the
outcomes were explained by a legitimate legislative purpose. Before addressing the motive
review inquiry, the Court in Feeney held that "[t]he question whether [the legislation]
establishe[d] a classification that is overtly or covertly based upon gender must first be
considered." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). However, the
Court easily rejected the challenger's argument that the facial distinction between veterans
and nonveterans was in fact a pretext for a gender classification. This argument was based
upon the evidence of the outcomes of the distinction-that men disproportionally benefited
from the preference, because most veterans are men. The Court declined to interpret the
distinction as a pretext for a gender classification, however, ruling that the evidence of its
gendered impact/effect could not "plausibly" indicate that it can be explained only as a
gendered classification. See id at 275. Something more than impact/effects is needed to
infer content from facially neutral action:
Apart from the facts that the definition of "veterans" in the statute has always been
neutral as to gender and that Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status
in a way that has been inclusive of women who have served in the military, this is
1164 [Vol. 72:1065
INTENT AND INCOHERENCE
More fundamentally, the Court's scrutiny of the gerrymandering
legislation in Gomillion was dependent upon allegations of a
discriminatory purpose. The Court notably drew a connection
between the unexplained evidence of virtual total exclusion of African
Americans from the voting rights and the "real" purpose behind the
legislation-to deny the plaintiffs their voting rights on the basis of
race.465  Gomillion thus is consistent with a requirement of
demonstrating specific discriminatory purpose before judicial scrutiny
of facially neutral redistricting legislation. 6 Despite its attempt to
transform the Shaw claim into something more illicit akin to the
Gomillion legislation, 467 reflecting a purpose to harm the disaffected
racial group, it is too much of a stretch to reconcile the two cases on
that basis.468 At most, the only aspect that the Shaw claim shares with
Gomillion is legislative race-consciousness in the redistricting process.
However, even a finding of legislative race-consciousness would
not be enough to justify heightened scrutiny in this context. The
Court's stringent scrutiny of express racial classifications partly rests
not a ... gender-based classification.... Veteran status is not uniquely male.
Although few women benefit from the preference, the nonveteran class is not
substantially all female. To the contrary, significant numbers of nonveterans are
men, and all nonveterans-male as well as female-are placed at a disadvantage.
Too many men are affected by [the legislation] to permit the inference that the
statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women.
465. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347.
466. The Court reasoned that, if the allegations were proven, "the conclusion [is]
irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the
legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and [black] voters by fencing [black]
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." Id at 341.
467. The Court observes that districting that "includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and
political boundaries ... bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." Shaw,
509 U.S. at 647.
468. As one Justice has persuasively argued, any effort to turn the Shaw claim into a
Gomillion claim is sorely misguided and patently offensive, as it turns the very notion of
apartheid on its face in a bout of historical myopia:
Although the Court used the metaphor of "political apartheid" as if to refer to the
segregation of a minority group to eliminate its association with a majority that
opposed integration, talk of this sort of racial separation is not on point here. The
de jure segregation that the term "political apartheid" brings to mind is
unconstitutional because it emphatically implies the inferiority of one race. Shaw
I, in contrast, vindicated the complaint of a white voter who objected not to
segregation but to the particular racial proportions of the district. Whatever this
district may have symbolized, it was not "apartheid." Nor did the proportion of its
racial mixture reflect any purpose of racial subjugation .... It obviously conveys
no message about the inferiority or outsider status of members of the white
majority excluded from a district.
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2002-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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on the presumption that race should be largely "irrelevant" to
legislative decisionmaking.469 In contrast, in the racial gerrymandering
context, a majority of the Justices agree that race is not only "relevant"
to the legislative decision here, but that legislatures may
"intentionally" create minority-majority districts without invoking
judicial scrutiny.470 Hence, because of the complex nature of the
redistricting decision 4" race-consciousness does not automatically
prove constitutionally problematic.
The Court recently acknowledged the difficulties in treating
facially neutral redistricting decisions that "appear" racial as the
equivalent of racial classifications by adopting a more demanding
threshold standard.472  In Miller v. Johnson, the Court clarified that
strict scrutiny would only be triggered where "race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a
significant number of voters within or without a particular district." '73
This standard requires more than a showing that the legislature
"substantially neglected traditional districting criteria" or that "it was
committed from the outset to creating majority-minority districts" or
that "it manipulated district lines" to accomplish this purpose.4 74 The
predominant motive standard instead requires a demonstration that
traditional districting criteria were "subordinated to race" and that race
469. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989)
(expressing the constitutional aspiration "of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race
is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement"); see also id. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
470. In Bush, a majority of the Court agreed that strict scrutiny does not apply to "all
cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts." Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951-52; see
also id. at 1976-78 & n.8, 1985 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 2007, 2011 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
471. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the
legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of
age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other
demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to
impermissible race discrimination.
Id.
472. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 ('Electoral districts lines are 'facially race neutral,'
so a more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in
redistricting cases than in cases of 'classifications based explicitly on race."' (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 250 (1995)).
473. 515 U.S. 900,916(1995).
474. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1953 (noting that, although these factors "weigh in favor of




was the legislature's predominant and controlling factor in drawing a
particular district.
75
In moving from "bizarreness" as a threshold showing to
"predominant motive," the Court once again conflicts with its
institutional process commitments. Indeed, the Court has regressed to
its pre-Davis quandary regarding judicial inquiry into legislative
motives. Unlike Washington v. Davis and its progeny, the Miller
standard requires a showing that racial considerations are more than
"a" motivation behind a challenged redistricting decision. Requiring
only that racial considerations be "a!' motive, the Court admits, would
involve too low a threshold for judicial intrusion into the permissibly
race-conscious redistricting process.476 On the other hand, as the Court
has repeatedly acknowledged, ascertaining a legislative body's
primary or dominant motive can be difficult or impossible.477 This
difficulty rests, in part, on institutional competence grounds-the fact
that legislatures are often motivated by a variety of considerations that
cannot be parceled out by primacy without significant judicial
intrusion.478
2. Assessing Judicial Competence
One way in which the Court has sought to overcome its relative
incompetence to assess redistricting decisions is to say, as it does with
respect to the jury cases, that there is something about the nature of the
type of decision that increases its competence to assess it 479 Unlike
the otherwise "ad hoe" legislative decisionmaking process, the
gerrymandering process proceeds along generally accepted traditional
districting criteria that are presumably race-neutral.' 0 The existence
475. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
476. See id
477. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 n.11 (1977) ("The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough without a
requirement that primacy be ascertained."' (citation omitted) (quoting McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263,276-77 (1973)); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,225 (1971) (stating that it
is "difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation
behind the choices of a group of legislators").
478. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. The Court stated:
Rarely can it be said that a legislature... operating under a broad mandate made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose
was the "dominant" or "primary" one. In fact, it is because legislators ... are
properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts
refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of
arbitrariness or irrationality.
Id




of such "objective factors" gives the Court a benchmark by which to
determine whether the outcomes reflect racial considerations or other
race-neutral criteria.481 Therefore, before the Court begins to reassess
the legislative cost-benefit balance, the decisionmaker has an
opportunity to rebut the inference of "suspectness" by pointing to one
or more of these objective factors as the "predominant" motivating
factor underlying its decision.4 2
However, the "special nature" of the districting decision, as the
court acknowledges, cuts both ways. As easily as it can be an
argument for heightened judicial competence, it can be an argument
for heightened judicial incompetence. At the same time that the Court
invokes objective factors to guide its determination of predominant
motive, it also demands sensitivity in assessing legislative rationales in
light of the highly political and complex nature of the decision.43 The
legislature's redistricting "calculus" involves a "complex interplay of
forces" that makes the distinction between being aware of racial
considerations and being motivated by them particularly elusive' 4 In
addition to "traditional districting criteria" such as contiguity,
compactness, and respect for political subdivision, other factors make
the redistricting balance difficult to assess. A legislature is often
concerned about complying with the Voting Rights Act, protecting
incumbency, as well as ensuring mathematically equal populations in
each district.485 Moreover, individuals are appropriately classified, and
treated, by group characteristics in the legislature's redistricting
calculus. 86 Given the likely confluence of these various factors, the
481. See id. ("We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are
constitutionally required... but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a
claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.").
482. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (finding that, where traditional
districting criteria and other race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting
legislation and are not "subordinated to race," a state can defeat an inference of
gerrymandering on racial lines).
483. See.id at915-16.
484. See id at 916 (noting that "[t]he distinction between being aware of racial
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make").
485. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (discussing concerns of the
legislature).
486. As Justice Ginsburg explained:
In adopting districting plans ... States do not treat people as individuals.
Apportionment schemes, by their very nature, assemble people in groups. States
do not assign voters to districts based on merit or achievement, standards States
might use in hiring employees or engaging contractors. Rather, legislators classify
voters in groups--by economic, geographical, political or social characteristics-
and then "reconcile the competing claims of [these] groups."
Id at 947 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986)).
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job of ascertaining the "predominance" of any one factor influencing a
legislature's redistricting is an arduous task, akin to looking for a
needle in a haystack.487
Complicating the "interplay" of these forces is the fact that many
of these traditional districting criteria "correlate" with race, making it
difficult to determine whether a districting decision is truly racial or
merely political.488 Of course, the degree of judicial interference turns
on these very illusive correlative distinctions, whether a district is
either "racial" or "political." 489 In McCleskey, the Court refused to sort
out the correlations between the racial outcomes and the challenged
legislation, citing the inevitability of racial disparities in the criminal
justice system.490 In Bush, a "mixed motive" case, the Court was faced
with districts where race along with other traditional factors all played
very prominent roles in the legislature's redistricting decisions.49'
However, this complexity provided the Court with a reason to intrude
even more.492 In contrast to the Court's stem refusal to intervene in
McCleskey and in earlier racial gerrymandering cases harming
487. As two commentators put it:
Districting plans are integrated bundles of compromises, deals, and principles. To
ask about the reason behind the design of any one particular district is typically to
implicate the entire pattern of purposes and trade-offs behind a districting plan as a
whole. Searching for "the reason" or "the dominant reason" behind a particular
district's shape is often like asking why one year's federal budget is at one level
rather than another.
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Hanns, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-Distict Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv.
483, 585-86 (1993) (footnote omitted).
488. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1954 (noting that "appellants point to evidence that in
many cases, race correlates strongly with manifestations of community of interest ... and
with the political data that is vital to incumbency protection efforts, raising the possibility that
correlations between racial demographics and district lines may be explicable in terms of
nonracial motivations"); id. at 2005 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "in the political
environment in which race can affect election results, many of these traditional districting
principles cannot be applied without taking race into account and are thus, as a practical
matter, inseparable from the supposedly illegitimate racial considerations").
489. See id. at 1954 (noting that "[s]trict scrutiny would not be appropriate if race-
neutral, traditional districting considerations predominated over racial ones. We have not
subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny").
490. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) ("At most, the Baldus study
indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sentencing
are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.").
491. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1952 (noting that "[t]he record did not show "'purely
race-based" districting revisions' and that "incumbency protection ... also played a role in
the drawing of the district lines").
492. See iL at 1954 ("Because it is clear that race was not the only factor that
motivated the legislature to draw irregular district lines, we must scrutinize each challenged
district to determine whether the District Court's conclusion that race predominated over
legitimate districting considerations, including incumbency, can be sustained.").
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blacks,4 93 the Court's response to complex evidentiary inquiries in the
gerrymandering context is conspicuously obscure:
If district lines merely correlate with race because they are drawn on the
basis of political affiliation, which correlates with race, there is no racial
classification to justify, just as racial disproportions in the level of
prosecutions for a particular crime may be unobjectionable if they
merely reflect racial disproportions in the commission of that crime....
But to the extent that race is used as a proxy for political characteristics,
a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation.494
This opaque line-drawing raises more questions than it answers.
Is the Court saying that strict scrutiny will be invoked where a
legislature, for instance, "assume[s] that a black resident of a particular
community is a Democrat if reliable statistical evidence discloses that
97% of the blacks in that community vote in Democratic primary
elections[?] ' '49s Is a legislature's decision to redraw a district to protect
a black incumbent in a district with racial bloc voting "political" or
"racial?" In Bush, the Court found one district's contours
"unexplainable in terms other than race" even though they did not
"evince a consistent, single-minded effort to 'segregate' voters on the
basis of race" and even though race was both used to "protect the
political fortunes of adjacent incumbents" and to "maximiz[e] the
minority population of [the district]," perhaps in pursuit of the goal of
incumbency protection.496 Why isn't the task of untangling whether
493. Compare Wright v. Rockefeller, in which the Court refused to intervene where
"conflicting inferences" could be drawn from the evidence:
It may be true ... that there was evidence which could have supported inferences
that racial considerations might have moved the state legislature, but, even if so,
we agree that there also was evidence to support [the] finding that the contrary
inference was "equally, or more, persuasive." Where there are such conflicting
inferences one group of them cannot, because labeled as "prima facie proof," be
treated as conclusive on the fact finder so as to deprive him of his responsibility to
choose among disputed inferences.
376 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1964) (footnote omitted).
494. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956.
495. Id at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
496. Id at 1958. The difficulty of labeling such a gerrymander either "political" or
"racial" arises from the fact that consciousness about incumbency and race can overlap and
even meld into each such that they are indistinguishable:
By definition, gerrymandering involves drawing district boundaries ... in order to
maximize the voting strength of those loyal to the dominant political faction and to
minimize the strength of those opposed to it. In seeking the desired result,
legislators necessarily make judgments about the probability that the members of
certain identifiable groups, whether racial, ethnic, economic, or religious, will vote
in the same way....
A prediction based on a racial characteristic is not necessarily more reliable
than a prediction based on some other group characteristic. Nor, since a
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this is a political decision that merely "correlates" with race or a
political decision using a racial "proxy" a slippery slope for the
judiciary in an area where courts admittedly have limited competence
and significant risks are posed to democratic validation principles by
attempting to do so? Moreover, given that claimants in these cases
constitute the political majority, why couldn't this alleged harm be
alleviated through the democratic process?497 The failure to seriously
address these issues of ascertainment and impropriety, beyond a quick
dismissal,4 98 threatens to harm the Court's institutional legitimacy and
the democratic process much more than the purported harms
threatened by these districts.
3. Is Judicial Intrusion Justified by the Substantive Right?
The Court's decreased restraint and increased intrusion may be
justified by the substantive right at issue. At first glance, the racial
legislator's ultimate purpose in making the prediction is political in character, is it
necessarily more invidious or benign than a prediction based on other group
characteristics. In the line-drawing process, racial, religious, ethnic, and economic
gerrymanders are all species of political gerrymanders.
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 87-88 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted)
(citation omitted).
497. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1979 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihose in the district
could elect a representative who is not a part of their racial group, while the population at
large could elect a legislature that refused to rely on racial considerations in the drawing of
districts."). The Court also stated:
To the extent that a political prediction based on race is incorrect, the voters have
an entirely obvious way to ensure that such irrationality is not relied upon in the
future: Vote for a different party. A legislator relying on racial demographics to
ensure his or her election will learn a swift lesson if the presumptions upon which
that reliance was based are incorrect.
l at 1988 n.29.
498. The Court's only response to these democratic process objections was curtly
stated in Bush:
We believe that the dissents both exaggerate the dangers involved, and fail to
recognize the implications of their suggested retreat from Shaw L
As to the dangers of judicial entanglement ... [w]e are aware of the
difficulties faced by the States, and by the district courts, in confronting new
constitutional precedents, and we also know that the nature of the expressive harms
with which we are dealing, and the complexity of the districting process, are such
that bright-line rules are not available. But we believe that today's decisions,
which both illustrate the defects that offend the principles of Shaw I and
reemphasize the importance of the States' discretion in the redistricting process,
will serve to clarify the States' responsibilities. The States have traditionally
guarded their sovereign districting prerogatives jealously, and we are confident that
they can fulfill that requirement, leaving the courts to their customary and
appropriate backstop role.
Id. at 1964 (citation omitted).
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gerrymander cases seem to affect, albeit indirectly, complainants'
voting rights. A closer look reveals otherwise. Unlike Gomillion, the
Shaw claim does not involve harm to complainants' "voting right," nor
an alleged violation of the "one person, one vote" principle as
contained in the vote dilution claim.499 In Gomillion, petitioners
claimed a direct burden on their right to vote, as well as a
discriminatory purpose to deprive them of that right because of their
race:
According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legislature has
not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with incidental
inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more accurate to say that it has
deprived the petitioners of the municipal franchise and consequent
rights and to that end it has incidentally changed the city's boundaries.
While in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the
allegations are established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in
geometry and geography is to despoil [black] citizens, and only [black]
citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.50°
The alleged harm in the most recent redistricting cases is that the
legislation violates the challenger's "constitutional right to participate
in a 'color-blind' electoral process. '01  Thus, increased judicial
intrusion can be justified if color-blindness itself is crucial to the
proper functioning of the political process and a violation of color-
blindness harms the democratic process. This type of claim cannot
succeed, because, as the Court has acknowledged, whatever right one
has to a "color-blind" electoral process, it is neither absolute nor as
weighty as impediments to the right to vote.02 Because the Court has
legitimized the relevance of race to the districting process and the
inevitability of race-consciousness guiding that process, the only
499. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (noting that "appellants did not
claim that the... plan unconstitutionally 'diluted' white voting strength"); see also id. at 652
(describing racial gerrymandering claim as "analytically distinct" from vote dilution claim).
500. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,347 (1960). The Court went on to state:
The essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries is to
remove from the city all save only four or five of its 400 [black] voters while not
removing a single white voter or resident. The result of the Act is to deprive the
[black] petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee,
including, inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections.
d at 341.
501. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641-42.
502. In Shaw, the Court poignantly explained: "Despite their invocation of the ideal
of a 'color-blind' Constitution, appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting
is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-




question is how much a legislature can take race into account before it
becomes too much-posing a harm to the democratic process.
Most recently, the Court has decided that "[t]he constitutional
wrong occurs when race becomes the 'dominant and controlling'
consideration." 503  The Court makes a stronger case that a
predominantly race-conscious redistricting decision harms the
democratic process. Such gerrymandering reinforces racial
essentialism in the electoral process-the perception that members of
a racial group share the same thinking and political interests-which
then exacerbates patterns of racial bloc voting." 4 Moreover, this type
of gerrymandering undermines our system of representative
democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a
particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole.
While appealing on its face, the harm to the democratic process
of "predominant" race-consciousness is highly disputable. The reality
is that political interests and race are virtually inseparable in a political
environment where race more often than not affects election results.
The diffuseness of the harm from "predominant" race-consciousness
also arises from the difficulty of separating political and racial
interests, the intertwining of racial and "traditional districting
criteria"--particularly incumbency and uniting communities of
interest in a single district, and the historical reality of racial bloc
voting:
If, for example, a legislature may draw district lines to preserve the
integrity of a given community, leaving it intact so that all of its
members are served by one representative, this objective is inseparable
from preserving the community's racial identity when the community is
characterized, or even self-defined, by the race of the majority of those
who live there. This is an old truth, having been recognized every time
the political process produced an Irish or Italian or Polish ward.
Hence, in some circumstances, even "predominant" race-
consciousness can actually help the democratic process and the
participation of its diverse members in that process. 7
503. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900,911,913 (1996)).
504. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647-48.
505. See id
506. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,2005 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
507. See generally T. Alexander Aleinkoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and
Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 601
(1993) ( It is only as collective partisans of the same political preference-whether that
preference is defined by party or race or any other measure-that voters can assert their right
to meaningful participation in the political process.").
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More importantly, if predominant race-consciousness threatens to
harm the democratic process so fundamentally that it requires
increased judicial scrutiny, then the Court should explain why
bizarrely shaped "white" districts are not subject to similar scrutiny.
The realities of racial bloc voting and political interests shaped by
ethnicity is cogently illustrated by the existence of equally "bizarre"
and "noncompact" majority-Anglo districts that the Court refuses to
seriously review or even acknowledge. 8 The Court's uncritical
stance toward similarly bizarre "Anglo" districts ignores the
countervailing harm that may result from its selective foray into this
area.5 9 Giving whiteness this type of racial "transparency 510 results
not only in doctrinal incoherence, but a retreat from the Court's own
commitment to keep the democratic process open in order to ensure
access by minority groups so that they may participate in the same
electoral and political pluralism enjoyed by every other bloc of
voters.5 11 If "predominant" colorblindness is crucial to the proper
functioning of the democratic process, a highly disputable claim, then
at least this "right" should consistently be enforceable toward all the
diverse groups in the political process.
508. In Bush, for instance, the Court virtually ignored three other majority-white
districts that were ranked along with the majority-minority districts as among the oddest in
the nation. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1982 (noting that "[flor every geographic atrocity
committed by [a majority-minority district], [a majority-white district] commits its own and
more;" and noting that incumbency played a major role in both); see also id. at 1994-97
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing shapes of invalidated black districts with unscrutinized
white districts in Appendices A-D).
509. As Justice Stevens persuasively noted:
The great irony, of course, is that by requiring the State to place the majority-
minority district in a particular place and with a particular shape, the district may
stand out as a stark, placid island in a sea of oddly shaped majority-white
neighbors.... The Court-imposed barriers limiting the shape of the district will
interfere more directly with the ability of minority voters to participate in the
political process than did the oddly shaped districts that the Court has struck down
in recent cases. Unaffected by the new racial jurisprudence, majority-white
communities will be able to participate in the districting process by requesting that
they be placed into certain districts, divided between districts in an effort to
maximize representation, or grouped with more distant communities that might
nonetheless match their interests better than communities next door. By contrast,
none of this political maneuvering will be permissible for majority-minority
districts, thereby segregating and balkanizing them far more effectively than the
Districts at issue here, in which they were manipulated in the political process as
easily as white voters.
Id at 1990 (citation omitted).
510. See Flagg, White Race Consciousness, supra note 15, at 957 (describing the
"transparency phenomenon [as] the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about
norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific").
511. See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. Cfu. LEGAL F. 83 (1995).
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VI CoNcLusION
As this Article has demonstrated, the intent doctrine in equal
protection is multifaceted. Courts and commentators continue to
restate, and critique, the "rule" of intent as a uniform, homogenous
standard. To the contrary, it is clear from the application of the intent
requirement across various contexts that different levels of
consciousness can violate the Equal Protection Clause. I have
identified three such levels of intent-specific, general, and
unconscious-reflected through the different evidentiary frameworks
created by the Court in searching for intent. Despite its facial
incongruity, the intent doctrine does cohere when viewed through the
lens of democratic process values, which the Court has embraced
throughout its constitutional jurisprudence. A close look at the Court's
reasoning in its intent jurisprudence reflects the influence of reigning
democratic process values. Moreover, these values provide criteria
from which to judge the Court's adherence to various normative
commitments.
This Article is premised upon the notion that a coherent
jurisprudence has value apart from the wisdom of the underlying
normative considerations that drive the Court's intent jurisprudence. I
criticize the Court where it has not adhered to its doctrinal and
normative commitments. However, in criticizing the Court, I also
answer the frequently asked question: "How can the Court do better?"
My answer is fairly straightforward. The Court has embraced certain
normative precepts that have guided, and could better guide, its
application of the various levels of intent and their evidentiary
requirements. By consciously and consistently following these
precepts, the Court would accomplish a very important goal in equal
protection law. It would increase public confidence in the Court's
institutional capacity to mediate the boundaries of racial equality in
our racially charged society. At a time when the Court appears to be
retreating from its previous commitments to substantive racial
equality, a coherent jurisprudence is crucial to its institutional
legitimacy.
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